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CHAPTER I 
I NTRODUCTION 
\'lhatever e l se idea lism may be~ in t"lhatever system it ma" 
manifest itself , it rests on t he conclusion thr: t to be i$ to 
be experienced in some vr y . Thr oughout t he history o-r m6dern 
i dea lism t he re hcve b een two .fundH m~~nt;?(l i nterpre tations of' 
'- ' ' 
experience 1rth:ich have been utilized in defense of 1dea1ism ... -
empl ricism a nd r a tion.et lism. The pur pose of this di~s.ert:J tion 
i s 'to examine and evaluate these two interpret at ion.'"' • 
i 
< . ·The ter m ex )erience has be n the butt of much critt ... · 
cis ro in recent philosophy , particul:.u•ly by t he American rea l.-; 
ists. uinoe everyth ing ; in · order to be kno'.•m , must pas s 
t hrough c onsciousness , t hen t he appeal to experi 8nce renders 
no help t o any particular philosophical problem, so the re-1 . 
a1ists argue . The i de a li&t must .s hot-1 , if he i s to escape 
from . f.tr . Perry's indictment, \-lhat .fa ctors in cons ciousness 
point t oward ideal is,n~. Obviously, from t he mere f ac t that 
e verything knmvh must be re vea l ed to consciousness, it 
does not f JllOvJ' t ho.t f <!iets ca nnot exist independently of 
.1' 
consc.iousness. But a n lde <.11.st of a ny r.::mk is not so .much 
concerned Hith t he f act of our ego~entrio predicament · a s he 
is with attempting to discover ;.lus t what kind of predicament 
it real ly i s : J ust Wh9 t i s experience and hol-t are .fa ~~ts 
relate d in experience as to ar gue t ha t a ll fact s are a 
1. Holt 2 et al., NB. ., 1-19; Perr y, PPT , 134-20C . 
2 
part of t he consciousness of some r.1lnd or minds . The ideal-
ist ha..s every right to explore this predicament if he really 
ex lores it rather than ex loits it as a ready-made argumenti 
~at r.~ . erry f orgets is that most i dealists do not ex_lo1t 
t his so-called predicament , but r a t her arrive at t heir ooncl' ... 
sions from inter r tationa of experienc~, whether rationalis- · 
t ic, e mp irical, whol1stic or ~hat you l ea se, To endow this 
predicament with an untouchable sa .• ctity because a rule in 
some logic text tells us that no argument is valid unless it 
allo a for the ossibility of negative instances, a possibil• 
ity denied in the case of' our "e-gocentric predicament," is 
like telling a boy that the onl y way of testing a e ood apple 
is to eat a bad one . The rule of negotive ins t ances is valid 
only in strictly logical realms, valid, that is, only if one 
is look ing for strict proof, proof which ph ilosophy can never 
give, proof , may it be added, tha t realis· can never ive. 
For the realist as \"Jell as the idealist is unable to tran-
scend c onsci ousness in order to test the validity of h is 
posit i on . 1\. r . Perry•s argument is a tv1o-edged s •ord whi ch 
cuts both ·u:qs. 
t'hotever else ex-;>erience may be , it has a d,ouble ref-
erence to self. and a reference to the not-self . fuether one 
belie ves that the object or r eferent o.f consciousness and . 
c ::; sci ousness s -r·e q ua.l:ttati vel y or quant t tativel y identical, 
either in the ma t t.: rialistic or idealistic aens · , or are d ouble 
as ects of a ne utral entity , or totall y dissimilar entities, 
3 
t i o• blo re · f; r nc i n v t• h·;l a f ct of e nooi a css . 
Th p bl m t'o tho io list , if h st t s h is ca e O • .! p · -
t .!::olog:t a.l grounds, ic to ho ho t he not- s .. e.nd t·.~. · el · , 
t h . f rent nd the er .,er1 n t ., ar so r lat tha··· .,.. · y r 
1th r qtal·tati ly or u ntit tl'V'aly idont i c 1 . ~ h:t di -
rt tion l t 1 t\"10 i .port t int rpr~e tat i on r t 1 
b l t · r 1 oe f eonsciouonc !.: , both O.t. bieh h e v b n 
u lly influentiul in e st bli hin :tde-11 .... on op1 t '"' log1-
nt : . c 1 -11sl!l ,. 
pir1cal 1 lism :1. ~t an att .pt to build n 
c 1 r 
Uy 
1.1 on tb ~pi ic l ar um nt that th :t n~ediatel 1v n 
in c on eiou .. ss is tho baoe t.:l .-o hieh all val i lmo· l cl :re 
.n . t t . R tionuliotie 1 !:1 , on th. other h -nd , r -et 
pon the r ' urn ::'lt t .t th ' 1: ·diet l y g1von i n cons 
pr PO s rati onal ctors . esa j f nit!o s ' 1 bee . 
cl r · a a P ()Gr> It I t :. port nt t hat the d 
k pt in mi~.. b c use the rm~ atlcnal . m nd 
ar u ad b ;.') dly in both ide li tt-e nd oalis tic ci cl · ·• 
11 .· ·• ric• l :!.n 
brond ns· - mu·t not eor>...f'us th t chn1c l p r bl 
t h 1·t...ch e · r .. l:tng. T1st • vom n t e · t -
t ·r:pt t v 11 t i ' l ~· on t h sr~m d t L t it b t n t r · · 
p ts our e p r 0 1 c l 
' 
p ,. rtlc•llnrlJ th neol ct 
Ie s of relig '· ous ~d ,a.o·· l l~i c • ''hil ti. is cthod 
a c·ll e~pi . ical , it i m rea on 
I 1. osop teal v .. ture t ' l ':m :ls o.. · a !'l::lito t he e. >y of x r .i no t 
althou h it in_plies uc 1 a th •ory.. 7! tmport "'lC · ot th 
.1 te 
by an ~~cl1 ive int l"'·.st i n ·h · mathe ma:li lce.l n<l phys i c l 
sc len ~ s. in o th 1 '' 1· c;ht . ~'i.1.:i.le t_l tli r~t r.. f '}h-t loao hy 
is n ~ thout it · mo.- , eoeial nd e 1'1:1 u · th ort · s, th s 
a · ;. o '6· p~ enda es t ha.-:1 t h y ar con iderat l · . • 
tP b ·ted or . :lcnlly to a. r.:;.c n r l m, t n_,· ies . 
~- c con-
not bl 
oxc * t ion t o this of' cours e re t ::1e o cnoolmen , a tic l rly 
qu 1.n . • · ut t : is : cen t .::.ov ant in i J alism. h s by o 
r: o n s tt in d a full s 1 - eonscio 1Sl1eas . gl nee t th 
s oci 1 th "Jr of 0!';1 _f t he 1" "'' re nt tivo· of' th1 g~ 
""'tests t o th t . .~uch ·o ·k nt:J e on in rel tin 
s oc1 l t c s ..... nd th ric s . \0 .1.. 1 t 1 c 
bo 1. rn d f o:m th . p1o 1·er:tn !'or or J hn :ne ~ y and 
G o c l ad , both of hom aro outs ol! nly a--~ti -idea.l sts . 
ro bly no i deo.lio:~t dlr ctly or 1.n-:lir ctl y t 1. '!1ul t 
u 
t ·1 ..• .,. c nt r :td i"' i,.. e li m mot> t han Ka :-1 ·, ~1 o .:. 1 -
ist li For ~ . t o · .1t re t not onl y in ci ntlfic bu 
al, r l1 7~io,s , esth t1o . .x.p·riene cov 
h t r t· onal ri c pl c ... uch xp ri noa p. e. ' P~ osed • 
'J s , n of tha fi st of mo ern philo·s ( ph r· to tl t hea· 
ious r a .... :i.r t SAt ldnd of 0 ga:n c y t m. B t n t 
int in t hese div:~r if1od t ypo 0 xp · l"ionc 
in hich c nt ide lisu no t . lils pro lam D !~ p bl 
of e: l o h t e t nt r the vario~u real s v 1 d , 
a ~ at p rL1.ci ,l establish th il" v 11 t ty. So! ;. t i !'i 
y 
5 
o 1 g ~s obvious!- val d , but !"ecaus un v r '· 1 
nocacsa.Ly concepts of th m1 d s'ablish it>;) val1 '1 ty . in 
~r n r 1 ""c1en a possessos validit , it mu t r ·t o:1 t:-lv·r-
a l :>::'1. ciplee , in K n ' e ens ·,. the ca·'ogor:!.c 1 · rnp o r~t v 
and it coroll r~ s. 
Th con t mpor ey u1ov -.ent on th oth r l 
n ti hole o:f expericnc 1 ot so 1 .1cb foi• t 




q · t hich impell"~d .. ant to axplo ~."'C h U .ff1c !"ent ~ s of 
co .sc ousne sa , :.H.lt 1n bo ·11.nc; h0\7 the ., hol · of e _.; rienee 
r n ors 1 ·alis m plaus:tbl intorp·:.-etation. 2 
.~. probler:1 o thio di oart t1on is li.IY:.i tad t o t .e :r.'1 to.• 
p ysical 1mplict.tiona of t·•o e on tra.s.t!ng · pisue.rllolo--;:c 1-· n-. 
· r ratat:tona of e r l ati nship bot~een tho m· . d !. s 
C\b f ct or re eren t .. . at i .n:tf'ic c , f ot· r ol"'d s , hn 
th. (ic u;l . :r;-efererc of c nsciousnass fo1~ h ea.l1si? ' 1 ·1 
t h term xperi n ee J.ncludes vhe ho le of oon .... c n s, it 
u. ill bo limi ted to th · mo"' t i .. ::,o!•tant .np ot o:r 001 ... 
t'lC. 0 lS . S * 
cur-1ou tu:.. .. mo ln the _,istory of mo1j rn 1Je , .. l1 n1 
h !'l t o t h inkei•s re ach d l _dee.lis:r tr .m cc) t l'.ldt 
.xp.ri .I.C • I it- Be kel y o ·1 - ve t' a al tr-
·- th _ K nt , t e T.'.: t · on is ic str•a.i .. . n :~.. le·lg· , 
c n~e· d :t ar·· ee Ol l fro~ 'ho t i~ g i ven t c on• 
so o~ ~. n s from a"'l xt r ·1nl ourc • ·'th ..... t i.s g i-v t 
2 . c ._ .ertocc1 1 r:A ; r1B an , ru .. , p • 
ot: 
c~n~ iou ... nuss r nly i d , l {' Si e lt contr d cto!"y 
to t h 1 , or i 'eas oi nt in L ort 0 J cts , r 
-r-t r all i .:ens ~ M e logic h r · is que a un /1 e nd .J. 
Bark l· •s .. ~. :l···:t.cal sumpt i on .h t valid kno led 0 r st 
· ordy on t~l ·' d1 t .. l y gi v to c · ~sc1o 1 . oss h'i.c 1-./,.. . .. 
e e »ens im 1~oso ions; rhich h daf'in d • and 
t h mir . itself. hat., t hon, is valid c n . . nly b t 1•. d-
i t.ly sens.ed or OOl"!' c ln arenees fror, tllaso . • pac • m t1on , 
~ . tt r o. .::!. t . on Qd but thou~ht ~ d, thou _ts, c~n only 
1st in t e ml If" th o e ories not 1 '1 t ly 
() th y oo l d still possess li ty, on erkel yt vi 
· 1ey could oe ·ll'lf'er red rom o-r s ns 1ur.:u'* s.si t e 
er is no. r.. tt r, t pposad ubat t~m of l l s 
q l t 
• 
. r al ·Y J is unint ll· ·1o1e 0 00Ul1. 
* 
If it i s no· another ns quQlity t ·e 1 wh t i t ? 0 co ld 
so ath~n 8 rve th f' notion >f r d tn~ ' 
port f Oil se· q al1t1: s? on tl oth r h anri 1 if it i s a oth 
h l not or of so que.l1ti I when t also • by 
be i . a 8 n"'e qu lity, 0 l d nee suJ,Jport? t .. ,e :Ok l y ., 
·'' 
ya b ut tter 1 sin 11 r to his in t i n• 




. ot_ n and th lik • tial 1 
-
t n · 1 no· lrnnl oi tely sen ed , but rather is it n info n e 
:f:rom J 
.t 
if recra 6 s o. · tl i n .J.In·' e n d · .. 1tJ: · a 1, 
v 11d in · r nc • Th only ti .. d th t 1 




- t'r1but to things . Berkeley c nclf.ldo __ that th · only va.11 
1n.t'oren e from h t · e ilmr 1 · t l y know s no t n n· o n t 
.a 'eri 1 order but a Supro · . ind i n hich 11 s ns · quo..li ti · s 
h ave t oir existence . 
. orke loy t th n 1 1 ... a. pir1e 1 1d l~st .ot c un h 
r ef'u sa . t consid r anyt i n.g other t 1'1 n en in his o t uo-
t on o 1de~l! sm. for ha c t nly di d , ut ec B 
nee rom t h 1mrred1~t l y ""ivan s n 
a .. co l d 
3 ' fa tors - , 
l d i n f' 
· n coo 1d rin~ t h ese two :!. t ~pretations of :xn r1 .. nee 
ond ho t hey have be n t t111zed n c nstruet ng , ... aal s o.L , 
rnust b on h ·ard against ce r t i n d·ang r s . 1ret h · j u t .. ot 
be deoe.iv d by l bel • T a te rm mpir1eal has ec 1 d 
of c tch or by hich a t e st a hD.o :>, h ' c 1 t' or,. ... . 1· ~, ~t 
nde rats.nd.ing . h,~ t t • r by .. p i i e 1 
c:me mean;;s lnv st1go.t ing t he f c ts of exp r1 noe o b n1z-
1ne the: nto some kind r intell1 :.-1bl e yst , , than l l 
pliloaophy must b p1r c 1 i n this sensa ·•· r s , 
unla · they re devot d s poel 11s_ts , tall at 1 a t to t-
... 
te ; . t t hi • v t neo- al ist who r vere ntly r _rds neal-
y 1 a the 1 st oro i n ph losophieal In! ho 
·nt hi-s n ly 1 
to oxr lain som.e t r> 1n , ore th the f · nal t erm f th 
In ao t hc believss t ho:t h i .s ne utral n t ::.. t!es, 
.c 
case the r--na.l p- odu t o . an l y a , plain quit 
lys s _. 
in h i 
n 1! bel' or 
3 . . or docume t t ion of' th bov surnm ry o . rkelayl 
position, cf . C! P• II , 29. 
a 
v xil1g p obl ms: t duali t of tno lght ld thi " r!: . i. t .. 
.._t· on of m nd a d body, e objoctivlt; of v lu .. 
• 
tl di!'f r .. 1C b t.e .. tion 11 m .n _, ·;1 r• 'f c1ari7 , :r• 
p r t oulo.rly. tic 1i lis .l a. a ~ " ~ n.l1 
' 
., tot tru t on~ f·c n.d th otl !.• v rloo • tba f ct 0 .. _ 
cons.- ou !"J.G s . B tl race the f ts , b t th di c 1 
o o ot.~ int t ccul b sho n t~at ·n o- ll d 
r nt iv n ! n o n ciouen ss pr s rpos rat ion l fact 
· 1 ' . is foll-· -ers o. mot' 1rical t ~an ot>k l y n hi · 
.... Ol'l l · th re ' 13 d for th pu 0 of cla 1 1-,.,. • 
c tion lU must not be r ear ~()cl s xh u tive . B rL 1 
.. j a 
l.ll be lscov r d , artie l rl h hi thea ot on 
a d his l .t r p atonic tteranc ,, include ~nt-on. "11 .t _ ele• 
ts . cert l nly 
"'·s (H~plric . l in a.cc.:;pt1 th " onsuous 
·i · o l dn .. th i 1 te "'J . v n • Th m 0 .. nt 
-n t oa t - tian l de lists -a.u~:~t not b -; t h ·!; 1. 
'1 of r t.i.on·11 . ich t s tt ,p t . comb t . 
r ·tio lism tor the d g t. cl- C0:.ll · 
n ver be th. same s t . t hi. ch e i~ted b()f'o:ra ti 
• ant • 
t o ITO llu tration, gatr cr d 1 0 
or th co . mporal'""'s so ~ool of thou'!' t , n·nd ro' eht i.t 0 
in r r ahinr lO r • .. nt's a to d .cov r 




·.- lY ic 1 , and ~oral a on •. lid 
sis n ry t vely to 0 t ' l,i r ' on not roun (} L n 
a:xpol:>i ne·, i ... e- ' n t r lo.ted t tha s n s , eo . ::; t ra • 
n t h c s 0 t .ics ho h to ·trt h t ... po _tion :L .. 
9 rt .ng c rto.in .o tul t <) of faith ., 4 
t. 'h1le v· i}U ·iL J.oa h T.' ... ha/ utt ffi t d t ccom lisl 
t hi • ana .r ued thSJ.t t c ·n m.11- ex . I ' i nc id t>.. • B r.~te -
1 t lizing on *i •. , 1-t t ide lism ~ f Loo 1 c nt .. nd d 
!Lt th l of p. :1. n oomp ls u to rop 
Ct; f r oa C ~ better C iWey l .. pr i ons to 1 iat. 1 
t i tely by mans o· nun :1. ldly m tt r . 5 
' . 1 .. :m:tz 1 on th , oth .r h n J ar· ... u th t experie. o - bi ~ · s 
y nt ion 1 principle ; t ·t i ·t; c ould b~ d cuce p ss ssed 
n o 1a s t i ve l . o ledz i';J • is th ... 
11 s ion of' 
s. ere .tiv po r hich e.n blos i t and of 1t o 
r o rcos to d:t. co for ts lf ·1ot . 1 t h ': ;u ... 
al constitution of th mat rial rld, but th 
~ d r real of poss blo entitle • 
The t lis not the oontingant but t he. logically nooo .s ey. 
uu f a fal ous atto.ck on the prinoipl of "sur icia t r a-
s nn n ds l i.tt le r epetition. l.l judgments a. 0 t p e no ·119. ; 
he co t nd d, a~o synth tic, not . a.lytioal .- .xpari ne th 
' 
• • ant , rrv, '79"'1 • 8 1 . Cf' . 1 o 
..i • : rkel y , · ) !J: (Pra . ~ o . }, I , 1'7• 11 , 
6 • Sm.1. t t CK , X . I •· 
• 
10 
i ~ cannot be d1..1c d. It can only be L.due d .d in ue tto 
ea~ yi l 
o.t 
no b · c 
c!h iz 
at s t pro 111 ty • 7' 1 
ne b. rs a that ant ' r t i n 
nf d 
n t nis r t . n l1am. It "t'. th 
g in 
of 
y t nt e l:l.za th.11 t pe 1- nc ,f.ll::lt have so.·· log -
0 1 sl , otl e "11 e 11 sci nces f l rot· , 
1 :1. 
iz J. that th t r r.~ibniz mu t h ve 1t~ .. 1 ee , ( nt 
ru t his o 1 t of ·r -ed 
h t a.ll j d , enttl about SX9 :rienc r t1 • r e .. r -
· c t o the jud ~..m nt cannot be deduo th ot ; 
nt ar ued tho.t c r ta.1.n jude•· • nt t r+atn-
in p t1cu l arly to t o the' at c 1 11 pl ysi e.l 
univ :r·sal and necesse. • This, an.; as o th . 
ibniz ;. Bu nlike L ibniz, he n · in t r .. e1.r 
un- vo fl · ity and nece s5 ty , n th f c·.s or h .1 rt 
se ve b t in univor . rincip~e or 
lo call p _ior to axp rienee n tho t n:teh "-h 
. t . r ould be o.n1 1 s .a • 
y ro.t on listie icle 11sm1 t on, 1 .nt h t ype o 
Li e 1 . om ic b il n t he anti nt rpr t tion 
·osol uto te . of i de 11 . • for -X ,; p , of 
t 1. no t - " t!an ere rat o ·,listie to th. c .. , . 
7 . TII T1 ·vol . 1, '73 - 4c : 118·175• · cur.~ nta..;i n , ci • .P•· III , 120 . 
11 
. lile ant prot st d of 
r t _on l1nm,. K t ·t 1nt rp.ret t ion us ne voi•tho l r t on• 
l:l t c . ' no s yn tl et c a prior·i jud mo 1ts pos ib1 
.. n t l+s . P ':)OS Sible he . c nt t·~ · n a 1 .. !n n s e rinu 
b "' ic p:..•ob a. K + transc nded r c r~ .11 t con..., , v 
.flict i ()' e~ 1rieism a nd 1" .t i -, ~iS"l 0 of hi da .. t I is tr -
e ~· ant .. _ in oin: bo~r;:> 1d t e em ir.icis·· of i'S mp e i 
b it ls e· i icis.n 1 n i tin n:no le :1ge to the 1 . ld or x• 
n·rie lC ,n 9 
~ at is th 1 ort ce o tr ein t t 1~ "' listie . n• 
te r•. 1, tations ·)f .Joo i .. nee? l 'l'ho c ucial 
t :1v r t ':1e c .-: t gori· s of e per e 1c , 
ver they .~y b or .. e :- inter r · t d , d, n rJI: On co.. cious ... 
n -:- for th 1.~. :.e .~ing ar . xL tence or h t.1.or s 
_, · ~· "'n -s upon t ho · om~ ~r . ··:hat is the episte .ologic t-tus 
of t h ... o · rent or ob ct of con ci ous n ss an 1 t e its 
met phys ·cal i :.1 li.cat..: n ? 
h t hB. r · nne . , t lm.,.. ..• fo ... .:: 0 , "1 r ·y , c •salit"'7 -ntt. 1 ""'"·-~ .... " . ~ ..... . .. ,; J l'O U J , - • • I~"' 
c 1 e .. t~t1 s ae inJ n 1 1 tly t enl tities , th r all t con• 
s·i:fru a t he <•linlj and th un verse 1. tht)se l1d r . 
!' 1• · xar tple ,. bo-g ... n 1L .; i th h t a~,.p ars L inno J .ut t h - ·y of 
ep l ·t r.nolo. • not only llerlv from. 1 ob ective 





~"o un or~Jta d his s t m one 1 ~ st .:.r?lsp o nt n 
p t molo. • Once cceptin tb .. , it little nge . uity, 
b t ny t hing can b a ,.,pen and in .. r 11 lcxa •. dE;rt v cy·• 
!'!ht- th r ona 1 a h n ~ -
e!-· n n · o-r lL .. t the r o · r t l:e co rovers ., t -.t · r1t _ .,. 
p . t ~on of c nscio· s ess , 
' t or thl ne r 
t o o.) • ct nor th n:.. e 1 be p 1 · tn d in -or 
h oth ... r . 
t h pl ~mot. n list bot 
voe ' !T'.tn •d · tely C"iV(ln nd n furth r ·xpla.n () .. 1 )1 : .11 
Rt t can he 1"'). n be co.~tent in accent ng a r. • act · s r.:· rely 
g v 1 t hout s.ttcn1'pt· n 7 to l oce it into 
r ,at:ton. o p 2.-:. o ophez> can r e a t n 
./ 
h s. • cr .~ p 
1 
1 • lo.:: and r , fTD , I , 189 . 
1 • Cf , S t c , L'l , v • 3 , 133- 194 ; Hicks, C 1 l•S5, ~29·251 . 
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ju<:"t ·but a co .,le-· a the fact . To st ta S ~I:oly tha.t bot h 
co . ao:l. m ... ss and sans - · ... ta are · ... t!le di · ,_ ~ ly e ven t o ;;1t t . 
an . p i temolo -;o1c · ~~ "ob a!n, not tQ s lve on • ot t -... o o l -
is . n· t h 1. o ·list ur i ll1n,_, to ace p · 
"" 
:tv !1 d ta o c 
sci -~lsn s bu t nt enpt at t__e .;1 ' m ·irt · t o i nolu - t em in 
s o:·~ e 1-: ' 1d (Jf ::ntell i ,· b l q · ntl t ti ve o~ qunli t · t 1 ve mon m • . 
"'J i lo the c ntrovt: r s y , t hen , be t'f "Gn rf? l:t:Jm nne i ·. 1-
·.s _ i nv lv ~ -,, t 1 st " n p rt , t he L torp t~ t •.on ox eon -
so (,u n.os , it is in ort n t ·to ·no , J st tho.t nt 
lons hav b en l.V n by r .. r1king :l,J alis ts . ; o 
c ti ue of' i dealc.s ,. is ·c •tpl te~ s .... t:isfa.cto~ b 
J.nto!"p-.·e tat · ens ~:r exr•e "ionc 
d. i ... 
t nda ... c r 0 rlties f enlia!!l in t o ntt .. c' a pa t'tculer 
t~ pa of ideali~Ll nd h 1 avo t .. ey h vo efutc J.n 
gan ral ,. fo:r.ig :>:ttin .. ' t t L .oali s m rn.ay res t on di .. t _f 
not oppos •/J. lnte_p_etat iona of' consoi o 1sneso -. a. . . ooro • 
1.n ht s br 111a.nt e.::.na , 12 · r · x 1:. 1 • oel ve s ;j( t<t _ enl · m 
!a a f· .1 ·o d he :.1. l: is r.~ t o '·i nc onl ., 
."o 1 i , ... . a ... y · r th · n l!;tme ts f t he r nl:l t:ts havo th 
!'1 J'"J:l -- kn !3 • r U""&in, ·n an ca.s s _, onl y ~ ' I> y f1cl 1;: 
cte of t h sys te m a,. a tt 'clef# l 11 en a: s 11. te i u l . ~'l -· o. Up 
r r ~-n estieati n, hi l t -6 r•eal base of abs l utls · systems_, 
- ----
1 ":? . .''co :·o , ' i 6.fllte. t on f I deal s n" in r~ • r1no ~ . ., .t.n h1a 
repl y to D a se d, '1 ts t '1 t is . er· t t ion c... !d al-
iSl _,_ s • 1" .Jno- i hol · ing t ha t in no case is td~ ss~ 
o£ r1yth i ng . ero1.!1 . c:oo . ilp (ed . ) · ;~.~ 653., lis-
ilol p roblem wl'I h o trv .ted 1n Chap. ·r . 
14 
t ~elr r tione.lism, escn:- os u.m t:tced • n ex 1. in· tio-::1 :r t e 
the r as ::m. than to undet•s·an. b t ter t .))· co. tr v t·· . n 
re li-m f1n•.:~ l A alis., • 
: .. ut aecon 'ly, .it ; ill be usoful , it 1 ho!" d , ka 
t und.- ·t ~din~ ho e uroo of t~ a i ~et}nt tJp ~ of i· al-
1 ... r. • ! 11 TiUOh UO.S bl9 n \,.,._1 , t ::..,. ab Ut idenl S ; 1 
i n th d:t.f rt . t t < pes unde-1' t e hend.s of." .. lu lism, an-
psychism, vit li s ·, 
t' e l , muc t _o root 
of ti ten · . on pr vn. 1 n~ anong the -- ~r:r nt t '<t". a ~ lt 1s 
one or t he P' rpos s f t is ~ pE! :t• to s h · ·ns _on ' 
bet can bsolut i de d the di f'fer nt ty~ 
"' 
. l t ral-
1 t botto~ t he cont:r.o .st~n tat .. ons 0 0 
-
sc u hieh ro ut t o be ex in II mo ace 0 
!'11 1 ~:yth!n<1 ~ ... ·~ : e a tel ·"1ven ; to -coop t t hEJll .ith 110 
xpla .· on tt n t at t h y a ... ~ucb. eivon ·"" tors ts 
t o cc p t~ discr t • ould t. h 
b -:1y hing at · er th n a 1:ura.l1st? Ace . t: nc 
noc tegori 
t h ollow !'$ or an t nything ot i e r th mo 1st1o 'C lists ? 
.- t · all 1 th univ r and n eaos r~ c atego 1 s al."~-O not 
ply 
as a oonao.ious be in , nEHlOS ry to th t otal ch o t llngs? 
/ 
13. ct . s • oa l , IE . 
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Once e have consciousn ss in gen·r lor ev a un'" v _sal 
s ys -a. f · p iori conc epts , do ·;_ n· or~? one mia. u a -
1 ,. gu exceptions to this r •lle .. Jame s ·· a.rd-.; and eo n P .. 
__ .o · a , l5 both .ot b.la pluJ? list ;. h d a p l C<;'l .fot> r- t on 1· 
.. s L th ir s,ys .oms , p I•t1eul rly ith th~ir Utiil1za .1 o 
"ant . 13lt on must l'eme: .~b r t h n.t t ~ ir plu:r 11.., .,., ... 1 i atod 
i:ro tnelr empiric1s , not f'ro_ t hei ratio.nalis.2 • 
li'1na lly _·i:i is hope d t h t t e issa r t a t 1.on ill e UD f ul 
in ng to h t extent the ioeal1 of t he t :t.nkers 
in d to on t . eir pn.rtio l r int rp tat::tona of ·xperience . ., 
B ce. o keleyts i · ali i n t h in re .... t d up 11 hat any 
re a1 .. a an outntod d sans tional!sm, i.s t his to say tb· · hi · 
ide 11 _ . i o .fruitle s ? ui.te. on t he c ont:ra:ry ; f'or s me of 
his ~inost sr ,u.ments for i d alism o . 1nd pe ndent of 11s 
e pio-tem.ol ogy, an . . en~'!' i nportan t , h i a ·a piste ~'I.Ology s not 
)tltl'!..lQd d ae one oul be 1 d to boll vo .. ga1n nnt sug-
go o:~ta d any approaches t ide.a l ism i rres pective of his parti-
c lle.r intorpratatJ.on of nee . His f · ous . stulutes of 
thies ere tho beginning of a ne r to~ ide l is, a~ ~ell as 
s (J.1S t·w ... ry of kno 1· a . 1 1s :reoog11.ition o:f t h e oral, r -
lie : u s and ae t he tic lif"e as f ctors t o b rec on - • 1 '-h in 
one's tf1oory of .xperi nee h s inspired directl z> in ire tly 
-hat a rocen t thinker has call ed the "e 1pirical , gume . t 1' r 
Go · , 1 p rtic l rl th . v lue a. ·gwr nt . And i . . or 1 
1 • e . • ITa~6 • iA - ol . II . 
15 . .. osp .. Bo na, 1F "' , ':E:t:' . 
1 • c: t;.lr; eel • r. G, Cw P • I ,. 
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cool f d isu ~ s .i n• · 1 -
·and , iclcrt , iltbey. ··q.s not 1thout ti n :J 
m 1 • c ~ pe of t h s · o!"!. i 11 b i'rni t d t o t 
. er ~h '· s ·t. 0 
o n 1 ct •. n~ nt r 
.o recen t 1d lis I' IJ 1 
n a:ne ·:-ar'l, i rl s p to of t ,l{. raet t hav e A to 
me t h · ftr~ t 'J:! r;-li t hi .. t l . t ....s 
-
c . t on SC :l ol of y el o () 
.i • t 
. 
t' t den t 
' 
:r--a.liz d t h· t $ n oynthe t1.c unit ce···t · on" 
n Lport.ant f1 .~ ... fl t ... EH'"H"' :'l.n!: 1 ... lur l . · t c c o:l• 
rop e nts 
t ..te E r <=~ e . an a r - 11 t n 1d 1~ 
7t is t o t.e rec;r tt t h t anJ f ,e lists a 
· d l i '!:1 .av . UJ a re it "C 
· :t =:-elev t t our pr-o ject , t _ora , !1 :111 :selevn' t , 
I' ort t to . ur m i n ')roblem, s t 11 oth ·rs .hose 
l e. in tself . _roov all , o 1ever, is 
iss rt~ tio .. is u~ n , 0 a p· r - h 
noi t he r time nor e. ar .y i ave. loble t ,., nc una 
e 1· n··- s . This is t Le t"ta!n "' !'30 ror omitt n ..;, 
n t er 1 ns on co l d 





h ols of 
y are 
c1 ot hinc 
quon s 
":' t t hat 
d 
t ... e '"":P' t 
as 
~n lb na , ~r , 5 2 - . 67 . ' • TV · Y!d • 
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t .e ru ee of idan.llsm o ·1gln ;i , it ,_tut . . •·h~ 1 or.:·o ;ight 
e.r , e that he valo:. d - .~.. th .. cy of con cio"' s . o 
a no t ·r · to i dealism by 1nte 1e ce l , 
s 1 oh pp ra i sal is ino r... ot if ~ do n t t 1.... G 
r~tl -nal to the ord ·2 ole . be. 1' s:yn the i · s n. t 
t ' · e of the B rltel nd :lti strains of id al s ~ 
that?; it i synt s s o · the · tlan o togo 1e d b ck 
of th tole h nt ·rla.nd f od f _ed " _ tian 
ar,.,unent • H al ' pr blem was to sho ho ~ antts catee;oriaa 
evolv lnt ro '3r sively o · de.qu ta or co:Jipra a .. s iv syn- · 
t ~e 
' 
and ho no c _ te 5ory st od on its 0 n rit~ht sav th 
c · tegory of th hol • To arg th t - gel' s ztati nal:ts1 ae 
0 f o herenc , rnther th btu:•ren ahuffl of riori 
oate ri 1 qu ta j tifi d . . ut whi l e~ol st uggled .for 
t c-one t · , the o n~r . t w s a nre e mp1.,e a nsi v _ uni• 
not 1sol te r c t • e g l !' eVr l .t't t t ho 1 ~h he 
0 t i!lly transeende hill 1 d no st.I'"on · r rgu te f ·OI' th 
a r lo .1 c4 · st than t·1.o 1 old d in tb Phenom.e lor~ 3 ~ . 
ut nn iir the a ti n ar ~u ,ants , th y w re c velo ed fro 
h ,. p ul1 :r thod . q · stion~d t h a. : r~ -r.i ; 1e 
er l tr .. cd to s ho ho • nt ' s oategor ie · r e n oh os r t h r 
t h·n l o r;1 o. l do".relo :n nt . l9 le!'t 
l c · t 1 t • •in t _ .. e sc.rap eap. . . e ve ry att "'l: t to s SO~PP 
e J..d o .piric l -r ct , .e · 1 ar .,a .s, is to unlver li"" 1t. 
18 . e Jal , :r: .. · (tr. B l )~I, 73- 123; Of . 
91 , 76- · .... . 
llac ) 
• 
1 9 . He gel , ~OG , ( tr .- ' l lace) 1 82•10~. 
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If.' :ro:- • '1t !' ept 1 t.i."l~f 0. c c J. t . 1 · ·v· . ._ ·o~ ~!a (j0 1 !"· 
" 
.. L •• · · ·'-' II 
.-
it J . .., ~ ~tt l y rr.e ''l i ~r.:;l s , totallv "71.1:" · scri bl • e" 
~ tt 1 ~-o · 1 s .·f: se:.! : s or t h 
act• ally c .ce~ts. t::. i ~.:;.rt1.c ·J. l· r bel n ~o t_ 
n · t to .. . l t u t' . . J! -'· f 
h...-.r f" ct:::: n ·. i s"" t f orl 
ts , 1 t n v 1 .. occu ' . n the c . so of' 
+~ · " •'J 21 
"'·· ... . a .• n _, l 
in .. ~ · l. f'ac ?22 "t bG 1 f c· , 
') i ' y 
t o 
l nl: t:a.. c nc p • .·he po t s · .1:: I o e:el Clr'_i ~ - - ~ t · r .. n ::.ant 
h ·ra .1s ce · ad .m t ~ h· n er til~a. seen od r. '·i _ alis h 
T ~ l. ~. ·- , o = .., 1ot me an t ht'. t e v 4 .• 
in onr cl.:s cJss ·.o of 
r. tion li s· ~.. . It .oa.1s tlu~t e - ta 
~iv 'lS .no . -
:t.~1 1..., , l r.n. f.~ .,_ e t · ... uth. .·r:: • ) . o 1 t o the (!~.van in an a :::p · . <> 
t l: 
•· t t. t ' s ' ·1 or•..,. 
t o ) cify t he is e. :i." · y 1;o t:m1'~T0 1Sal :. · :!.; : _ t 
24 
·e t 1~a.1 - ce d . r an t in 
--
t : .}1: ( t.~. . 90-10 • ... • .. . :::n. V 1r· (t • ' 2 -. 22 . ..,,., ( t .~: • 3. -oa . ' f ' -' \..l , 
~) 
... ~ . ~~OG { tr. ·. 'a l l c ) , -±1-M2 . 
114 . nm ( tr. ~aillie ), r·,-. 90-103. 
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a port rr . t flo of co s c o~sr ss a~d x ~. 1dn~ pur~ 
-
.::... .~- y o r han · . t h 
oon e_ • :nut ugain1 oljr- concepto m.ovo nto th"· _r anti r a s . 
Your e~mca t o:f ca ·sa ~31: p.. :tnto your c nc p 
oc r.c p t of p 1•son int; s oc iety and it 5.n t , . n point..., -o th 
•">5 1'-hoh1 r r i · s m an:l.ng . 
and t whom dJ. sertnt:J .. o·1. such as this d.t 1 i :~::~ n t al 11:..1• 
i ·t tio~ s m• t . e c:or1.1. i ned • 'I'll 3 .. La us t · b said o 
JO.":fo:> t.~: e r at:i. ~ . . alis :tnr1a r~ ... t in ~nt .,. hila ·;an .. o. o a . 
eulled th~l fat · er o1• othor P- :. lot-o i 1e l s c l ols , particLtlarl 
po e i ti vis_. ~ absolute 1 ealJ. s a3 aJ.: i nevi ta· 1 . r s u.l t 
.,. an1~ t a , d ali tic SUf:b s tion • It t~ets d . · nd upon p ts 
t:o thei r· v r, · 1eaning, 1!' tb una l'!:.. t ~ ndiru:~ , 1 · : i 
a .. . e natur , nd _ f th~ u..l'l. ·erst d.:.nc is not 
pa ~tie lar pet~~lo 1, t . oH i t io but a s Lc<' t ""t p ·- tu nive-r ... 
s a l !lllda r s .;a "' ag , con .. 01. 0 ;.s or 71s ; ·· •. l c- l.' ·uh .., IJ..I"C 
ot- · a .. ti i r.i a i o 
:. th th oxee , 't ::.r ~ o.t' :' cL op nhauc r nl'· de t at e ~- y o ::; n • 
----
20 
a m.1l;rses ~f expo ri ·1 .. ce is :1o t to se.;,. t at it con ' ::-··  .11 
e pistemological argurnants · or 1 · ells • . et 
in 1 thin r ' a v be 11 i t;nor d . H nee the oT;'li.~ ion of 
Lc1 bn z nd Lotz ,. 
ho h storic 1 school e p rescnt& 
t h e ir~o 1 mo t hod .or{ l e y . 1 th :'L ... alb :n , t, 
ilthe J , ith 3 ork ley , ·· hav an r.rphas ·.s upon _,· ... . dia.to 
e p rienoe~ ... tho historical over a ga.in t the oonoeptu:n.1 . 26 TJn• 
lik~ ~erk l ey , these t inkers did not 11· .1it t h . . s lr s t per-
cept ual ex. erianoe in s up <n:at of" t h .1r i oal s .. J. P 
t he more nvelo ctad 1•ealma of.' h i(: t rica t moral , vel at1 n l nd 
r elig iou .. experience e :lnelu ·. d .. u ' in a1.1 D. . ' nt ins 
t 1 t · th is :not o m 1ch a co r re s po. dor c o :fn ts 
as it is the sati sfaction of the t t 1 ultu al em d s of 
t he s ub,ie "t . In rneri ca., G·• P. , d-ms. in ext din': ~.n· ol- · 
han ' s prir c ipl , oes so f'ar as to rgue t·l· t d ocr . -.oy n eds 
o t e rit rlo 1 i de l:ts"' as .houeh de rrooracry h s u 
ph:".losop ~ c 1 trt.'lth. 27 R.o · loy , t h En·..,lisl t inLe , d volops 
a. i ' aalistic 1-r. to.. hys·· c t•rm tha bjecti ·~ · valu cl i ms .ro-
ma o t i n ou everyday 
-
or ta h i i c list •• by ~en · r 1 coho rent proac l , b l ._din 
p ticula_l,.r t he ten ·cx.o·· s of B rhlle;;~ and · gc1, ""9 h J .... 
·----
s .• c:. a~ d -.,.. .... .. .L ... . . 
PO · • 
21 
,., r 
to a-~€tpt . ~- L· · :i.s:~ t o id._, l~em. ·:J 
::1~ .. :ee'!o. t m . irical n ver::m.t i:..l i · aa.li>:L: t·u .. '!" JO 
o .••.• tted or s .. oi 
d bv . or' 1 
so~. ~r· o~ this Ol ol h v th r n to 
t .. t .. ~mica ,cr•ob. e. of t~ e p ~t mological 1, :;'o - ph ::deal 
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d 1 scov _ t · e real ~oyc 
c nt!.n lly bamb-rd d thst :ttec·e t :lv mind .':56 
lio!'d n ~ • Bot· n oul have been an excellent ell. · ce _n 
i l1 st a t i n g t h e Beztk·el ian an K nt! st r u ·ns 
sr !t nov for the f ct tha t 1 1 
v rs ty .• 
T ·le r noons f'or t e c loia of \'/• l"d have b e n otat. · • 
H. Gr en did ot sufficient l y tran cena Kant t o a'1.t ut -
t n t; ion .- Fi i .., ref' t at on of Hum · a b s on Kant • s tr seen-
dent.:: l unity of · :>narce p t · on . nd his .:.bool t · daalis 1 is ut 
...,. . ~~a op· .. ont of th1cs prinoiplo .f nege.r·· l.nfi t h i'orr: er, hi$ 
!' :rut· t i.on of Jt'- a ' he art;uad t h' t :at tea ot• con.sciousness 
p-.. e a.- .no·e a unitary co .. Gciousne ss of sta.t . a . ~7 :..' garclin 
h1 · bsol1ta ide-al i s , · r oan s and t binga a. r-e but e ,n a ions 
o · i.ihis a.11- pervadin0 con c· ot s __ esa .. 38 
I t is d · :t.i'ioult to discover he1.,a Bosan.qu t stand opis-
'-A 
te ~ry loe lcnl" y d r .... taphy" ieally .. li:hil he i .s clns• ifJ..ed as 
enlist , one e uld ens l ly queotion s uch a a ti n . 
-. t est 'e e o l b~ e 11 d n th oal a nd s ocial .:.t. (.ie l i s t in 
h:a s• .or inat1on of indi,.i ual ir defertrce to so"'i.:: l ·J"ole !::. • 3 ' 
n conclu ion, t hen, this is ert· vion is con.. _th 
t epiota olo"ical q~estion o£ t validity ot t · t~ 0 1 -
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tl t t·~ e · · t r· 
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-· no · .. :.,-~ o rtan • St t 1 t d , .n . ....... t~ < -
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.. ~ .d.(' ~ u lS ~>. "" 1r r 0 
t t "li}J t "i0 r·" cup<· to · e t 1 · l e oy 
co~~ s , ni o the obj ct , .. o · inc , 1 nvo.r .a . y nr ~ s t >rc 
1 '(' ct. , sc .e n f' .c a .. · t h· . ~ s • !'Tmat 
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belone to some consci (' s ness. 40 . A little histor.r and inter· · 
pretation ex';)oses the falsehood of ·De lJ·,ey • s contention . On 
the contrary , it YJas not religion but science itsel.f which th e 
gtteatest or modern e pistemologiats wished to valida te . Kant ts 
problem as n ot so much to g ive man a place in the universe 
as it was to e ive t he univers e a place wi th man: in short to 
restore a uni versa.l a.nd necessary val id1 t y to science after 
the devastating attack whlch Hume l eveled a .:. ainat uni versal 
and necessary causation . VJhat is mor e , it as the scientific 
and socie l attitude more than it was the relig ious one which 
ao gr eatl -y st imul a ted the ep is temolog ical movement in mod• 
ern ph:!. loso. hy.41 The scientific me t h od was one of analysis 
a nd in ph ilos ophy 1.t had the eff~ ct of ph: losophera ana-
lyzing t h e kno l edge s 1.tuation . Cons equentl y e ge t in Hobbes 
t he atomis t ic sensation as the ori(;in of all kn o dodg e. 
Social developments onl y a dded to t h i.s tendency. The g rowing 
i ndividualism, res .1 t i.ng f r om the Reformation and the advent 
of a ca.pita.liat economy , turned phi1oso hy .: nward to t h e di-
rect i on of man, his me·ntal s tat es and processes • It was no c o-
i ncidence t h .,.t Lock e , who l eaned h eavil ;¥ to a.rd sensational .... 
ism, was also the p .' d loso_ h er of t he Cromwelli an revoluti on. 
40 . De e y , QC, 287- 31 3 , 26- 49 . 
41 . Cf . \ indelba.nd , EP , 378-399 . 
1 .. The Empirica l I'lethod 
I ( B rkeley is an empirica l idealist in t he san~ that he 
limited his investigations to ltlhat i s imme di a tel y gi v n in 
conscious ness and to whet can cons ictently be i nferred from 
l 
t he c;1ven . In no sense · s he · pure em irici t , for the 
r · u.•~on tl at a pure ernpiriei~m i s solipsism nd Berkel ey "tt s 
not a solipsist . To limit oursr:.11ves simply to t he i mm di-
a tely present dnt a. ,. refusing to drau inferences fror- t hese 
facts , is never to gat beyond the present let alon ~ ·rrive 
G.t other object ::; or p0rson» . To i gnore the t\10 f a ce t s of 
erkeley ' s octrt n·e of exp~rience , the ir e(lia toly given :. n • 
t he eonai .. tent inf erence from the int.":led i:~ t l y presented . is 
to acqui'sae in one of t he most co non mis interpret~ tions of 
Berkeley• ~erkeley, so t he neo-re:l li,'lts ar ... c , 
\ref used to recognize t ha t ( 1) t he relnt i ons bett·m n 
·i deas or t h o:r·d :..r in ~ hich t hey ··re gi ven to u , ana 
( 2) the othc · .minds t hat are known are uite a rel ative 
to th kno ;er · s a re t he prin · ry · nd ;;! ondary qu, liti es 
of t h'>J phys:Le;?l orld . You ea n. knm other inds only in 
... o f a r as you have eXperi~nce o t he. • a na to in£er t mir 
i m, ependent existonce inv 1 ven just as much "' nd just a s 
1. cr. es • ALC , II , 354 . .A ll references tt ken fro o. r aser , 
IGB (4 Vol •• Wherever posni ble , se.tions , rather t n 
pa ·e ref'erenc~.s , are ,si ven . 
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litt le o_' t he p oc s s of o jeetifying and hypost .. tizing 
o e' s o"Vm ideas a s to i~~r the in 'epGnd · nt existence 
of' t he physic.~~ l ob ja ts . ) 
The critics go on. to s a y that sue . a .. if . iculty ra , ob cured 
by a faulty di stinction t\o'reen i dea a.t1d notion . Berk ... ley ' s 
doctri ne of i des ! nd noti on --ri ll be discus ~;ed l :·. ter . ~~hat 
' need~> er.1ph . ...:is ~ ,ere ic 'the f a Gt t hat t he above criticism i 
true only if" he i s t ' ken to be c: pure cmpi r i ciPt (uhich very 
I fe 11 , or any t hinkers have bee11} . 'Ber keley ' d problem r- s t\i'O ... 
fol : Fi rst , do I ever it'i .. :tedi ately experi nee p .. y ""' ica l ob-
. t ' ? JeC s. Secondly, i f not t c~n ! infer t~leir ex i ._ t~.~nce r om 
t hat I already do :imme di utely experience? As to t h.-. x·irst 
: point , Berkeley argues that t·1e never ex eri ene bra i ns , o t h r 
persons ~ space , etc ., but only smm data by which we in er 
3 
t hese othGr t d:ngs . Regard i nf' the second point, Berkeley 
believes tha t to inf er that objects can exist independently 
of a ll mi nds , or min in go:.meral , i nvol ve.3 us in hopel $S 
4 
i nc ns i stenci es . \~hat i s space apart f r or ~ t he: ~on ,at ions of 
5 
touc · and movi'3mE.nt? Berkeley { sks . a i ; that i s time 
pr:lrt from our cons .... i ousne so of ch, nginr; s ensations and th 
memory of these successive events? Ber eley' a famou refu-
t 1 tion of mat ,: er , t hen , is founde d on c::< twofold criticism: 
It i s n ver i . e d i ;O±tel y ex:peri·enced a nd it c. n n ver be 
2 • 
5 " 
Holt, et · 1., 1rR ; 6- 7. 
.- erkcleJ TN'l.'V, I, 127 .... 20 .... ; PHK , I, es • sec . l - 56 ; ·:'DrP, 
I , eQp . 1s t . diologu~ . 
TD HP , I, esp . 2nd di · lo ,,ue . 
NT r, I, esp . sec . 1- 30 ; PHI< , I, sec . 97 , 116; TVVE , II , 4Cl . 
cons istently t hought about. The realist se ms to forg t the 
latter hal t"' of t he i!u•r;wnetlt . 
y c-1n inferonc - from t he i mmedir tely ;:~i ven we C~.r :ci ve ( 
;;., real >Jor l a order Q.nd other peroono . In t h . former ca e t he 6 . 
inference i s mad~) by me:u1s of · nalo y hi le in t he l a t t e r 
it obviou~ly f ollo s .f'r om t he mere fact t hat we o not cret te 
7 
our sensations a t will . The ind.ep ndent world order is on· 
in whi h all i deas { s n.;) tion~:; or it1 . res sions } a re s i o ... 
me.:1nin s , rel~ tions , connections; a divine l anguage by hi ch 
~e· c ·~n i ntelligently oonver~e 1d.t1· our universe, 
(Returning DOl1 to t he realist crit ic! .. m: To contend t hnt 
Berkeley ref us ed to reeognize that i dea ., and other mi nd s a re 
rela tive to t.he knot er i s to cot!IDlit a double misinterpretation . 
'irs t , i dea s. or obj.Jcts of sense , · r e not . on Berkele y ' s 'tie 1 , 
relati e to t he knower . tie do not create s ensa tions but r a t ... 
er t hey -=' r e given to us fr m beyond . Decondly • the relations 
n on . i d A:ts are no · relative to t he knO\-ter . On the c ntrar y , 
if i t e re not for t he in . ~ pen ent rev .. tions existing i n 1;he 
supr. ~ ... e mi n , mi r-culously organized to_ oonv u me anings of 
--11 ich t..;e become at-,: 1.re by m ans of our senses • kno ·rled f:..e · 1oul d 
be i t ·· poss i le . l~erkeleY' .. point., and t hi s cannot e over-
empha ized , i s not trheth r f act s c n exist a part fro our 









I, sec . l.4l· , 145 • . 
I , sec . 29 , 90 . 
I, sec . _l04. 107 , 109 ; · TDHP , I, 461; , I R, fe e• 234 , 
2o4 , 29·J . · 
gener a l . The other po i nt , n·! e l y, t lat for Harkeley the minds 
of other persons must be rel tive to t he kno1:r r s ince l·te do 
not i .• edi t.tel y experience ther minds aga i n i s to con ·u.·e 
t t e di-~.'ference, E. clifferenco i i ·plicit t hrou h.o 1t Berkel y t s 
correctly inferred from t he L · . diat ly present . mh t \1 e do 
not e.xpQ:ri .nee otl er minds i s gr nted by most philo o·ptrer..; 
an Herkeley here is in no · oul i ar di 1''.f'ioul ty-. But erke• 
ley, as r.:te. tioned ~ova . di d n t 11.-:i t ht .-3elf t o a ure 
empi icism. In!'erences re v· lid ,. ha insisted , 1£ t. ey :. r e 
9 
cons i stent ·1ith the f ct~ o i l ~diate · .. c . ~int ·· nc • re are 
i edit lY :cquainted ith our minds nd our 1 pr~ .,sion..., , 
an . :.: ert~ i nly it is v ·., lid , erkeley hel , to infer the ex-
ist nee 0 1 other mindo fr m -t h seno t'ons l i de s) or their 
l (i 
bodily move ento . ·beth r the nt from an;.:ilo, . is 
sound i s be$i c t he p int . _ 1e po1nt i th~t erkel -y nev r 
li Jited hi mself to a pure empi r i ci s but granted th~ va l td-
it.y f non-.s n!)uous d-:tt.a provided such d t a ere correct 
info ;; no fro h ·t •t s · l r e ·y i mmedi ·tely exp.rience . On 
Berkeh.yt s theory, th\~n , contrary t o the neo-re ·~ list critic ism, 
oth, person~ J o not for l.. leir existence depend upon bein 
perc i veu for t he si;r,pl · reason that persons are n ver ·per-
ceiv . • \ 1•lo t of t he n o- r ealist.;J are in the s~me r icament 
'j • lit, I , sec . 35 ; TD 'il' , I , 435 ) 437 , 383 ; ALC , II• 351+, 
380 , 3$ • 
10 . PHK , I , sec . 140, 14 • 
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wh n they ab · n · n , a s most of t hem have , t:.e th.:.ory that one 
poss e s se s ~ irect acauai nt nee ·rith ot1>1 ,r minds . How do t h y 
s :~lve th.ents ~lves f ro · n i hili .. m rmc bot.; i s it b tter t h.on Berke• 
l ay ' "" , r ,. ents? 
(Berkeley, t~ en, .1ad a t to.fol d t ask : first, to disco~er 
t he con tituants of i mmedi ; t e exper· nee , :1nd s ccon . ly, to 
cli.s cl se ··t ut irue_~ ... n~ s · n bo dr· m from our i om , i ate x-
p rie .. ce . It ·ms Berkel ey , not us ~1111,. 1 o · L st utilize 
i n modern philo ~ op y , in ·· t .orou 1going way • the d1 tinction 
betueen cqu i ntance "'nd descri . tion , One i s i medi ately e-
ll 
qu i nted ith hi s mi n · and sen..:.e ·ta . The t ·o elements 
are di sti not entitiaa for jer k ~ley a nd i t i s . mi stake ever · 
'· to co u e t hem. The crit icioms of Bertr:..cnd Ru ""ell and G. 
E. ioore rest on a £nilure t o observe t ht di s tinct ion hieh 
e r keley "'·ke • 
erk l y' s viet , that obviously t he color must ·e tn the 
mi nd ,. see a t dep nd for i ts plau s i bili ty upon ... onf'u ... 
i n, t he t hin,; ~ pprehonr.h~d :rith tl e a c t ·O appr hen ,;i.on . 
"it.1er of these mi '-.;ht be c-... ·lle an "ir ean ; proba ly ... itl -
er rould 1 ave been called an i dea by Berkeley . The E ct 
i s undoubt edly in the mind ; hence ., vrhen 'le ar t .• i n .ing 
o.f the ~ct fe readily e s ~nt to the vie·'f tha t i ~'ea" mus t 
be in t he. 1 in • Then, f o gettin~" t h t t hi s s n y true 
hen i ~ s ere t c.k n as a cts of a ,:-tpr h ,ns ion , 1 · tr ns-
£er t he proposi t i on th t f1 1deas a r e in the rni nd" t t he 
i de" in t he other s .nsa , 1 e., to t he thi ng· "'ppr&hended 
your "'Ct.:;;. of r pprehen ion . Thus , by an uneon ci us 
11. PHK .• I. sec . 81 , 86 ., f 9 ; '£D HP• I , 416 , 429 , 435, 437. 
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e uivoc •tion , ~e arrive 't r.r.-· conclusion ·.h,. t ' -:1'lateve . 
·re can ap r eh ~nJ must. be in our rnir ds . Thi s sea ... , to be 
t e tru~z-J annl yHi ... of Berke leY! s i:I.T'f,t:u:n .nt e nd th,. ultim· t .,.. fall~~oy upon l'lh i c h it r e sts . 12 
( 
C:uite on t he contr·:~ry • \Berkeley ins i sts t hat t he 0 et of '· -
1.3 ' 
prehe·1sion Ci.LO nev r be i dentified ·ri 'tt the thinr; >.pprchen e d . 
14 
:\n i e for Herkel ey i" ny sense i;·~pre ,..s ion l·Thile t e rnind 
i s r estri cted to th.:i t;. uro acti •i t.y b/ ·Thich we rel ·'· t, .. nd 
15 
r e l .et upon th e d .. t a O..L 8 nse . That onl y E:m ,.  da t ' , 
.. ever phys icnl o j cto , even i f .. uch o jects 1 re real, r o • ' 
i mmedi ately experi ~need by the mind i ? not to s· y that t hey 
~-.re. i dentic· 1 ~~ith the mind . F )r B r keloy , color nd oth r 
oe-nse qua l ities e not in th. mi nd in t ' e s ens_. t h :· t tr e 
mi nd 1 hi t«a or bl ac. or sol11, but i n th e <·nse th3t t h se 
are experi enced by t he mi n· in ·t~y t ich ot her ~eferent 
of · im. ~ r- not. 'fhe mi nd ha a direct a cou· int~nce t•rith 
sens.ory f cts ; thil c ~v-ith otl er ob .iect s it pos Qe s se s ·only 
a eo ri t i ve kno..vl edge . B r keley 0 s aw:.;re of a poss 1' .. le 
· retation of the p : se ni n t he mind" ·th n he ·\i'f"Ote : 
\'l1en I speak o:f ob. e ct.s as exi sti r.g in the mi nd , or i -
r i nted on the s 11nses , I oul d not be understood in t he 
gro ·~ liter al sense ; as .·; e n bodies are S~'1. 1d to ex i ot in 
0 
• a pl · c , or , sec. l to ma ke a.n ! ::-pres sion upon \'! x • . :.y 
me ni e; i s only tha.t t.he mind eo. pr hends or perc i .Jee. 
Ru Qsell, PP , 65 .... 66 . J ohn Grote , ho~tever , pred .... ' e d ~s-
s e l l i n distinrui '~l i 4.tr bet\'Ieen · .... cqu r i ntance c.nd descriotion . 
lDHP ; I • 4.06 . . 0 
PHK , I , sec . 5 , 25 • 138 ; TV"I/E , II , 3~6 . 0 
HK , I t se ~ . 138 , 1 39 . 
~.:.-· . ~: •. '· .. 
them , and t hat it is a ffected from Hfthout , or by $Orne 
bein;.s distinct from itself .l6 
Thc.t color r.: nd other sense qualities crm have c:tn existence 
ap.art from i ndividuo.l minds Be:rkeley make s clee: r . The . rob .... 
lem i s \..;he t 1er they ca n ha ve an ex istence ap::n·t .fror1 ~ 1:1 · mind , 
or mind in general , and here Berkeley ansHers in t he :ne·gati~e . 
say sense c:ualities bec<.n~se a physica l O'b,jE:~ct . h:as ~no· · exis ... 
tence , on Berkeley' s vi ew, to begin with . A physi.cal : ~ttject 
. ' . 
i e 'only H colle ct ion of sense qua l it i e s which in the qrrl$r of ' 
nat:lre, or t he di vine l:.:: nguag~' s eems to possess a regul ar oc-17 . ·, ,. . '-' 
cwr~nce. . Onoe disposing of the phy'si cR l obJect on t he'. ··ground 
. . . ' 
t h-at it is never immedia tely experiene r;;td and t hat it . :ts~ a. use .. 
l e.-ss· and fal s e infer ence f:rom That is i t1::media tely given . in 
e·onsciousness, the pr obl em become s 'lhether sense qua lities 
oa·n: enjoy independent existence . The answer seems to be ob· 
vidus for Berke ley. It ~as obvious in hi s ea se bee · u::-·~ ·he 
was an empi r icist and believed that anything immedi ately ex. 
periuuced by the mind possessed the -hi ghest degree of t ruth . 
And since t he matori al object no longer existed to afford a 
substratum f or the qualitiest the mind \IJ'as the only enti ty 
l eft ~rith \'lhich Berkeley could tie sense- da t e into c:tn ·. insep ... 
c:~rable rel at ionship .) l'ha t this line of argument streng~h t:ms 
mol;"e a phenomenal ism than n.n i deal i sm \'lill be discussed l ater. 
16 .. · TDHP, I, 470 . 
17 . PHK , ! , See . 49 , l hB; 'l'DHP , I, 406 . 
... 
.) 
~ hat noeds empl~ asis . ere i ·~ th . f et th~lt erkeley did , eon ... 
trE,. ry t t u ;;#ell ' s eritici ·m ,1 <l i tingui s 1 bet.-Pen a pr hen ion 1<-, 
... nd t he object appreh·"\nded , di sti ngui .. hed t hei s o sh .. ~ rply 
t h t one ond -r -.. ,. he tLer t he ni n ~ Ui the i dea nre a i n e p-
!3 rkeloy believed . Perhn.ps thi s ·:" n d .fact rith 
~e ~ -·ley1 s i nt erp_cta tion)•'lS it may be ~<rith n.u~sell ' ,;) theory 
.f inv . Crt i s .jUv t t( e l~~k of cr. '•rdc tm1ty bet e ·n t he 
1.. ert ! t.iea and th~ purely active mi nd u'hich pa ed the ·ray 
for Hwne ' s n i hilis ~lnd K· nt ' s r econstruction o.f th::~t unit~ .) 
Is t h mind necessary at .. 11. if it serves no other unction 
t .L-:111 to b tte ear l" of pa '"' c- ive i r'.:. re~aions ? 'r ke .. , y 
1e il 'ip s s ions an~ do y~·t h ve :-'!Iytl i n .:o le t? Car1n t s i m-
p.! y t he a"'Soc i ation of b tpr s sion:::; ace ml·lish t be a;:. e t ·. k 
as Berk ... ley' s s o ... ca.llcd a cti v . .. ind? Hume · ;.:~kv . Tc: ke -: w y 
t 10 L~nrcv;·ions c nd t1 . have pl enty l e.ft , nt ar~ -.:>-• t he 
fon a l .functions or ca t .... r:ori •s of the · nd it..,el f · i thout 
uhi•h vn e qualiti t; roul"l I e ~ot.ally me n i n .. less . \ · r ke -
ley t a l ke . uch abo t t he act i vi ty of . in£ but av i t very 
little to do . t: nt bes to ed upon it the \1 ig ty -U .ction , t 
ma.l~ · n~ n.t:tur i nt lli · ble--i ntellig i 1 in the sen e t - t 
uithout mind t her - coul d be no intel.li i ble p .cnomon~ ~ 
( 'ollotring Berkeley• . etho · o di.;;tingui sl·<in r:: bettteen 
i mt!le di · te a . ren s e. and in:!\~ , ·me , r kno l edge by , __ cqua.i n-
tance Emd description , t he fo1 lo't'ling q tt(3Stion s ari se: !"'irs t , 
1 • TD HP , I , 406 . 
what constitute-s imrnediat~ ex-per.! ..,nee? Secondly • t/.that can 
be derived from in:ference?· Finally, tf1::1t faetors derived 
fron t he two source~ of knowled e are metaphysically re 1 
""nd ho is such re.;.; lity to be c.o:nceived'? The second question 
involves the derivation of t.he cat·agories v:hile the thir d one 
r a i&vs t he proble n of) their obj~ct:tvity J 
2 ;.. !\.no 11led e by A cqua i ntttn.oe :· Berkeley' s Theory of Im• 
r11ediL te Experi ence . 
( lmii di a e experi ence for Berkeley i COMf>r·:Lsed o:f s~nse 
d · t. und t he aoti vity of the rind -'>:hich ece ives nd c.o , 'l i nes 
19 
t 1ese date. into meanings . Physical objects \'le never i~~u~ ... 
t i a'tal:1 expari mce. The:y ~-re in~erences from s nse facts, 
20 
t.i d p $Sess reality only in so· fall' f.U1 t.hey are inference-s • 
Ev n a s i nferences they are false i f t aken a s somethir .~ real 
21 
in themselves. A referent , ::for Berkeley. i s me.ely a collec-
t;ion o sense data .-vhie for onva niGnae ~~e reg~ rd . as a · tiling 
. xistin~ in space n . til:;e . aerl.eley confuses at times the 
differene ~- bett·reen a sensation and a physi ... al object but t hbt 
t'ie former , nly i ..J i m;nediately prau~nt is obvi .ous throughout 
his o:rks. This is p· rtieuL r-ly evident in his ·theory O·i .; 
vision. ~ ·e al tr ys refer to obje.cts in a sp ee ord~r , yet 
distr ~·.ce i""' never i ·.mediatel y erce i ved . It is an inference 
1) , P "H (Int •. ) • I , sec . 1. 
20 . ~TV , I,_ 1 .... ;30 . · . . 
21. HK , It SGf! . 16, 68' , 77. so . 
drri m f r om our e · rien of a collect iot o£ sens at i ons oc· 
curri n. s i n:U1 ·a1.eousl y . Si ght g1ves ua extens ion ( a pl~ne 
cont inu . or spread ) ut neit .. r . agni t ude or '· i s·t rmce , hil e 
22 
ouc 1 a 'H.l r. oveme t yield t!' e l a t ter ·. G.r anti11g t he scien-
ti ic x:pl.:!n\.O t i on f vi s ion , e:t-keley s.hors th!t it " t os t 
1 l d oxtension ; e ver ·. ni .tu e . 
r . y st_ 1: n ;, t he eye fr.o _ · n i noty e ~x- e .... l·· l e. re 1 ' is-
: ) . 2.3 
t~ .~:q • Bcr r.-1 "l u .~l s . Hut on . us &J."" u- tr t · :·1- , . 
c iphro . : 
t. 
':/_he · riter s in opt;ics t e ll us of :..~ n -.a ngle m11de by t he 
t '> ~ optic · x ' 5 • ·rl.e~ ·they me t in t ... "'' vis i· 1~· -point 
or 0 ject. ; {fhi eh ngle , t . ~e tuser it is. t he ne···rer 
it ,;) ·· o t h obj \.': to be • a b 1ou mu h t e acuter , 
b y so much the .fa.rtt··ar otf ; and t h i n :fro n n n ce .. ~ ~ r-y 
· . noti~ bl e o nne :loh • .::.. 4 
.. cord inrr to this des cription of vision , t he n ,_ t he ind 
di~co er s t he dist .:- nc o.f t he t 1i n by e metry, -Berkeley 
r et-orts , a d it f oll.o s t hat n.oborJ y could a e but t se x-
25 
ccp·t:onally \'Tel l vers ed in geometry. In other t-.rordE> • t he 
l aus of optics are symbolic descriptions rather t han expl n -
ation;;:~ o vis.ion , for t he si ·tple rea on tha t :re ,muld firs-t 
b .... ve to percei'Ve t he a ngles t ·~ sel ves ·; lieh it; never t e 
26 






., .. e .. ele y ' s am: lys is of vision is a g{)od--::; ~·llustration or 
rep . UTV; I; 1~30 ; TVVE . II , 380-415. 
LC~ II, l64. 
ALC , I!, 16~. 
~LC , I I , 19$. 
ft LO , II, 165 . 
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t he dif:t erence bet '!ee:n sci ence and philo ~ophy flnd ho the 
form r ne ds t he l ,s.tt r to give i t rocder ers ecl.ive . 
~ ciGntific explanations of a more eompr ehenoive pr.obl• th · n 
science i s equi pJ>ed to t nd:l~ . resuppo o t he acts ~ u , o::; d to 
be exple ined . Optics , if t aken for anythin~ more t han s l-
bolie de~eri tion , presup~os s vision r at her t han explf ins i t , 
w 1ile physiologic <.tl ax L .nationo of mi nd . memory, .,el f con-
ciou~ness gain presuppose t l ese :fa.cvor... .. Hot can <-.t phye-. 
ical event in t he space-time order ever ccount f r e ory, 
or recognition . or .::-nticipa t ion? \'!ho ever i mt.edi a t ly ex-
perie nced ;. synapse? Many eo le go t hrou h life ·.:ithout ev-
er kn 'tfring they ha ve a hra in, let t lone exnerieneing one , ~~ nd 
yet t .tey are a 1e to perform menta l una t ions. 
( 
. · erkeleY' s '· .a lysis of vi ion s ho ·rs 1 t en , .. hat objects 
in sp8c "re never it:u--nedia tely experi e nced , but ar .. i n .ere.nces 
dra:~ n -rorn t he i · :1ec i < tely ex eri enced sens e qua.J.it i e s of 
sound , touch , si~ht , odor and t ~rt.e. B i'ore ctiscusain 
Berkeley' s t heory of phyeica l object .. and tl1 ca tegor ies it · 
i s ne e s sury to trace el"keley ' s contention t hat t h . con tit~ 
uents of i imedi •. te e;,cper ienco c c. n never enjoy an existence 
i n e pendent of lind in , neral .J But firs t a isconception 
/ 
must be cle~red up . One must. i n criticizin . Rerkeley t d i s -
tin ~ i.., l between t he objective reference which one does · ctu .. 
27 
a l ly 1 ke of ense qualities , an.J rhieh erkeley ants • and 
t he vie 1 thio 1 regar ds t hem as por.:1sessing independent , 
27 . PHK , I , .;. 29 . 90 . But o jective refer ence i s not merely 
to a sense dc. tum. Other .factoro are involved. 
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: ;· . . 
extra - mental re ality . Berkeley' s critics , part 1 eul -: r ly· .Mo re 
2a 
a nd H.ussell, have a t endency to confuse this iss ue·. The f a ct 
tha t we always , i n 01~ common e xperi ences , re£er to sen$~ 
qua lities as ob,jecti ve is no argument t hat t he y reallY. ,~re 
• . '·.1.) 
i ndependent of all mind or even in e pencient of my min~;~,':·<' .a.s 
ment ioned in tr e Int r oduc tion , experi ence , houe·var · i.rit;~;t~ 
:· r' - · 
·. ~' .: .-.' ' . : -·:·· .... ~;) 
pr,et'ed , has a double ref e r ence .;...- ~he reference to self' 9-ii'ct to 
t he not- self·. Thi s i s no ar ~ument tha t the not- s .elf cuih ex-
. . . . 
i :s t i ndependently of all mind , a ny more t he.n the objcetive 
reference of r eligious a nd mor( 1 exp E·riences i s a proof of 
the existence of God or the objectivity of va lu.s.; Take a - · 
way t he objecti ve r e.ference a nd \>re V'ill undoubtedly "kill the 
goose t hat lai d t he JSOlden e g_ u , to us e Pr att 1 s sugF~est ive 
illustra tion , but t ha t refere nce nevertheless possesses no 
peculia r met aphysical va l ue ·. 
(consi de r i ng the secondf.1ry qu ::tlities of he-.. t , sound ,: col.;. 
or- ... are t he se inde ndently rea l ap··rt .fr om t he mind?. Ca.n 
sound exi st apart f r om be i n r, heard? No. because a t hing o"n-
not be l oud and soft at t he same time . Yet such an in¢onsis-
t ency \·roul d have to be gra nte d i f we gr ant t he inde endenc . of 
sound because a sound may be loud to the pe rson wit . "norm~ lf' 
29 
hearing \"lhile ha rdly udi ble t.o a. person defic ient in hea ring . 
To argue , on the othe r hand , tha t sound i s mere ly a mot ion of 
a i r ; strikin _ the e Hr , then one WOUl d have to conclude t h· t 
28 -. Gf •. Russel l , PP , 58- 71; f·1oore, "The Re:futat1o:n ~Ideal­
i sm" i n -'ioore , PS . 
29. TDHP , I , 391- 392 . 
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sound s (l re seen and felt , not hear -' , s i n ·· e motion i s pro""'lerly 
31 
the <ibj : t o s i ght a nd t ouch .. 
The sa n.e "remn nts p0rtain to tie oth ·.r second 1.ry qua l -
Jl 
i ti ,s . Color is r el:: t i e to t he percipi ent . . t hin. ca n-
not be red and blu . ui1':1Ul ~:. neou~ly. Yet such ·tould ha ve t o 
ppose l y inde.pende nt color i" viewed 
by ane 1t11 th normal vis ion :;.nd one r..- ho i s color ... blind .. . ... ... 
g·· -in to say t h t color i s merely a p&rticul ' r wave n tiQn , 
t hen . That ~ e "loul d see 'lould be ruot ionn and. con.fi""' r tions , 
not olor . Color , like 1;he other sen "" e qu.-litias , 1e .. ,n u-
ni ue entity in~eparably rel n t ed to mind . 
vlhen Berkeley ur·gt.tos that color i s relative t o the per-
cipi,nt e does not s~y th't the mi nd crates color , ,ny more 
t han i t creates soun' or the other sense d L.t a , but s imply 
th t i f t e s "'nse qu:- liti~s be t aken !"l<s somethin .:. real . part · 
32 
from mind ~ e .fa ll in·to the ir consist~mcies of t he above • 
.' 
Sine ~ t hen, \·re . .~-o not rea te t hes qua lit ies, ::; n yet sin e 
t hey ~re mea. inglJss apa fro mini then t.heir source must 
be traced to t he supr er11e mind 1hich mira culously oommunic tes 
33 
t he se · Uc liti s , 
The prime ry quali tie., a re .. i L.ply t h ~ produ . t::1 o.f m nd in 
,:5 4 
i ts .Jani pulation of t he s e cond ry quali .i t:s . De2troy t he 
·-
:30 . TDHP , I , 3')2 • 
.31 . TUHP , I , 397 .. 
32 . PIK . I, ·'"' ee . 26 , 29 , 90 • 
. :n • P.HK , I , ::' A~ • 26 .. 
134 . .u)HP , I , 39: - 4 2. 
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secondary , qu ali t i Js a rd t here i s no thing lef t of the primary 
ones . t•Ia gnitude, as d i s cussed tl.bove, i s the pr oduct of t he 
seconda ry qu<.'l lities of sight. , movement and touch , while :mo ... 
tion is an i nference dra\'m from our changinr; i ::1pres .. io.ns • To 
cons i der mot i on independe ntly of our changing ob j _ects ~f$ec-
....... ; ·. 
onda ry sense qualities ) t'fe would have to uphol d t 'he c'ont:r a -
diction t h ; t a motion coul d be s .,_i f t and slow at the:. sd~~ 
' . ·. ·. 
tii'!e. li'or .::.omething whi ch mi ht appea r s low to one obs e-r ver 
mi ght appear f ast t o another s i t"! ly because our experience s 
of time differ. A day ; for example , a ppear s longer to a per-
son awake t han to o ne a -l eep. 
v1hat , t l en, do the above a r guments actually sho,r? . J'hey 
show , . it seems . first , th,_ t sense aualities do not reside in 
an independent substr .:- tum or m-- tte r , a nd secondly, t hat they 
are r el ate d to consciousness . The y do not show t hat se.nse-
dPt a are ment al. Both mind and sense dat a could b~ r e.l a ted 
and yet enjoy a met a phys ic<l l existence . The gap betw·een an 
inert idea a nd an active mind i s too \'Tide for a full- f ledged 
i de a lism. Berkeley' s services to i de a l ism were mainly neg-
at i ve in expos in~ t he bel ief in mat ter as a use less an in ... 
consist ent doctrine. His f a ilur e to make · a more oreanie re .. 
l at ion b etween mind a nd s ens facts p:-:1. ved t he vmy, via. Hume , 
for the r at ionalistic reconstruction of i dea lism. BerkeleJ 
believe t ha t once he established the fact · t ha t 1-1e are i m .. 
me.d i ately aware of the sense qual i ties t heir depe ndence on 
mi nd i s established . But the depende ;·; ce \'forks both ways) 
I 
All of Be r ke l ey 's t hought which has b een discus sed hitherto 
coul d be i nterpreted f rom a phe nonenal i s t view . Both mind 
40 
:1nd t he u ven sens .... ... d . t a could be t11o metaphysic4lly reel en-
t i t i es ,. It 't'till be ar1~U~d l ter on , t 1a.t B rkeley l't-. s , s zytuch 
t he fat her of hno .enalism ""' She ts o.f i ealism , t .e: st 
ith r a rd t o i s po'itive arguments in av o the l atter . 
crh question l i the etny, i r i ci.,t must ask hi rna l f i s whe t er 
t here is anything: net;.::. pl y~.;ically s a cred ·ut ·. nYtr inF e i r. 
imznc i ~ tely exJ.erienced • i)oes this f· ct bring it Hny elos r 
to th · mind ? Is i 1e alism re s t i ng on s uch n e. pirieal bast.s 
·=my 'ett~er t han he no : r:}n' ltbm, ant i s not the l at ;er 'the log-
ic.::. l o to 1ne of the former? 
3 . Berkeleyt o Do tri ne of the ;ategories . 
\, erkel y; unli e Ka nt and He el and nr ny r\t:;:cent t h inke o , 
did not 'lttem,:;t to deduce c a. ···egor i . , but t hi s 1 .:· not to 5·. y 
he did not ha e .a certa in theory ·· out tl Otie eoncc., ts vrhich 
ot.hers have re ar ed ~ catcgorietJ . i\ eat~: gory has be n de ... 
35 
f i ned as '" nY concept ne es, nry for any ur 1vert~e of d i s c ourse, 
and philosophically s peaking, the uni 'Fers o· disc our ie ex-
peri ~nee as a • 1ole, t h. tlP'h the phi losopher ean dicrid;: ex er-
i ence i nto dif erAnt realms • such as mor-:1.1 , r esthet ic • r . l i J.~ ... 
i , u s am:. the liket for the -sl: e of s p ei·· .. l i zc.tioh . Kant be -
lie ved t h t no person can h~ve an intelligible experione~ ~it i­
out pre ... up ~ osetl for1 .. s of sp .... ce · nd tim.a nd th . ct:mc -pte of 
U·'dity, cuantity , relr.t ion · nd modali ty·, ne t_ el , t ·'king h s 
cue f r o Kant , nrgued t at '-.rhile !.- .rt,:., in c r.; te ;; .. ories 0.r:.. <:?..., .. 
3 5 . Bri '"htr . .,•·~n • I P ( l 3t .. eel . } , 96 . 
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unfoldin,:- conseiousnesG • r ather t han r "dy- mz.de conce _;ts ch -
sen '. t random, or deduced fro _ a pGrticul ·- r area of e);:r erience • 
l! oate~"'ory , on hi s vie ., , i :. plicitly r efers to anoth r or its 
rne.., ni ng and this rocoss continues until one arrive-;1 ·t .the 
' 
aole r : \Jsolute ex erie nee . Ul ~t' _er t his eate -~ory .au,bsis ts 
or dhet· er it is a p :. •. t o:f an universal con::.lciousness ·is a 1 ,. . 
..-0 
much deba ted qu ~ t ion a.mong r e elian s holn.r • Lik \11se i s 
their difference about ho';'l t l i s prooes o l o ,,1c· 1 1t:.plication 
is related to the temporal order of dev .lopment . 
'ow erkeley' interest .in t he so-e:·lled c t egori s lies 
not in shot-lin&; \'V'ha.t concepts a..re nedess ry for ~n intelligibl e 
experience , but in sho~1ing that ·th · tever c !l.t.e ~ory one may con ... 
si er , it is derived from one• a inllaedi nte experi ence 'hich in 
his ease 1er e t l e mind nd sense duta . 1, h t 1e really have. 
l1Tith rk0ley i s ore a repudiation than a theory of' the c."· t • 
e .or:Les . Por example , i f one s~~YS that the Ci:itegory of suh-
st nee is an inference dr a ·tn f'ro one ' s immedi ate sense ex-
peri e ... ce {and a false one at that) , t ru:m 1 r t her than . t'ense 
experi onee p esupposin.~ the ca tegories e have the reverf'e) 
In act erkeley nt..1t only repudi ates the m taph rsic· 1 reifi c .1 ... 
37 
t ion of eu ·sta nce but even its place in kno.-rled.ge . J.;iVQn here 
c .... . ~1cTag~c;ort ; bHC; :Jtace , PH .. 
ThL, st ·· tement must be ( t.ttl lified by Berkeleyt s t ndency, 
at ti es, to rf:'l;gard spirit as sub~:i tfince . Thi s problem 
i s reser ved f'~"r l a ter dis c mH1 ion. 
42 
we can g ... t alon? \• i tl out it , and otill . ve nn i ntelli ')i ble 
experience. '"'Jhen -re re.fer to a tl· in.g , 'Ber kele y .. t · tes , e 
merely refer to a collection of s nse quali ties which out o 
habi t , customs an convenience t..re oignii~y by a ~!l ingle or d .. 
1hat i n the tulip for the plain man? '!lSks Berkeley. Just a 
eo bination of color , tactua l a nd olfactory ;;;.~ensutions , . hie. • . 
always ocdurring in t he s~me combinat ion, tJre learn to ai gni.fy 
~$ . 
by the 11ord tul i p . ) Now it ia one thin _1 to s y that the c.- t .. 
e .::~ory of substance i s incons i t nt i tnk~' ... n for somethi ng in-
dependently rea l and q i te another to ar gue that Xl')erien e 
does not presuppoH· ca.te ·ories . I n our perce t ion o a t ing 
do w~ not al ayo regard the thi ng •. s som kind of a · .,ity in 
Aich its qualities inhere even though by ph·looophieal s .c-
ulation ' e are convinced othen is ? I n other :rords it i s i ·-
rtant to s eparate t he a ::>i.stemolop:ical f r om t.he r et;.;.ph s ictl l 
i nterpretation oi" t he c:nte p·ories , · hie~1 Ber keley oftentimes 
don unes . _"or exampl e no thinker ;;· r gued more strongly .for t he 
ep istemologica l ~ignifieance o.f the categories t han ant yet 
he did not believe t hey had any reality apart from cons cious-
ness . The s ame is tru of many other rat.ionali~tic i dea lists , 
39 
f or extmp· e , owne; in recent hiloso hy. ~lith ant th e-
pistemolo:;ical s i gni f' icn,nce of t .e c ~ tegories had tre : endou. 
met aphyc-ical i mplicat i ons , } ot•rever , ·or the s i mpl e· re~son that 
}$ . 1'Db ,. I , 4~l6 , 469 ; ""rK, I , Je c . 99 , 14.-
39 . Gf • Bot-me , TTK t 59- 117 • 
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if they are so necessary for e:xperiei:tce then an object could 
posBess no rueaning ~-:it.hout them. If the mind , not ~;he obje ct 
o.f senso. " i S"; ">he se<l t of these univertml concepts , t hen ntture 
cannot get along t-ri thout t he mind . 
(3 ince Berkel ey, for the most p;lrt, i gnores the pist~m .... 
o1ogiea l role of t he categor i e s t he discuss ion i'Till bo eon-
f'ined to hi s metaphys ical int erpretation of' "h''"t Kant and 
o.t her thinkers re.gard as cate.ftor•i es to i llust z"ate Herke'l y' .s 
logic of exper-ionee••MTi~ely,. tnat no e.ntit:t i s i nt.elli gfbl e 
apart from ·eXperience . To be i s to. be perceived by some m·ind ; 
i f not ouz,s , then the ;Juprem'~ r~li.nd . In the follo.t:1ing discus .... 
mediately experienced , and seoonuly., i f' not ilfl..med:t~tely ex-
perienced c" n t~heir i:ndopendenca be in£err~d from \\that. we do 
i mmedi ately experi¢nee? Be:t"keley . r.tay it be repeated , i s 1111· 
ing to ~ ant t he .metaphysictitl re· l ity or a t hi ng even i f it 1a 
not itl'h~ediately experienced pl"'ovided s uch a r eality c.:.m be 
soundly inferred f rom what we alre:;:dy '·re i mmedi ately · c .. 
quainted ¥rith , vrhi cL in hi s ea se are t he nLi.nd a nd the sense• 
. - l-~oG 
data .• ) No diseuosion is better a ble to ill us tt"a te ·the logie 
O·f' e rnpirical and. r a tional istic i dea.l:i.Gm than t he follo d.ng ; 
for here one di scovers ho\"1 an i dealis , might be reached 'by 
t~f() opposing interpretations or experi ence . ~he ca:te go:rie.s 
,_ 
possess meaning only in rel ation to consciouont:ss , stat.es 
BerkQley . f.~om~ ... iousnese possess~s meani ng only if' on~ pr ·e· 
..... • •rr ! c;• ,., 5 • '1''~' r•p t' ~:uq , .;.; ec • ' , ~n'1 , , 
T\TVE • II; 386- .3·S7 . 
I , 303; ALO t II. 354, 380, 38$ • 
su .poses conce ts , Ka. t cont n· s .. Concepts Ere uninte111 -
i bJ.e ~-!it 1out .:m i mme:·.i te <: c ,u~ in~d .e Hith sentL a t : • .. r -
.. ues B rkeley~ 
i , .:>pace . 
~ s al ready po inted ut , t'.ree diH:.ension.;~ l sp .. e 1 '"' never 
i mn d i e t ely kno\oom bu t is inferre d fr ra our i: .. :\a t i a t e s .nsa -
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t i ons of tc.H ch , s i p:ht ~· nd moven .. ,nt . oan space e j oy an 1n• 
dep :1ndent existence ..;. p · r t f r m con~Jeiousncs .s i n ge.ne al . Ob• 
vi o .:1ly not . T-i..ke aw<> y o e t s sense of si,J t ~ nd i'e loo ... its 
ext nsive quality .. Ueduct one ' sense o ovement and touch 
nd h los -:-1 i ts maenitude . Is .ere an yt h i ng l eft? Yes - Kant 
wo·, l d r ,tort . an intuition of an infinite s pati al 1,:11 ole ~Thich 
t he..;e disc ete experi ences o.f touch , movem nt c.;nd s i ght could 
never yield yet 'ri t hout \'ll"i ch a r eference to op<;.Ces 1:1ould be 
impossible. Beyond our l 'lmited a ces , de r i ved f r om i ed ate 
s ensuous experi ence , you ould s t ill have, "<-n '· .rgues , more 
s . ~ e .., d in.t•initum. Your limited sp ces presuppos ~ an i,n-
42 
tuit i on of n .i nfini te spa ·e . To this erkeley 'IJ ould r · l y : 
that i s t he i dea of infinity but a v i n , monotonous repe t ition 
of the f i ni te uanti ties actually ~iv n or i nferred from o r 
43 
dis crete ~ense experie ces? Again t he c ncept of n i n 1nite 
O;)pa t i a l t·rL.ole could never yield mag11itude , e ssential t.o .the 
sp~ ti 1 i de <:. , rhi h. i reveal ed by the i mmedicte oens· · ions 
41. Nr V, I , 1- 30 ; 'i•VVE , II , 38' . -l~-15 • 
42 . · a~"!.t , Kr V (1 t. ed .• ) , 23- 27 . 
l~) . ~~ HK , I, ~:.ec . 124, 126, 127, 132 . 
of t.o ch and mov~rn n.t., ~.,. . .~ .x-
45 
tenaion nr€hJttf po(efl a sense of.' iire.ction derived .fi-ou a loou~ . 
~ nd a po::r t from l)llr :Lm lNHl i t). te av:areness, which functions as 
c locus; to "Jhich we re:fer right and l e t. and t t .r~by ·a in 
"i sense of d i r ~tion, ·:~hr. t uould k 1ppen to the eone...:. p.t of in .... 
finite extension? .Again take a,..ray . ~11 
obje ~ts in opace and 'that • auld be l eft o.f the spatiAl eon ... 
cept? In it possible to conce ive a spece devoid of object .... ? 
Is not the .former de:ri ved £rom one ' s refer ence to th.e lattor~ 
1 
l3 erkeley utilizes t he s me . ·: rgument~> vtith regarcl to quan• 
t:ity ns he does in t he easP- of space , as this category 1s ~~ 
derivative of the sp· t i a l concept . it' or Kant every r terence 
to oua.ntity presu·?pos.as an intui tion of an unitary~ infinite 
l':IP" tiel a nd tempor a l vrholo to 'hieh d finite "'w~ ntitie s ca n 
be a ssi ;;n~d . The number three i s meaningles s part f .r om an 
intuition of o:n infinite nunlb;z:r seri e ·which no sense exper• 
i en .... e can possibly reveal . Geometry• in v.rhieh t·te construct 
11~1ited units of spcee , &gain is i mpossible t·i;thout n i n-
tuition of <.tn inf i nite apace in \!thich the former are ~-;:i ven 
.::~ setting or pt-1rspect1ve . In otlr~r · -tords , math0 ~tics and 
geom~try c£Lnnot get along '~ithout t he concept of' i nfinity 
fmd 1nf inity can never be revea led by the discrete exper-i er.lces 
of the senses,. It must be presupposPd b ;t the mind itself, in 
t be form o£ a.n intuition or an .infinite space and time 
44 
order. 
r·or Berkeley thi s is a ll nonsense . \'lhile number f;l ntt; 
figure , mathemat ios and geometry, are eonvenience,s, they 
<.:: re derived from sens0 experi ence . 
.. . :, 
Number, being de f i ned a colle ct ion of units, t'l'e may . 
conclude tha t, i f there be no such thinP:: a s unity or: 
unit in a bs t r a c t , t here a re no i deas of nuinber . i n 9\b;.. 
46 
·· .:. ·: :str~act denoted b y numerica l n.~m0s and figur e G. tf he,"; 
. . ·t heories therefore in ari thmetic, i f t.hey a re ebsti"'~ct­
.. :ed .from t he na mes and f i ":ures , as likewise f rom Gl .·J:f: ,.use 
:~nd pr <:-tctice , as ~rell as f r om P'l rt i cular things' nilr~fi.ared, 
·. can be supposed to have not·hing at all for their . ob:ject. 
·•·. Hence we ma y soe entirely ho'tlt the science o.f numbel"s, i s 
. - s ubordinate to pr~cticc, and how je .june and trif ling it "-A-5 
.be ..... omes wh .n consJ.der ed a s a matter of mere s.peculation .; 
. . / 
What happens t-then I•Ie trent qm:. n t ity absolutely, indepen-
dently of all experi ence? The same t hing that occurred \'.rhen 
Kant , i gnoring hi s deduction of t he categories of quantity 
a s well a s hi s a priori intuition of an infinite space, 
sho,.,ed in hi s Antinornies t hat to regard space a.s absol ute 
i s to encounter the antinomy of an i nf inite space and a finite 
46 ' 
s pace . Why do we encounter these antinomie s of i n f i nite 
divis i bility? Berkeley asks . Simply because we drift too 
far from our sensations . ~ conce pt i s only valid i f it can 
47 
be inferred cons istently f r om '"hat is i mmedia t ely exper1.enced . 
I n the case of absolute spaces, numbers , ti nes and so on one 
44- Kant , KrV (1st . ed . }, 23·50. 
45. PHK~ I , Sec. 120 . 
l .. 6 . Kant , 1\r V (l~t. ed . ), 426- l:-3 4. 
47. ALC, I I , 3 ~4 . 
4·.,· 
ake~ u. reality out of rbstrn :~ ti·· ns , t Le very err or ~ith1eh 
Kant h · ·::s lf in his tl'"•:.tnsc .... ndent al log i... r arne one n ~ver to 
commit) 
( . \ t-\ 49 once .· t fen l:Ser keley is a •la. s term ),l'h i <f1 
any p-::1 t icul<.tt" o.f tha t clas ~~ . \~tt ~t 11e do , he conten ,.; , in 
or 
t he ca e of infinite i ndividibi litYt 1.., to reify he t r it-
S y ,_,.re have .: con~!e pt of line . The 
concept stan '1 .., for any line t inlt·· le . Ip,norin~ hi in-
d i ffer . nt reference to ;.11 particul .. ~ rs , we f·:. l .Jely u.a~:e one 
lin . i dentica l •ri th • noth··~r . S ince a mil ~ , to usc .tJarkel~ : ' s 
i l lustr tt ion , c · n e divided into ten thous~n p~rt : ~ ~lso 
50 
bel i eve t har. n ine'l , or a t nth of an inch ca n be "O l ivi ded . 
'i'he re Ult o jug~,ling t- i t h c n , epto;~ ~rith no elev- ce to 
en ~~ e cr ience produces ttose antinon ies of t 1e finite and 
infini te w; ich Kant discovered in his antinomie. • fho_av r 
'1 d "' p r ception oi' a ten- t• ouea.ndth p rt of an inch ? 'on-
eep.s ust hrve the.ir buse in th i rnm di t e::p_ i anc ·of 
sense i f ;;e a re to s a ve oursel ves f r om t he contra ,.' ict i n 
51 
e,l a 0 qt d by Zeno . In whort . t.hc Wliveraal l!lU ·t be r l~ted 
to t he part · euhu· •) 
\ In .spi t e of' th~:.: arguments aited above , it ust not be 
t l ought tlr?Lt Berkel ~Y b l i eved te c '"'~n h., ve no concept of 
4S . PHI\ , I ; 3 ,c . 116, l2l~ , 126, 127t 132 ; Sr' , III ,. :'Le. 
257 ; .3 56 . 
49 . ?HK (Int . ) , I; Se ·• 12 . y concept Bei·keloy '· l so 11e n"' a 
r l ·:· t ion ; c ment 1 o . ... r _tion, or a n --rc1':H3type i n 1od • s 
mi nd . /1. discus ion o.f er cl cy' s emplo· cnt of these 
t r ms .follm·rs . 
) 0 . PHK , I, Sec . 127. 
5 1 ~ PHK , I, SLc . 12 -132 . 
48 
in:f'ini ty. t 7h&t. .~3e keley is eo b; tinr~ is a t andency t r d 
in. i ni t o a.xt nsion a s reprev..._ntinr~ aomethin_ ~e .::tl xi:~tin. 
i n 'e n Berk l ey• s vie · , a thing 1 '3 ~-1 
i f imru d1~· oly exr ~rien ad or if con<qistently in£ r r ed fror~ 
tne :-1 v n da ta o eonsciou ne e . In · inity fulfill neit'.1er 
qua lifi t on} 
. (cert ... inly Berkeley did not d ny the muthom,:1 t. ica t:i.lit y 
o · t~· . . e infinite, though he did question somA of' its 1 · . · ·nl 
52 
pr:.Jaupp s it ion~ . ~ in~e m:.-th ~ t. ics i s a m ~ntal op.a ·ntion 
a l ready ithin experience , Berkol y hacl no re-::1 -.. on to f'ea r t he 
math ma t iea l e Jployment of inf inity. \''hat .e did ear 
the pplieation of in.fi nity to t ~ing . • 
· · Thus . erkeley ~-rrites : 
~ ar·ticulnr deteru in' d lines are not divis ibl 
· itum. but lines as us•d by geo ter 
Sei ne de~e rt'llin ' d t o &ny purtieular 
· - te 5 oJ.n · •;)• ), 
The concept of unity, a .• nin , i s deri1J'ed fr om our i ... 
medi ate sense d::-.t:: , and t o abst.ract t he t erm unity r r th 
unit'lry t hin ( · certa in collection o. sense cmali ti t:>. re -
ul .r2.y f alling int t he same c , mbina· ,i ns) t> e · 11 rey "to 
54 
th ~ ontr adict ion.- of pure • · inr · or matt r. ,; t ·•ntty n; y 




B rk L.y , MJ~ , II! , 17-60 . 
B .rkf··ley I en ; I, 7S . . 
P .. K I .... 12,., J2"' · "" I R rt , , :>ee. , _ ~ , ~.t • III , Sec. 257• 356 . 
49 
Of Sens i bl e .·U'· lit i < ..S or it ma y be derived a r bitra rily to 
suit our purpo ~~h~ s, suc h a s a da y, a n inch, a cha ir etc . _ 
tulip or a piece of bread might illus tra te the- former . , t 
a ny rate, a nd th i s is t, he i mportant point, t3erke ley i-'lfould 
r a t her est a piece of seris ible bre d tith its t a ste -nd 
odor t han a thousa nd pi e .. es o.f tha t t a stel ess , odorless, un-
knowable "rea l " brea d "'t ich the m.:teri a list or Schola stic 
s pea ks f . 
iii. Ua usality . 
~ant believed that our intui t ion of an infinite , 1r-. 
revers ible time order plus our ability to relate events to 
t hi s s inr;l e series and tore r oduc o a nd r~ : ognize t. em in 
t hi. ·. orde r by me ;..ms of universal nd ne ces s -':lry concepts en-
able us to attrib, ~e c~ usality t o t hings . ~ithout t h i s c us ~ 
al_ ref erence to things of' phe nomena l 1'orld , experi e nce. a· t 
55 
believed , 1·ro ul d be unint e l lig ible . r. uch of t hi s , accor ""' 
i n to erke1ey, i s no ns e nse . i''ir st e do not always at-
t rib,·t e universa l a nd ne ce s s ary connect ion to thin.~s . hen 
\'1e do it i s only f rom custom ·:~. nd h:;\b i t ~ n .. en, e r ed by t he 
56 
orderly a nd re;rular connect ions of our sensations. Seeo-ndly, 
~e n~~ver i mmediately experie nce any Cr. .use-effec ·t relation 
among sensat ions . All t•re do expe r ience is a unif or mity of' 
55 . Kant, KrV {lot . ed .), 1S9~2 ll. 
56 . SIR, III, Sec . 240 . 
50 
5 
su cessi on . 
experi need is in our -oli \. i ns- ... our pur )03e"' , c~~ oic s , .,mel 
::> B' 
our r"':.< n i·"ul ati-.. n o.t. .:.>e 1S _ <.:~ ta . ~ro re.fer ·H '"' · -~ f'o-··(:j t 
. : , "' ..... ~ .... -~ .. ~, u 
obj ct · caubinf; c ~ta ct ~1 , or se:nsr..:.tionn onunin.:~ c11r .ntiona i s 
to babble ... b ut SCPt., thi c, no one ev ··~r eJt"')cri enced or c , "' i s .... 
te rt ly i nf'erred from e" nex·ience . To n ;;u~? t! , .. t · ' ·t . br;: in 
Beside s epi r .:..t s , a ll t · 1~ t ·rc k:1 'or _.on e -{ v • r:J €~ our 
C:>'t·m i le s . i: i"l.en t £1e.Pefor o yo\1 ,..._,ay ~~J..l ide.~· ::· r~ oc -
cas · oned by i ;,p e · .s ~:. - n·;· in t .. 0 br in t , , you . r c .··v., 
t 1l i '"' bra in or no"! If lt ~Yu <.t · , then y u tcllt of i ( ~.::. ~ 
impri n'CA'l in rut i d ea c ~~using t. ~1 t~ s :::w1e i.~E.L ~·h · ·· J. i 
;;;b~mr·d . I f you do no t co.l., .. e i vc i t , you t a lk un ·.1te1 ... ... 
lie;: i 'lY inz+-ead :: r. o ':"iinr. , re· 'i.n 1· 1.:: !J('O :.:te"" i.1 . 9 
1 ut our r.1i n·- d. es not pr.::HblCe itn o...-m Jen .. ..~"t ion~i i :"' , 'lti ou ·· • 
t hen our o ns"~+- ioru ·lU .. t e llJ<-.. ni e ~·t:·ttions of' t .:~e -~:nlprm- mind 
t o cor:nuni ·n t;e .... l-:.Lt t : 
()u 
us . In ot h r ' ord..:~ , ,_le ource ; E:. ,co· "'d i n:.:: t o oley , of 
our oliQf in C··. uSt:. l .Lty, i s 'o d i n voJ. ition t ::m l".o ··;e u;;r 
senset; ions a e c nve y-:-d ~.~o persons , t, ·~ey mus t e con ~ey 
~ n ,, ,,smt . ) ;~ g! in ona d i s Oi.'"er . ., t iO em_,1h·i~ .:11 metho - . o r l e_. t~e ... 
i '11 . i~ni ··ic .. n .. e.. 
58. t ··""t ... ~ I, 356 , l;. j l . Ul. t 5q T!.H lP , !, L_.z~ .• . . 
D 
1"' . ,. I, 356 , 4' 1 ; ~-~ I[ .. , III , ~;ec . 2 '.)2 . .. l ill ~: t 
31 
(rr t h :ce i s no c r.- .u~nl · ty i t l- i n£:.,s ( coll · t ons of s en-
pens to t.ho univer dn l en· n ocess _· PY p-i nc i p.V'I o f re ·rvon ' n 
P ·;y <-• i .... ~.;) T '1~:r.: ·n 1· '-1 ~ ,... ,. • . V v,:>./ :. v- ~ ,. ~ ... \., ~ ~ h:: t 
n~cess~ y 'ln<. UI i ve r s,-:' 1 CO.L ·.nt ;"' hut vJ ;)t it - ..-.fords ·~ ri · o-
61 
c i pt i ve S""h .u ·, of tl .. unifo m · t i. · ~~ of l'lr:tt·:..t c . 
gr a i ty , f o:..· OX'i . • pl. ~ , c: oes not c. ·l "' mut \ .~ .. - ··' ttr< .. Cl.i , n ; it 
s i Lp·l y r .por ts it . An d ..:"•ar fr: 1 b in~ .. u :. i·"'o!"G "; l ··n:1 neces-
s ar y c · r ... a in phenone ... n r espon• 1~ ;;-· t i vc ly to i · , ::; · ch n o · 
ryl " ·t:::. and el!.:1 ·~ tic .::.gentB) _he l n:·J"' o m.u tion c:u·-e us f 1 
a n.i r~·n.wt .'n.tc,~unb to t :e na tur a l l i tl" i a t i on ··' of <:!l l _n-Ju:Jtio t . • 
• 'P' r;e to .• ~~o :tute 
ob j e;ts cont_ad i c· s t he i e~ f o~i~n itsel . for 
t '-i .., : nt ::.on i s o.l ·m. rs rol a t:. i e . f.. d He -:: rt ::m' c conr::opt O-•-' , n 
'· · solu"C· Gp .. ce i s e-m i n.fe e nce l d i n ·line; i .1oti:m" . The 
<:.. i on of our s e.rw· ·tions . I"" ev .rythi n.., tr•re elini nr-· te" :· ~ 
61 . , . ....... . . 
. ( . n y oo · i LY , 
.one :t ve p3t·s i hl 
r~:.:=tcl , n -~·r )JO . • Poyc ·,, \'.~nr 1' Bmm ·-, erl eley concludes ·J'ith 
6.,.t 
on.fi ned to pr ac t ice 1 pur poses . 
i v . · . i 1.3 . 
(r-an· dainta i ned t L • t no ternymr ul ex ·~ri ·,n~;e could be 
po"'s i ' le v;i ~ :- ut · he i ntuition of a u:Jita ry in ... ini .... ~ time 
,64 
to ·' .:l<:r one refers t::.l l oi' "li s articula r time;; .i Do re 
he ff , uc o·~ oion of i d .ns' ? ,.;erl eley iil'oul · 
or conPciou5ness , 
65 ~ sk. \Berkeley 
cont -.nd ~' t hat t he concep o f+ [; n i nfi nite time 1 . .;; (leri ved frOl'i.l 
a v~in r~petition of di scret e tm or a l fact~ o; consciouann s ~ . 
t . por-a l one :o pt i tself . Ti i_e i .... i nt. ·.lli c:,ible on __ y i f it 
6 • "· '~ :tP , I , 'Ul ; · v' E , I I, 401 ; 11·-1, II , 5" 1 .. 52 ;., . 
6:3 . ·r , I. ~ic c . 1C5 , 1v7 , l ,.·SI; 3I H, III , !~ec . 2: 1~ , 24 ,, 2o4, 
2 ;>5 . 
64 . l" r~ t, (r , { l ::;t . ed . ) .?.· · ·29- 2 . 
o 5 ,. P. :u., I , fj · . c • :; ,. 
On t he cont "'::. ry , ti .~e i u but th · .flw f conscioum css .• 
"""f tisne be t ak- n e- lu'"'i ve Oi <.ill tho,.o p~ ~ ·ticulcr r et ion~, 
. . n ~ · de~t:• t~l:..,_ t d..:.v0rs i . "'y t .... c :.. a y, ~e:rely for t he ntinu-
__ ,_t .q em of e .;:·· .. : t~ · n .e or u ·a·cion n ab s t · a ct , th ,n it \·71 ~ 
rer',·" P~ . ~ rc:. vel even the . l ilo .;opher to corn .r(~hend i t . For 
rn o ·m p t. rt , 'l:.henev r I atte :1pt to r ame t he i n! l e i de a 
:':time, nbstr..:c t Gd f r ol'l the uccession o:. i de.'1"' ·i n f!lY 
··ind , ·~hL,h .flo111s u . i.for~- ly , c:m·1 1 ~, -pa:c•ti i .:J: t ' by a ll 
b· .in.r~G ,. I ~ m lost a nd eHbl"i'' 1 ,l e <l in inex licHblA dif 'i-
c u.ltics. I lv~ve no notion ox i t crt Elll: onl- ·1~.;· r oth-
r~ •·a~" it is · i ni'ini·c .ly \ivi~i l c , and spei3k o it in 
,:;uch :• 1 n • e· ! ::; le ·~d "~ .I . t o 1~ r bor o .d t l:o b:Lt ~1 1" my 
e i st:, cn ~ . : ~dnce t h::.,t )oc · :. i ne l a yG one under t.r e .:·bsolute 
n · ... u :.: uity of t ~ inldn~ .. ~ , eitner :.h<-, '.J • o p -:: 3~1es ..., ' \ y innur..er .... 
.:1 ';l<e <,. :en ~·rithout a t •loUrJ;ht, or else tha L i .;; an· i i ted 
e v· r:.r . o '":e . t of i s e z isten .. :o: ">o·th · hi~l: s?c a e rju.: lly a b .... 
Gur:1 . Ti me t~lerc -·r.n"e being nothing, abst r.:1 ·.rted .rOl;l t c 
succe ·s i n of i eas .:n our r ind· , it follo~.'is t at~ t he du ... 
. r~ ... i on o.c> t· ny f i r ic.e npi it must be e"tit. •<:1ted ·ly the nus~-
b .... .... ,...f' :t' r 'o• -· ~"'~~r ·~r·t·io ~~ -· S"""Ce~¢>d ·' nj · (.) '' 'n o·~ h·,,r in tt e .• ;; ·,., !VA. v ... , \::) v c;:.. "... --':> ' \,.&¥ \,;.; . O:.J .~ ....... ~ ., _ t~ J. k , - . #> ;t., '~ 
s :i. --·it r 'lL 1d . H .tLe 1 t i [:; : nl ·~ in cons e ·7ur:..nca t. ;: ·;.,. t -
.s- u1 : ltr~ rs · Linl~s . t~nd in truth t•thoovcr c ·: 11 ;o ·' o ;j,t 
t -t iviu·~ i i. · i ,, t i lOU ~ht <" o r <lbstr .ct tLe e' L .. t~c1n""e of :.1 
spil~::.t. frq_g6ito co( ..,itatior. , r.rill . I believe , -ind it. no e~:' sy ta~,~ 1 · 
' / 
v. luo "'t c:mce 
~lo t ~1:L1ker .. \..1S uoro dev·HJt ,':tingl y criticize· t he notion 
67 
of s ub z:t .: n ·e t.!an .~. cr _eley) :'.ile so ·,.e philoso hers be li ve 
t a ~ ;;;ubst;an(.:e or matter is 
;jected i t oth in the e " inte11 olo ;~ic 1 ~'n.i met,:. physic!l.l sense . 
I _n refcrr il. ,_, to ~ .. hysic~1 ohj · c , one do~s not. - cfer 'to r:: ..::~ub-
,. 6 
u ' . 67. 
~ I, .Lc,. 98 ~ 
Ber keley, ne erthel -~s, u t 
s u'.Jct :..nee, c pro bl ·· N -co be 
t. i : ies hel 
isc ~ ... ed 




e i ..;ni i 'i . . by n a i n ol~~ ~·;ord . 
If' n · t -.: :.1n its existenee be i nfer red from 
not ~ lv~ c - 1:-10 ollo :s from the discut5 inn above it - EL·-:>ides h~.s 
otrm co :t•;ci u sn'1H(> one e e i c.nees onl 7 •nseJ · { ua lit i r1s a nd 
n vor ,; z b tr· t n t1hich flo! .t.::ho\·r support. ~· the se . 
· urr inr~; to hi n lo• ic.· 1 H gumen4. s · ~,. inst t. 1e "li .f' in 
b "" unk ot· ~ )1 .; . If unkno ·able 1 ;;. i · . osophie · l . rin-
..;i ;') . ·• becc '.Wo -l ilo.:.o .. !'Y io co · cernec onl y •· i t. t Le t.l ir s 
=. n t .c otl:er h n(l , !!1< tter i , knovm - t :.n it i u .. 
; ct ·· ~;:; ... (·.:nciplo . 3ut t l is is to ontr:,.di t tl e not · on of 
~, pt·i neiple )f 
cxr l;::m.ition, for OtJ,lY i l"l min 
a nd c :::usal ·.-.~en ' 069 
oes m~ e.;; p·~ i nee , cti.vity 
1 If m.G.t~:.e s .. ports vens 'bl (,U"l.:.ti ·: it Cl'1no · b. i ~e~;.­
tif i 0d t-Jith r, ny ona qn ... - li~~r~ Y:et hot e-.;·.n s ubst r a tur .:"' u. 
. • • 1 • • t d? p r~ e x ·8ns on 11~ 1out o~ 1n~ ex on .c . Hot ~~ n n thin~-in-
it.s lf, tmcolor d , be 1 · kc c· 1 - • or i. a udi ble , "' i ke, 
7 1 
. a _ns : tion . 
6 i:' . , I , .... ec. · ·::J > l l;.S ; T .' ~·:P , I , It- J6 , 4 ·J . 
(:9 . 'lD HP ~ I , 1~3., 43j. 
7\) . IY:. J I, 41'7- l .. l'~ . 
n the 
f5 
othlr 1a1.d , · o supp f e i t re ~;;c .bled OlP o • :~.11 o o r s~n-
~:J ations ' ho ·.r shc:-.11 t·re a able to di~·tinJ:uish ;..he t rue co y 
?l 
f ror al se one7 tt T' e o cep ·· o su stan e , in o h .,r 
"t· ord,;;> ~ r"'p.~, o i uces t 1e probl~~ 1 it i s supposed to solve) 
I.f u st[~nca must be, yet e ·~ c. not. be , likG C' ene.a .ion , 
t .1 t e ~a·terialist ~~s""erts .• eo -':" n u _mo\:r< ble . T a 
U~ l . ·;.1 •f {~\ le is t l.e ref uge o.f ph.:loso. hieal em urds , for one 
p e:o .;le -=· f·is r i vilege of m!;J.kl n an a ~ sertion while ~t t he 
;,';l i s · ·ncy : n only be a ~ lied to d f inite, intelligi ble notions . 
'.t'h ~"'n· y · i n.,, o e c ··m c y about r.lC"'l tter i s t at i t exist~ ,. 
?2 
·i!-- ici s l:lcgel urges, i s to s ·.Y not in~. Can a pl a in man , 
l ~l. ~.lon::.- ""pt il s o_ 'mr , n At· n' t o b~lieve ttyo _no·Y not 
. ?3~ 
vh ."- =- :. •:)U k m not : ... y ? 
\TJer ··el ;y 1 vels another ".:'r r.;ument a. a ins ··· su~ ;:J t ance , n.:: .... e -
ly, c.! ·: & :t gume:rt · r n=zl co 1er.:.nce . 1\'!lw belief in mat~t -rr re.:.ts 
o: t11o :·~-PP~ ·i t ion , erkel ·Y rot:: i nt a in·:-- , th~t a t.hin , i::.> ~ 
at ·:. · i ··, . eli'- -:>uft i c i ... 1t entity n :~e inJ:, no fuT>t.her refer .. nee 
;J:l .;. - ~ , ur c ang_ng ent ity •·r:lich pc.opl 3 reg ... :rd ,,.,. r ·~ttar . Pe yl.> 
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rkf~l y t-ras . ppe '·' ling o c ·.e. en ... .... -.han , 
i 1 r e ·,"uting t e concept of i nJopondent ly e~l ob j ~ c ts ,. ho 
o J 1_.e 
l os ·.· g 
ir vi nr; 
:.1.:.-r ~e l :.y ev m i 
sor v r . '·. us ! Ti l d 
:Je find 
hi .G l a t e r ,ork , . he ' l .. eo 
'18 
tr ·.ed ~o r>luc ~· e co1 .on t.en ·e . 
, t r:.e , .!. r E' 11 t i.l\.:! ir 
•. : r n:i n · .. i ro .. co. ; c i u.sne , ~) ~ n -..:t."'u. te . ..1.. rom t 1 l c-. ·t · t~r :1nd 
n ep d _: t met · phy ;., i ::! "' - , n ~.~itir~ s i n ter . ~J o..:.. 
i!'.:: h the universe and '~he mind. a ~"'e co 1s trueu , t :.ey be co ·e 
? •) 
Tl i · ~s t 1e i ~ort ant lesson of 1erk .l oY' o 
t 1 ... ol .. Y i' t ae cato or i e :tor ideali~n -. Both tl e t t eorie 
. n ~ ~.- ut h · v:.. been e qua l l y i n ..:. luet ti· ·l : nc b fore 
75. ~.- i l d ' .l ' l ?8 . . 
76 ,. ~ . i l l , ·s , 178- 179 . 
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4. The Emr i rieal Test oi' Truth . 
If~ aerkcley·t s empi r ical test of truth canno.t be G.ccepted 
is toto it at leq-.st exposes t.he t'Teok:nesses of' doctrines h:ich 
h;.;ve passed tor a t heory of tru.th.. One of its most i npol"t<"'nt 
.eol'l.tributions is its criticism o.f skeptic:isr11• The source of 
s kepticism, Berkeley mainta i ns , lies in realism: in t:-.he pre ... 
~; pposition that the reul is "singl e , unchanged, U..l'lp ,:)reeiv ... 
so 
ahle" * Thus when t-te see t h i n.";G changing , \"Ihen our naoses 
re ;eal di .fferent obj(1Ct,-:. un<iet• diff erent circumst;,;tnces the 
sophi st concludes that our senses ar·e not to . e trus ted.. Yet 
the true i s no·t necess:'.ril y the sta tio • A sker->tic t..rouid ... sk. : 
How can s rao.n be mistaken in t.h:Lnking the moon a ;pla!_n 
l ucid $U.rfaea about a oot in di ameter; or a s~uar$ .. tot' er 
seen a t a daftnnce round ,. if truth i s derived from ,.our 
ex.p .ri ence? · .. · · 
The man , Be:r!l;·eley t•etorts • nis not mist aken 111 th regar~l to 
ideas (sens:.ations) he actut:1lly pereeives but in the inf'erenees 
. ~2 
he makes f t"om his present pareapt:Lons . n That i s .. he i s mis-
t aken in the 
\'II"Ong .judgment s he rnakes Conce rning t he ideas he eomprohflnds 
80 TDIW ; I , 464. 
" $1. Tll lfP t .I ,. 45 5. 
$2 . TDHP , I . 455 .... 456. 
to h conn cted ··TitL those i mn di,~ t ly ::er eive , or 
concerning t .e i deas that , from •:Jh t h pErc ivl.'\ s 2' t 
r ·sent , ho~!mtF7in , uo .1ld be p,~rceived in other .ir-
e stances . ·-
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Truth then is derive- • first , fror.1 an a.c .. ur ato report of 
our senses , a 1d , .. . c · nd 1 y • f r om o. coherent account of" our 
84 
sensory expt, r i ences . "·.sk t he . ardenor ,rhy he t hi nks t.a 
yonder cherr~r tl"ee exists . He \'till r eply because h see gs 
and fee l s it ; bec.:?.uce he percei v i t . " The mat erialist 
:.a tlerkeley both a J_ree t h· t e percei ve only se s i bl qual -
itie s ·. 
u t here i n we dif.f'er--you ( Hyl · s) ,ri ll h., vc t~hem e empty 
.::a ppearances , I reag6bc i ng-v . In short you do not tru,t your senses , l do ••• I do not pretend to be a etter.-up 
of ne\'t noti ons . 1Y en, et vors t nd only to unite • ·~nd 
pl ace i n a cl earer lip .t, th t t r uth vrhich vtas be or e 
sh;:.r d bet een 'the vul ftar an the philosop 1er : ..... the 
former bei n , of opinion th,_t those t hi ng h ·ch t hey 
i m1 ediately erceiva are th · real thin~s; on i the V tter , 
t h' t the thi n s i mmedi a tel y perceived are i deas , 1:thi ch 
exist only i n the mi n • ''hi ch t '10 notions put t o ethor , g 
do , in ffect , const i tute the substance o :rhat I " dv r c • · ?· 
Has any philosopher made a more convino i n. , a peal to com on 
oens ? Has any thi nke .... mor. abl y combi ne common s .-... nso '"i th 
phi losopby·t 
aut this i s only on(~ si e of l3erkel ey' s c r1 teri on of 
t r uth . Truth i s not only the i uunedi ately experi ence 1 u.t 
8J . DHP• I . 456. 
€4 .. TDHP. , I , 455 , 456 , 461 , 464 . 
5. ~~ : l; ~ 51 .. $6. I ~ !;.03 • 
e'' f • 'I.'. i:lP ' I , 4$4.· 
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the coherent account or th,'lt ex . erie nee . «!he more a n 
no·.-.. of t he connection of i d as (sans t i on · ) , the more is 
he ... i d to know the natur e o.: t hint!;s , " Berk..,.ley sta te.... . The 
fa -...t s of our dre m life are true only in the sen e th. t t h y 
are ... pori e nced . Hu t they r f'a l se i f they ar e trlms f'erred 
into .judgmentH .lbout the character o t he real--fa l s e beeE: llSe 
t hey l ack that steadines.· , orde r n j coher nee which ch::lra c .... 
teri .ae ou real l ife .. In othe r ords , Ber kel ey, i n a rgui 
f or cot erence , hc:;.s not abr,ndone ~ is empir i ci sm · ut has ex-
p · nded i t int o a t heory \'Th i ch et bodi es the coherent examin-
ation of' the i mmedia te f'a cts of consciousness . 'l•he rea l mu t 
not only be a n experi ence ; t hen , but a coher nt ex erience 1 
which in the l st a.n~ lys i s , i s , .for erkel e y , t he <~ uprerne 
tserkel ey ' s empi r ic '"l crit e r i on of truth serves ~s a n 
i mport ant cri t i uo o. Kant t a noti on of a. .,t hin ..:,•in-its .~lf" 
or any met aphysics t'lhieh advances the unkno ·able s a. f ir t 
principle. 'l'he "thin, -in• ·its:.. l f ", Berke ley ould ar e .; 
follow.' from our suppo s inF:: , d i ffer ence bet ·~e n tl ings 
and i deas and that the for m r have a subs i stene Jith• 
out tbo mi nd or unp")rc i ved . It were er~sy to dil: t e 
on thi o subject ancl sho t ho 1 the a r p.ument s 1.1rged by .t he 
Qkeptie ~ n all :,,g .... s depend on t he s upposi t ion of e xtern· 1 
ob j ects • ...., 
• h .. -ti;. i s .'(lo· ·e, in so t ar as a t hing is unkno I< ble it n ver 
$$ . '1tDHP , I , 464. 
89 • P HK , I , Sec • 7 9 • 
enters a..-.:yone ' s exper i nee an ... onsequ. .ntlw i s p: ilo t:;ophi ! .lly 
irrelevr-:.ut . In so .,; a r as it i · known i t is a lready exnari-~ nced ~ 
hence no longer t he unkno~r~ble . l.h tei•er i s re 1, t h n , i s 
90 
either axper i ~nee t or e . . n be ex f.-)ri~nced . 'I'hi n additional 
·: I" ument of tJerkeley' s ha ..... been util · ae u y 1 t ~r i .1 a·· l1 ts , 
particul.~.rly Royce An d Hocking . 
5 . uri'bi i sm of · erkeley' s I nte retation of ·r.:xperi en a " 
i . Berkeley' s l lege r Subjeetivism. 
It should be clear by now that i n no sen e was Berkeley 
.~~ subje ct i vi st . The d if erence het . een Berkeley ancl his crit • 
ics is not hether a sens tion or an object (colleet:i.ona or 
combinations of sen e. qualitie · ) can exist i nde pendently of 
my mind but '1h.cther t hey have meaning apart :fr om mind in en-
era.l: \' hether eo lor • li'ght etc ., an . infer nces fro. t . se, 
can exi ot apar"" f rom· mind • 
. tte pts to give i rJL'led i a tely xperi onaed sense qua liti es 
c.:' n ind pendent status lead to certa in mis ::.ivinE! • E"ifen an 
acute t hinker as Bertr~.nd Russell, ho criticizes Berkel ey 
on the round that the appreh~nsion of color doe not i pl y 
the ment al existt ... nce of' color , l a t er f'Oes on, i n defendin 
a theory of kno•l'fled )e · s both medi ate and 1 medi ate "' cqu ... i n-
t ance, to ·· r..... e that t he essence of color" i s the ex · eri ene 
a f it • Thi inconsi s tency is observed in the .follo ·ri ng s t atement: 
The P• ·l't i cular shade o · col or t h· t I '.m seei ng rn. y hHve 
9 • PHK. ! ; : co . 20 . 
. an:y t h inP.s zai ab ut it--! may s e that it i s br o , tA .• t 
i t i s rat r dark nd so on . But suol statam~:: t s , thou . h 
t hey ka me kno,; truths about t he col r • do not t'!l'·' ke e 
no the color itself .. ny batt r · tl '"'n I di d · E!fore : s o f r 
r s concerns krto t l edgo of the color it3el i' , (: s o pos d .to 
kno'lttledge of truths about it , I kno t he color p r.fectly 
an eo pl etely ~ rhon I s ee it, a nd no fur ... J:.:er kno '11 d o 
it•:-elf• i s ev n t heoretic ' lly osst · l e . Thus the s nse-
d<;lta l'lhieh . · ke u the a e r ne of my t able re t h.in~s 
with 1; hich I bave a oqua · ~tr: nee. t hings immed i a tely known 
o me just as they are • . 
E'1:om this account • tha t i s color a p rt .fr om t he experi ence o£ 
i t ? 
1r • ussell' a in cr iticis:: of Berkeley •. a s mention d 
e r lL.r, is Berkel ey' s a.l le ed ( .. obi .. i t y of the phr .. se "-in the 
min n .: '!hat Berkeley docs , Russell ax\ _ es , i s to exploit t hat 
• 1 bi ,_..uity in deren-.> of i d alism ,. 
~'le think: of n i dea " s e soenti l l Y son1ethi n,§. in so e ... 
body ' s mind and thus \If 1en we are t ol t · '· t a tree con-
s ists entirely of 1 ees , it i s n-.. tur· 1 to su ose th"t. 
i f so the tree must e ent irely in minds . But t he notion 
of bein ::; in t e mind i s am i ~ ous . ;Je pe"'k o · be...,.ring 
a pers on in mind not r!le¢l ning th.f.t t he p_r• on is 1~2our 
minds , · ut t hat a t hou "Lt of him i s in our min s . 
Berkeley ant ioip· .... tcd t hi .. ., criticism, a he anticipated . ost 
c i t ici m l eveled a a i n this idealism. 'l'hus he s t.,tes : 
hen I s pe k of obje ts <: s exiati n ~ in the ind or im .. 
pri nted on the s enses . I rould not be understood in the 
gross litera l sense ; c s ' hen bodi es a re said to ex . t . i n 
91. Russell, PP, 73·74. He r e, Ru.s --11 seems to ::. a nt aerlm• 
l oy• s point 11he n enthusiastically advancin(' hi s t · or~ of 
r;. cqu~tint nee a nc description. 
92 . Rus. ell , PF , 63 . 
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t~ pl~ce or a seal to m~ ko a n impre ,sion upon W' x . y 
• aani ng i s only thnt the min comprehends or perceive .. 
,hem; .~ nd t hr- t it is a.ffeeted fro \'tithout or by so 
be1nr_: d. istinct from it elf . '!'hi s is my explicati n or 
your diffieult y and ho ·1 it C i: n serve to make your t net 
o£ an unp~r .eiving materi al su stratum intelli ibl • I 
'tmuld f in to knot1. 93 
rkeley' s point i s t hat sense qualiti ·. s a r e not "'patial -
ly in t~1e mind in t he literal sense but that they have no 
me::tning anart rom an apprehension of them. In short he 1"'. 
s yi ng exactl y rhat Russell say in the above quotution. r ind 
and sense dat a re inseparable entities tthich cun never be 
severed . lJhatever else t he univer...,e might e . i t c ·nnot be 
anythin"' l ess t han mental . .s .f.or the ambiguity of t he term, 
" i de· u , Berke l ey u su.::'' lly means by that l:rord a sensation . or 
94 95 
an i , n.ge . C neept he refer~ to as notions . Now,. 1r. 
Russell' a critic i s t-Tould be valid only i f Berkel ey believed 
that t '1e obje t #rnbodied more than sensations und ima _,e f'l d -
rived f r om them. llut such is not the oaso . The trea. for 
ex:..mple ; i s just a group of sans· tions •. · Berkeley ha "' lready 
disnosed of matter or s ubstr:a.tum underlying the sense qualities 
which a -ttree91 r veals. ~ realism must; sho\1 that t he tree is 
more than en ible qu lities , hether it be matter, neutral 
lo,dca l entitie s or tvhat have you, or th.-1.t sens-=-tions t hem-
selves re t he real er1titieo • hich e n enjoy ' n in epen ent 
9J. 'l'DHP, I,. 470. 
94 . PHK , I, · ~:kc •. 53 ; T\TVE, II. , 386 . 
95. PHK , I, -:'ec . lZ, 100, 142; TDHP ,. I, 432 ; 46S; ,;; I R, III, 
Sec . :1.35 • 337. 
existence. The pheno ten l i :3ts have t .en ove r t .e l atter 
t a sk \"'h icL leaves t he re;.:llist ·rith the former . Of course 
the r ationalistic i dealist believes that t he tree is more 
than sensible qualities, but the ''more" is i n the form of 
concepts ·thich make thes -) qu liti s i ntelligibl e , and he 
l'roul . not thi nk that a concept could e ver be severed .from 
·'· 
mind . For erkeley the object a nd t he sense dat a are 1,~ 
dentical , and the "more" i s neithe r a substratum nor a :con-
cept. but t he will of t he Supreme ~ :lnd , 
In no ;,-tay, then , does Berke ley's i dealism "depend for 
i ts plausi bility upon confus ing t he t h ine: a pprehonded r •• ith 
96 
t he act of apprehension . " On the c ntrary , Berkeley was 
one of the first mode?n phi ·op~ers to make t his distinc-
t i on clear : the distinction b e t ...,.re en pu.re apprehension, the 
purely .:tctive and apprehensive mind , and t he pass ive , i n-
ert i deas (sensations or i m ges ) of the mind ; a di st i nction 
which ltTe eli eve , if Kan~: and Hegel ' s analyses of exper .. 
ience have anything to offer , c a nnot e a ccepted as final . 
It i s ironica l tha t the very dist i nction t-1hio h ... erkel ey in-
sists upon i s em l oy · d by the • nglish re a. li..~ ts in t heir at-
temnt to refute him. 
huss e l l ' s criticism is simil a r to t hat of G. E . ¥oor et 
The essence of Pr, · re ' s "cla s s ic" Refutatio11 Q.f. Idealism· i s 
simpl y the statement of the fact that v1e al.l make obj .. c t ive 
96 ~ Russell, PP , 65 . 
9? 
ref'arences . ~ihile Aoore' s critic ·· s m conve ys a n i mportant 
message; it i s not really a criticism of Ber keley ' s vie\'T in 
s pite of the f'ac t tha t i t was Urected ag·- inst tha t thinker . 
Berk;eley - r es a long 1;lith 1 ~oo .. e a nd most thinkers that · e 
mako ref'erences to objects \·rhicl vre do not create . The only 
difference i s that the o jects (collections of sense dAta) 
are imr1e di ately apprehenc ed . Othe :n.·dse his · rgurnents bi· 
defense of i deal i sm \'IOul d be pointless . The r ef'erenee . to a n 
ext·arn 1 obje c t i s so un iversal • ract • Berkeley eo·ntends , 
that people have gone to tlte extreme of ar ing th >t obj cts 
ca n exist independently of ~11 min:i . It is this un t c rr"" nted 
!' intro jection'* which affords the s t e ppi n g stone of Bark le ' ' s 
critique of ma teria lism . 
The general impact of f.loore ' s crit icism , and hi s philos-
ophy of mind in genera l , is in showing the t mi nd .and datum 
ca n ne ver be e qur.Jted.. :vi thout an objective reference to · a 
... 
da tum the concept of cons ciousness itself l-tould be i mposs ibl e , 
for consciousness t s defined in terms of its other--i ts ref-
erent . Just a s t he concept of time is meaningl ess 1-lit ·~ out 
some type of perm:1.nence , so the eonce . t of consciousnes ~!i is 
inconceiva ble a.pa.r t from s ome kind of refere nce to <-m externa l 
order . But t he f act of externa l r eference is no rgument . 
97 . ;Ioore, arrhe Refuta tion of Ideal i sm" , tn Moore , PS . Bu t 
: oore believeH tha t objective r efer ence is to u s e ns e 
datum , a problem to be discussed resently . 
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a.ga. in t Berkeley . The problem is whether the ref .. rent pos -
sesses any meaning apart from t he .r ef er enee , t ha t is, apart 
from all spirits , i nclud ing God: whether t he organic relation 
bet ·1een mind and 1 ts ob ,j e ets can ever be severed. . Fe , if ·any, 
idealists believe t ·1at cons ciousness ean exist a part from its 
ob j ects; for wh t reas ons can a rea list believe t hat the ob-
jeot. can. exist independently of mind? The problem her·e, o~ 
course. has to do ¥itll the natureot the object, and 9Y ex• 
posing the inconsis t encies involved i n art i ndependent . inert 
substratu~ or matter , and by r educing t he object to a collec~ 
t ion of sensa tions, Berkeley is cleared :from Uoore's indict-
ment. 
The merit of Ber keley ' s , pos ition , and idealism generally.; 
is th~t he oan .acccm:nt for t ho objective refernee w· ithout 
havino to s a cr ifice hi s ~ ea.lism. The vorld order is an in-
dependent sys tem of sens tions ~hich convey meani ng ena.blin 
us to ap~rehend i ntellig i ble ob jects. '!hile this order i s an 
expression of e.Supreme .. .lind it i s i n no case crea ted by t he 
finite kno1; er. The mate~ial substance of t he materialist, 
t he lo ioal entities of t he neo-rea lists, the spa .ce-time 
e'Ven t s of oerte. in physical rea.lia ts have not only to account 
tor awareness but a consc iousness of t hems elves as s om.ething 
other than •. yet a t the same time identic 1 with , thems elves . 
If t ... , double refer ence of cons ciousness i s to be s a"V'ed, t he 
r ·ea l1.st must defend t h i s propos ition , odd as it may s ound. 
eit er by a double aspect t heor y , an ep i s t emio moni sm , or a. 
doctrine of' emergence . 
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Returni ng , t hen , to r· oore ' s criticism, t he f a ..... t the t c on-
s c iousness points beyond itself i s no A'- ' ment against t l .e 
beli t:> f tha t t he referent c <. n ha ve no meF. ning a pa rt from 
consciousness in general. In f a ct i t is no argument agi: inst 
solipsism. The solips i st could a r gue tha t our experience is 
just a d r e <;;.m life in t"lhich externa l refere nces are tnfH~t e .but 
v1hich a dmittedl y possess no objectivity. ·e have to g(): be-
i 
yo;nd the simple ana lysis of ob j e ctive reference t o ct:i.~G8'ver 
just \'lhe1 t kind of rea lity the object ha s , just a s a · ph;tlos-
ophy of' religion must go b (~yond t he f~ ct tha t one m- kes a n 
objective reference in t-rorship , or in the r e a l m of eth ics . 
t ha t one ma kes objec tive va lue claims . 
•Jhile t he spir it of r!oore t s ar ticle cor veys the importance 
of object i ve reference , the .,may he· sta t es t he probl em r a i ses 
ad ii tiona l ones.. f.!oor e , in his a rticle con t e n ls t ha t · t he ob-
jec t ive reference is made to a sensum, a nd in t h i s r espect he 
9 ~ 
a grees 't'Tith Berkeley. The only diff e rence is th1~1t Hoore be-
lieves t he sens um to be ultima t e l y non ... mental. But t he ques .. 
tion i < , firs t , :rhether t he sensum is t he referent, a nd , s ec .. 
onu).y, whether t he sensum ca n be ind-ependent of sensin~ . · Con ... 
ce rning t he sec nd questi n , ucasse , in c r iticizin1: ~'·OQre• s 
article , a r gues t ha t t he t\'10 are insepa r able . The. s ens ing of 
blue is no different from striking a strike; "blue" , ''bi..'tter" 
etc .. n a re na es no t of objec ts of e xper i ence but o species 
':W ~ 1•1oore , P ~3 , 26 • ..... i 
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of e xperie ce itself . ·ro t he ob j ection that on · never sen ~) es 
a blue or bitter in ~eneral but a kind of blue or bitter, i.e., 
a c ~"' se of blue or bitter, Ducasse repli es t hf'\ t thes e deterrni· 
na te ca.::J es of .qualities are simply "express ions \'lh ich '1e r e fer 
not to ca ses but to deterr :in,~· tes , i .e., to infirmHe· s .Pe-cies, 
--- n 100 · · , 
of th~: t dete rmi n, te kind . Hence t hese determin t e sense • 
t i ons repr~ sent part icula r kinds of awareness or sensing . The 
question is , Duca sse asks , 
whether t he a ·m.::·eness i s d i st i n .ui s ha ble from t he ' lue · 
as f or ins t ance green is from s~ieet--1. e ., ·:~.s ·case . of 
one s pecies from a c ~1 se of a locric::'llly indepe n ·ent ~pecies 
-..;. or on t he contrary ( •cl s I contend) as a c a se of . a.>. genus 
. i s di stinguishable (by abstra c t ive observa t i on ) l'titl~in 
a ea se of a ny one of its s pecies--f 6r i nstance,, a~ ~ .~ 
•. Qa se of generic a ct i vit'{, "to dancen i s by abs :tra¢-,:.Jve 
. observ·~ tion distin _ ui shable wi t h in any c se of th(? ;.· ~pecies 
of tha t enus ca lled "to waltz tt? l 01 . . _···: 
hoore in his reply gr ants that t he sensum c annot be i ndf! ... 
pa.ndent of sensing , but will not gra.nt the v· liditY· O~·.~~ .... 
dasse ' s arguments , which creates a.n inter esting s ituatt6n. 
11<1oore ,QOntends that t ' e sen s inp: of blue i s not ana l A.pous t o 
s.t,rik ing · a stroke . In the l a t ter a se, f•1oore ma inta ins, it 
.. --:-. · .. 
·:· ;:: 
i s contra.-' ict or y to suppose a s trike C'.tn exist withou t : ~pe 
a ct of striking , "Vthile i t i s not contr a d i .ctory to s uppose 11 
. sensation of blue to exi st without the sensing of it• < What 
Schilpp , PGEA, 232 . 
.:.l ch llpp , Pu ;1~~ , 2 ~ .3 . 
Schilpp , porM , 2 ~9 . 
·.'' .... ::!· . 
·, .·, 
'·. : . 
. . ·t 
&8 
is more , )floore mai nt a i ns t hat "I ca nnot see t;he s en s i ' l o 
quali t y. blue , without d i rect l y see in~ somethi nr ~hich ha s 
. .102 
t h :... t qua lity-- 3. blue patcl· , a bl ue speck .... etc·" 
Here Moore has hit t he nail on the head . While he wil . 
not r...rant t he .for ce of Ducnsse 1 s argument , he is .foreed: t ·o 
admi t t hat t he referent is more t han a sensum-- a unitary 
o-b je·ct. But Due a sse , it ·rill be noted, is not contend ing 
t hat ob,je ct s c .. nnot have an extra-- or even a non ... mental ex-
l U3 
istence. He is s i mply s t a ting tha t a sensum is me~ningless 
l C;4 
apart fr om t he ·ct of s ens ing . 
102 . Schil pp , PGEI~ , 65 <?- . 
103 . Sc hilpp , P ?M , 242 . 
104 . Schil Jp , PGEiti , 2l;.2- 251. While t hi s dissertet ion up ... 
holds t he viet! . of t he s ubjectivity of s ,nse .... dat a , the 
a r p:uments cited above · r e by no means concl us ive . As 
Moore has pointed out in his re ply; t he sense .... da ta be .. 
lon '?· to t he object and t· hy should t hey be s e ,;a r a t d out 
of t he tota l complex rhicl. \'le regard a s object a nd i v ... 
en a specia l t ype of exizt e nee ?· The f [ ct i s we do refer 
to sense qua lities a s beloneing to objects , a lon .ll'ri th 
other f actors actmittedly not i mmedi ately expe r ienced. 
And t hough the s ensi ng cannot be independent of t he 
sensum, t here certainly must be a diff erence betw$en 
·· t he t\'10 sir..ply bec,::ms e a s ensa t i on of blue i s n~t · p. 
blue sensa tion . In t hi s sense Due,. sse has not ans"rered 
.Moore ' s f i rst article . ~Jhat makes t he situat ion \iorse 
· is t ne f act t ha t .f'.1oore does not a dnut t he force ot Du ... 
ca sse ' s r efutation ye t at t he s a m .... time be lieves tha t 
Tfthere must be some .:Jood rea son" to suppose t hat t he 
"esse oTSensib le qualities i s pe r cinft1 • Schil pp ;: .· PG •J 
61:)().'"" Hut t he i mpor t ant oint i ~. t na t t he reference is 
mor e than t he sens um , even i.f .one gra nts t he objectivity 
of sense da t a . Conceptual e l ements , 1•.rhich transcend t he 
i mmedia tely sensed , a re involved. Thi s point 't!"Till. e 
developed in t he follo\...ri ng section and in Chapter iii . It 
concerns t~ e problem thich d i s tingui she s t he 8erkeleion 
a nd Kanti an appr oa cl es to i de a lism. 
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ii. Berkeley's Alleged Epistel!lologica l !·1onism .•. 
1 oor e ' s crit icism r a ises anot 1e r )roblen - ... n amely, tha t 
Berke ley i s an epistemolo~,ical monist a nd that he s -~ands or 
falls ac cor d ing to the truth of that posit ion . Those , of 
course , Tho l evel t h i s crit icism ass ume tha t epi stemol o·gi ca l 
' . ' 
monism i s an unten· b l e viel'r . Bu t i f t heir crit ic: ism is ~v'-' lid 
they \'J'OUld first Obviously have to S h 0 \'1 the fal sehood of · t hat 
position . . .. 
The phras r,-;. "epistemol ogica l moni tim" i "" , m' iguous ~ It . c a n 
mean t hat , in knowin;~ , the i de a a nd the objAc't are quantt~ 
tati vely or numerica lly ·the same ., Or i t oan me:-' n that t r ey' 
are qualit at i vely t he same . Only i n t he l a tter sense is 
·.' l 't5 
B~.f~e1ey · monist . One ' s i dea i s not numer i ca lly i dentic a l 
u ith t he object ive i de a ( God ' s i dea ) . On t he contrary, God 's 
. . 106 
i cte·as a ccor ding to Bel .. keley are a rche t y ,s of mant:s i de'a s . 
'l'he object t the sensa tion} i s not created by the person b t.l.t 
belongs to an order i nde pendent or my knovting it , but n()t of 
107 
cours e inde pe nde nt of God ' s consc iousnes.s . 
But Berkeley "ras an e pisternol o r';ica l monist in t he sense 
t h::t o j a cts re perc ived immeiia tely , not medi aL.l y , a nd l Og . 
tha t t hey are nothing ut oups of sen~a " I t i s on t hi s 
b asis .1:3er kele y ha be e n cri ticized an' on "t-thi ch he has been 
105~ 
lzo6 . 
l u? . 
l CJ . 
Derta in passage s , h,)\'reve r ~ do indicate a rnonistn in t he 
f or mer sense . ur. TDHP , I , 464 , 4.67 ; 468 . 
SIR, II I , ~e • 335 , 337. 
PHK , I , Sec . 29 , 90 . 
PHK, I , ve e . 99 , 14$ ; TDHP , I , 406 , 469. 
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mi.sinterpreted as a subjectivis t . An epistemological mon ... 
ism of this t ype does not necessarily e,ntail solipsism. To 
ar gue that one i s i mr.lediatcly awar e of the r eferent i s not 
to s c..y t hat the object ca nnot exist in.::le .endently of one's 
'i\•taruness of it . It exists, :for Berkeley, in the mind ?f God . 
The u:!ity and meaning of the sensa are m· de possible l,)y God ' s 
et ernal concept .s or archetypes . Archet ypes , Berkeley .s a ys, 
serve t he nends of identity11 and guar·antee pe!·m· m~nce in the 
109 
midst f cl a nge . \'lhil , eterna l , forms are not rei ie l. i nto 
independent univers~ l s but simply exi st as eternal concepts 
110 
i n the mind of God. 
John Uild contends that the t heor y o .. a rchetypes .is a 
111 
culmination of Berkeley' s quest for t he concrete . Berkeley, 
Wil maintains , found in the a r chetypes a conorete ·untvers "-11 , 
stability amidst chcmge and relut i vity . Only in t hi s . stagr~ 
i d Her keley e1 neipat e himse l f .from the "absurd view that 
112 
' to be i s to be pereei ved .' " 
Nor f urther more , in t his final per iod of tlerkel e y ' s de-
velopment , is it possible t o think of him a s a spiritist 
s i n e sep:~rable and di sti nct s pi rit"' , i f they exist , pre-
suppose an !~~olute or "infinite·'mind "t hich om:-Jrn ends 
all t hings ••• The self, as well a s the wor l d, is n 
ab s traot ion.ll4 
109. 'l'DHP, I, 468; ::> IR, III , 3ee. 347-31.-9 . 
110 . TDHP , I, 474-476; SIR , III , f" ec .. 347•349 . 
111 . \vild , GB , l$4. 
112~ \ i ld , GB, 184 . 
113. !ild , GB , 1$4. 
114 . Wild • GB , 170 . 
-·--.. 
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Undoubtedly, t he t heory of archetyneo t-rithin t ·1e !~upreme 
!•lind represented Berkeley's search for t he concrete, t hat is, 
the coherent, and ltJild ht-ts rendered a great service to his-
toriaa l criticism in point i ng out t he ob jective .fe a tures i n 
Berkeley ' s philosophy . But t l a t Berkeley emancipa ted himself 
from subject ivism only in his l a ter writings and that he a ... 
bandoned his s pirit ism are simply not true. At no time ?ras 
Berkeley a s ubjectivist. In his earlier work , the Priheiples 
.2! Hura.an Knmded.P;e, Berkeley wn.rns his readers aga inst a su · -
115. jectivist interpreta tion of his writing . 
As .for aban onin,s h i s spiri tis , everything rests upon 
the interpreta tion of t he t-1ord "presup osos" in the quotation 
from 1~ild cited above. That finite minds presuppose the in- ·. 
finite does not necessarily entail pantheism. The mind could 
s~ill poss ess a relat ive metaphysica l existence even though 
that might involve dependence . What i s mor e, 1i1d' s contention 
that spiritism i s unbecomin , to tha t "conorete" (coherent) 
logic which Berkeley 'lrta s stri vin~ ... to a tta in certa inly w.· rra n+. s 
more attention and support than Vlild gives. 
Ret urning to the ma i n problem, Berkeley is an epi stemo-
1o:::.ica1 monist in the sense that t he obj e.::! t is i mmed i a tely 
perceived " This follo1,-rs inevitably from his t eory of per-
ception, since the object is only a collection of sensa im-
116 
media tely intuited . 
115 • P HK, I, Sec. 146 ff. 
116 . PHK , I, Sec. 99, 14$ ; TDHP, I, 406, 469. 
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;: ·'. :- . ··~ .: 
.n e pistemology of t his type represents Merkeley' s app nse-
me nt of common senne , for if he could s how tha t '\!that on~ im-
me di a tely perceives i::; the ob ect he would not only a pea l 
to t c 'pl .. in man's" vie~f of' ob,jects, but wo ld rem ve· the 
.': . . · 
source of ske t icism and ap.:nost ioism. Ske pticism arises~ 
... 
.t:S~r!~eley thouf""h t. , Hhen one supposes t hat there is mot'e·· :t .o 
• I ! . ,~ 
an object than sense- da.ta , or \'lhen one " elieves tha. t se~,.se-
dat a f a il to revea l the re , 1 object. 
a c'ctimul;:'l+-.,e ~·.r.hen one a ttempts to sho 1 how the objec;t i s ~elated 
to ~hese da. t a and ho'l one i s able to reach a n object · n(i tes t 
i ts reality by a me di a te, r ather than an i mmed i ate , kn~~ .. 
117 
l edge of it. Nov1 the question is, to what extent do the 
stock a rguments aga i nst e istei!tological mon ism affect Ser.ke-
l ey' s vie,-r? Of the many ar guments utilized against a theory 
of irect ac ~ uaintance ~lith objects, the re are , I believe, 
four tha ,, are o.f re ·· 1 i mport a nce. 
The f i r st argume nt concerns the problem of error. If the 
object is i PJmediately perceived, then the problem of error 
11~ 
would never ari se . I:f t he object i s sil'lpl.y a .~oup of sense-
data immediately perceived, then what we perceive , \ve e r ce i ve, 
a nd that is the e nd of the mo. tter . It is not a question of 1.-rheth-
er facts repr esent t he object accurately simply because the ob-
ject i s nothing but the colle ction of data itself. 
117 . TDHP , 455 , 464 .. 
11( • Dr ake , et a l.,, R5 -117; El'ting, I DE , 273-2$0 . 
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hat makes this cri t icism for eful i s the fact thct we 
do make true and f alse judgments bout t he sense-dat a , not 
i n questioning their existence but in questioning their c. c-
curacy in reporting t he r object" to Nhich they refer . In 
short, the psycholo ~ical existence of error sho\s , the critic 
maintains , t hat, the object is more than t he sense- data ; that 
t he referent of t hought can neve~ be identified \lith t he i m-
mediate experience of it. The fac t of err or presupposes · a 
judgment, and , a s a judgment , concerns more than the im edi -
·~tely present . 
T~ d.:- argument is certa inly not fatal to Berkeley' s. v-iet,-1 . 
The t ruth ' of the c!riticism is that err or involves not merely 
facts but judR;ments ab ut f a"! ts . But Berkeley di d not deny 
the role of judgrn.ent in perception ,. 1'rith Berkeley , tte ,j udg ... 
ment concerns sense ... dc:. ta rather than rea l objects to t'\l'hich 
these data a re s a i d to .refer or i n ·hich they are supposed 
119 
to inhere . 
·' ince Berkeley ' s view provide s fo1~ judgments about s -nse 
facts i t theref ore makes room for t he fact of error . :.-;.at 
distingui shes his vie\<T from those of his critics ho uphold 
a viel.·J of me di ate perception is the fact t hat for Berkelc.y 
the question i s not 1hether sense-.datn accur<te l y correspond 
., . 
to a· substant i a l .or metaphysically rea l obje;-:.t but wheth er ·' 
12' 
they convey a coherent meaning . Error, then , is not a wrong 
119 • . TDHP , II , 456 . 
120 .. rrDHP t II , 455- 464. 
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judgment about a pre supposed ob ject , for t !·! e r e i s no object 
i n t l1 i s s ense , but it is a f r: lse j udgme nt about t he r. e a ning 
121 
\"-1 ich the sense .... d:~. ta ar-e su posed to convey. If, for ex-
ampl e , I attr!but~. to a cer t a i n coll ect i on of sense-da~a ' t he 
tteaning " chuirn, I would be c ommitt i ng an e r r or if a no·ther 
1 22 
meani ng \·TOul d lead to a more cohe r ent experi ence. · 
One i ,ht retor t t ha t Berke ley here is yie l ding the:: crit-
ic' s point of gr ant i ng an extra - sensory ob ject to w·h i ch sen-
sati ons · c ~urately or inaccur ate l y refe r . On t he .-:1 ontrary . 
Be:r;k~ley ' o test of c o b.e rence t ril kes c ;..1 re of the r:l< tter ·. If I 
.fa1 l.se ly ... ttri')ut. t o a gr o .1p of s en."at ions t G mea. i ng nch ir" , 
a chaotic expe rie nce results wh n I test my be l i e f 'tha t t is 
s e nsory ;~r up '\·.rill gi ve r e the sensati on of supp.ort wh~n a n-. 
·~ : 
othe r roup of sensations , my body, i s r elated t o i t in a 
certain tta y . Thi s l·a s purposely bee n phra sed in a rou.1d• 
abo _-t t ·m y to show t ha t tlte ,jud gment of err or could a rise . rith-
out ever ~oing beyond the vi w that the ob ject is a n :i.mm~d i ·, tely 
experi enced group of s .nsa . ·As long as we ha ve d i f f .rent 
t ypes of s ensations about wl:.1. icl '\'Te make predi c t ions , we. can 
define the probl em i n a way t o a ce unt .for er .or . Ducasse 
h i nts · t t hi s '''hen he sta tes : 
I n t he ca se of t he sonten .e " I see red" t he bel i e f .i t sel f 
••• cannot possi ly be a mi staken belie f . It eannot be 
121 . 'rDHP , I I, 455- 461,.. . 
122 . Be.:~keley doe n not sta t e thi s , b ut it r e p_ .. ese nts the 
logical L opJ.ica tions of h i s t heory . Cf . TDHP , II , 456. 
75 
err oneous beca us e that wLich he believes is n t a nything ., __ _ ~-. 
or e a t a ll t han is actually a nd literally seen b _:r him 
a t the moment. In t he ca se of the s ntenc' ti see. a rose't , 
on t he other hand t not only a s before may t he sentence be 
a n inco:·rect t·ror <.hn.-:· o.f' his belief , but no~ in ad 'lit ion 
his belie f itself m-'.ty be m'Lstaken : tha t w.1ich he believes 
he s e ~ s, may not be ti at he believes it to be . I t m--Y be 
sOt .ethin;~ else uhich looks the s ame a s what he belie ves 
to be t here t but the other c har acters of ·rhich a re very . 
'" i fferent; f'or these other characters~ e . g ., t actua l,-
olf<R ct.ory, ,usta tory ones, etc., of course ~ nnot be 
litera lly seen. Odor , taste , hardness , c ~ n be nseenn on -
ly i n the ellipt ical sense t h:- t t l e colors 1 t ral:J: y 
s e em to Predict to us :.;1. certain odor , taste , etc. · But 
't'fh .,never Wtl t \"Te bel "eve is something the n t.ure Of'' l'thich 
i s predicted or signi f ied even in part insteac of ~iter­
a~ly an~3 totally observed a t t he mom.:.t t , er!'or is pos-S.l.bl e • .J.. 
' . . : 
But aga in,. one mi ght a r gue 11ith E\iing tha t on a vie such 
as Berkeley' s, 
we must either put into the ph · s ica l ,. orld every ·per-
ception ( perceptutjl} any·)ody has, whether well or il_l; 
whethe r drunk or s ober , or admit t ha t in some ca s e s 
a t lea st perception i s rep:cesenta.tional . 124 
But for Berkeley there i s no in e pendent hysica l l<~orld in 
':¥hie' . to put illusionst Sense-dat .:il are communicated to man 
by Uod , a nd i f t he person f a l sely l abels them,or org nizes 
t hem in a wa y fhic would brin ~ di sorder, t hen he has com-
mit ted a n err or. • hat is more , on a ny view ill us ions , etc. , 
ar e .facts enjoyinf.! some kind of exist.nce and i f not put in-
to tho nphysica l ~:-torld " t hey have to be put some place. I f' 
not the "physica l \'Iorld" t hen mind must be desecra ted with 
these t hings , a nd t he one c a se is as bad as t he ot her. 
12.) . Ducasse , "Moore' s ' The Refuta tion of Idealism' ", in 
Sc hilpp, PGEI•i , 23 8 . 
124 . Ewin6 , I DE , 274 . 
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The second ar gument against epist·emological immediacy 
125 
concerns memory . \'!ha t \"te remember is not perceived t-rhen 
we remember itt so the critics urge, t herefore, the object, 
in the ca se of memory, cannot be i mmedi a tely apprehended . 
Like t he forrer criticism~ t his i s not fatal to Berkeleyts 
epistemic mon;J.sm. It overlooks th~ fact that for Berke'iey 
there . is no residual physical object which is remembe~ed .• 
t1hat i s remembered is simply a group of sensory .:facts · t . :htch 
. 1 26 
the present ones, in some mysterious 1ay, . a\! aken in us. ~ · · 
Onne 1tte rid ourselves of a static , rigid , "real" ob,jec~~, t"lhic h 
is supposed to exist apart from all experience, t hert there 
127 
is · no problem. In so far as sensat,ions reside in God) s e x-
perience, Berkeley has already accounted for t he objectivity 
of t he re.ferent. But the r e.rerent in Berkeley' s case is' i m-
mediately sensed facts, r ather than rea l objects to which 
these .facts are supposed to refer. 
A t hird objection to Berkeleyts type of epistemological 
monism has to do \-lith the fact or activity. !f the ob ject 
l'tere merely a ·group of sensa ~thich ar e passive ent ities, how 
could t hey ever report t hemselves? How does Berkeley's v::tev1 
account f or the fact of activity ·v.rhich science emd metaphysics 
reveal? 
Be.fore dealing \11' ith this criticism, may it be noted th<>i t 
125. Drake, et. al., OR, 63-73. 
1 26 . Ber keley do s not say this in so many '!,vords , but it 
represents , I believe. t he general tenor of' his t ... ought . 
127 ~ TDHP, I, 4; .:. , 464. 
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it de cl.s not only Ni th an epistemologica l monism, ut . ny 
vie ·.r ~ i h identi i es the object t-·ri th sens a , '.·rhet .. er t he .... a 
12 ~ 
. ~e i.mm.e i · +,ely exnerienced or not . 
' . 
Ret urning to th .... criticism, Ber kel ey• s vie\· cco:tin~s .f r 
a.cti vity , in the sense t at l oast , t hat sensory f octs , r e :· the 
. -;. 
pro uct of God ' s activi ty or ~ill . ::l cience does . not .. t-:e·if~al, 
..1 •.:. 
t. • • : 
Ber keley ins ists, t he nature , but only the rel ation::> ~- ·things . 
. · · .,· ',· 
Ul timately is there any intel l i ible vim-1 of act ivity ·. ~ 1ort 
129 ' 
of ~>litional acti~ity? 
A fourt h crit i .ism of epistemolog ica l moni sm de 1 $ · · ith 
t he existence of other minds ~ If ~e object \'re e i mmedf t e ly 
experi enced , how can erkeley g:c-:;nt t he inde pem ent existence 
of other minds? Cert inly other minds do not depend for the i 
exietence on our , or even on God ' s , perception of them,. .· Yet 
Berkeley r a nts their ex i stence indepen ~ent of a:nyone ' s per-
130 
ception o.f the r.1 . 
' Thi s crit icism overlooks t hree f acts . First , Ber kele-y 
does not contend tha t all bject"" a x-e immedi·. tely perceived. 
Only physical objects are imrne i -tely experi enced, ,!ind thi s 




~t .. C. Ewing , for example, i an epistemolo ~?iCA.l du list 
who interprets objects as "c llect' ons of sensa" ·inde ... 
pendent of our minds, a ~ ... ;.)s ib y i ndepende t o a su-
preme mi nd. Cf . Ewi .. : .. , I DE, 28g :ff . 
TDHP , I, 356 , 431 ~ 
Brightman , I TP (lst.ed . ) , 90 . Brightman, ho ever , does 
not direct his criticism to Berkeley, but to e pi s temo ... 
lo!'l'ica l monism i n general.. The neo- real i sts make a 
similar cri t icism, oddly enou .h , \."lhen they t hems ~ 1 ves 
uphol d an epi stemological monism. Cf . Holt, et 1. , 
NR , 6-7. 
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of senoations • 
.Secondly, Berkeley, as pointed out earl ier in the d is ... 
cus sion, does not object t o medi ate knowled~e as long as it 
:· . 
i s ba sed on a lo~d cal in.ferenoc from facts immediately sense d 
132 ' 
or known"' Matter i s refuted not because it it med i atelY 
1 ·.· 3 . . ~ . . ~ . ' . : 
knm-rn hut beca use it i nvolves inconsistencies, The · ~n.ference 
o.f; other selves ha s a concret e, inte1lie:ible mea nine:: b'ec,ause 
' '; . . . 13.4':: 
orie ·has an immediate a cquaintance 111ith hi s own mind . · '· In 
.. . 
short', ue do not ha ve an "idean ; t hat i s , a s ense impr ;e.s;sion 
of ·o:t h . r persons , a l thou~h »we · 1nay be sa id t o h '?l ve a n<;>.tion of 
.· 135 
t ·he·m. rt By notion, Berkeley he l'·e mea ns , apart from 'his: "theory 
of: archetype s , ( 1 ) an intuit ion of the "operations 1' of <>ur 
mi:!ds. ( 2) a concept of t he relat ions bet\•teen ob,je ets tse~sn ... 
. 136 . '• 
tions). · An i nference of the existence of other minds ·in-
137 
vo1ves both factors . 
· The argumt::nts concerning e r ror, memor y, act i vity ; and 
knowledge o. other selves , \·rh i1o effect ive aga. inst s onte types 
of epi stemolo r.dcal monism, . a r.'e insuff icie nt in refut ing Ber tre ... 
l e.y' s position ~ 
~ ttac.king the pr obl em diJ:e·ctly , a r e s ensa t he real · refer .. 
ents of thou~.~h t? Are other fa ctors invol ved . tr{hic 1 a e not im• 
mediately experienced? Do not sensa t i ons presuppose concepts? 
131~ 
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This strik a t t he root of' the d i .f.f erenc s bet-v een t he 
Kant i ' n an erkel e i an wpproaches to i dea lism... _his i ss 
\ ill be pare: mount t hroughout the d iscussion of Kant ' s 'rie~r 
of exper ience • 
. ccording to Kant, a reference t o objec·ts i s possible 
only 1.f t hey belong to ;.l uni.fied , universal , · .nd necessat"y 
order . ithout such a n order, one \"!Ould have only a series 
13$ 
o f pa sr od ic i .;pressions . 
The problem is , of course , what constitutes s u ch or ·er , 
or uni ty? In Kc· nt ' s ca se t hey a re .constituted by principle s 
of u ity; ·;hich a re presupposed by and i n consciousne,s s. i n 
139 
.,ene ral . ~"· physica l rea list ,. on t he other han ; believes 
t hey re c onstituted by physic~l entit i es inde pe ndent of , 11 
mi nd . .ant and d . ft leXHnder , f or example beli ve obje ,t ive 
r eference presupposes c tegorie s but differ in thei r meta-
physica l interpr e t ation of them . Thus " l exander ~~ites : 
Spa.ce- Ti . ~e t hen is in K·-ntian lan . ~ua::re a n i n f init e g iven 
1 7hol e • that i s to o 'l.Y , it is experien~ed a. s such , \'lhe'~"e 
the term exp r i cmce includes thou~·ht as well as sensibl e 
experi e nce . I t s ele ents a e repr e s ented conceptually 
c s point .... inst:.: nces or bare vents ; a nd we ha ve added t he 
hypotl e is th~ t ot.. e r empi r ic" l things or exist .. nt s · re 
groupings of s u ch events , \·thirl ools .ritl..., in t he ocea n , 
or tl oy are crysta l s wi thi n t he m,':l t rix .• Only VJhe r e ..:1 s <; 
crystal can e separated from its matrix , e xisten~ s neylU 
c""n; t hey r.emnin swimi.i' i ng in t he medium o£ ' pace- Ti me . 
13S. Kant , Kr V, ~3 A , 154B; Iuller , GPR , 77 .. 7g, 759 . 
139 . Kt: nt , KrV, 93 . ; r~m11ar , GPH , 7'7- 78 . 
lL~oO . ·~l ex..ander , ./l'D • I , 1g3 . 
~1. atever meta phys ica l interpr etation one mi , ,ht .?,; .... ve to 
c.::teg r i v--= , certain elementa l cone pts <:. r e invol 1 ed in ob ... 
ject ·vo reference, "' i c. t ake one beyond immedint,e ex erience . 
I f the essence of sense- dat& i s c nstituted by t e imr.ne i te 
experi~nc,. of t.hem, this c.: nnot be S' t d of' cono12pt.. si· .ply 
bee tse theoe involve refer~ nce . The essence of re.f'e nee 
i s to refer to f a ct or s not r~t t he ,ivan moment innedi tely 
expe r i enced.. Destroy reference r nd one destroys t hought , 
for it i~· t e . nature of thou )1t to point beyond itse-lf , .·to 
transcen the i mmedi :ttely r~i ven a c ts . , nd in so far "·' $ a n 
intelli ,ible sense e ~~perience i v .. •l ves the relat ions, di... -
cri ina t :i.ons, reference · of thought • sens ·.-d:::l t a . lon"" cannot 
COnotit te the .ob ectivc refel"en e • . mQng "'ant'n m'lny C :)n-
tributions to t .o·1ght r e, first, that. objective re erence 
invol...,e s conce} tue:~. l principle.;; 11r·i h tr-.. :,nscend sensor-y -!1, t a , 
and , necomlly, t h.? t t hese prineipJ.e o canno be ab strac .ed 
fro mi nd in e;eneral . . erkeley' s i dealis is b -sed on a·n 
appeal to ' common sense n . Th ob j cct L just those sen ible 
qua_ i t i es i:1 ... icl pla in len me· n by tha · term. He transcends 
co1 . on sense only in atte·mptin?: t,o show t hat t hese < ualities 
c ·- nnot exist in ependently o.f' mLnd in genera l . Kant on t he 
. ' 
other hanu , outfla nked common sense from t he beginning by 
ctternpting to show that reference to objects re supposes 
thought. mh€) p · eno. enal object is fl'more" than sense - data , 
nd "mo:t ... en t han our particular thoughts, but not nmore' t han 
t :ought, r etter ~ consciousnes in ~~enerL'll . 
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Yet tJerkole more or less i m .. .!.i ed t hi n in hi s Theorx of' 
-
V.i s ion . ' lhilc he ~·tan ted to <app•3al to "cornmon sens . u by sbo ·t-
i. ~"' t .... hat one i mmed i a:toly experienc~s is t obj.s•:!t i t -._ \..1 
s el.1. , he ,~ s compell ed t o tr nscend "common sense•• not only 
i n shm-:ing t. a t t he object i ., a constitu ~ nt o the experience 
of s or.1e mi 1 ,. but t hc-l t extr-:t - sensory fac t s e r E. involv19d in 
perce t ion. ' 'hus in h is Theorx .9.f lfi s on he betrayed "co~on 
se. se by shmving that the third di men .:..on i s never immedi a tely 
expe r ienced; t ... nt it is ar i .ference e; t he r e . _fr · m the v ric,us 
141 
sens a tions of' t ouch , movemert of eyeballs , etc . Yet tho 
plain oan reg r ds the ma ,::>nitude just as e ssent i a l to,, t t.e ob-
14:2 
i~ t a .. color a 1c extensi n. The oint is th t a ... lon · a ~-~ 
Berke l ey had to i nclude extr,.~ -sensory fac t ors i n order .... or 
an object to be k ttm ; t hen h h.: d to ab .. ndon the theory of 
i r ect a cqua i nt. nee ·1ith obje cts , eve t ho·...te;h he defi ne< . the 
oo j ect as c:~ group of i r·J. e :ii· tel y pereei ved sensa . In this 
sens'.~ , Berkel ey mti c i patcd K' nt , but only a t the cost o ~· 
ons.istency. 
iii . 'fhe. Egocentric Pre ica ment and t 1e .:"al l acy of 
I nitial Pred i cation . 
'l'h i s criticism of Berkeley , s \<rell a i de <J l '" sm in 
general, belong.:-> t o the folk- lore of realism. Because the 
i dealists en where most realists begin , nar~tely , vtit h 
141. 
1 42 . 
f~V , I , Sec . l-30 . 
:..; f' . ' 1 ild, GB, 110 . 
I I , . . 
\ ..... ·'' 
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expt~ r.l. ence i t;;:;clf :.1s :;. I rinc ipl ~~ or expl .·· m.'l t i on , t e lr.tt~er 
a re q ' ick to · f~ ii'm t l:mt, the form~r::r are corll!li·t t inf: a tcut -
olog y , r-. i l · 11g recogni ze the fa •t that the i 1 ealist , too , 
as ca n"ied on an .::,n.aly5is ; but he f inds no term in the a na l ... 
y s i s ~~dequate to the t a sk o f expl a i ning sr.:t.ve c onsciousne~s 
i t 3e l - . Th controversy betN en the ideali~>t a nd the re !" l -
i st , i mus be r~peated , i s not s o much the question of' the 
v aliui · ... y o f' ana ly ·· s , .for both rigidl y adhere to thi s , ' ~ut 
vr i ch result of the a n .. lysis is be t t er abl ~- to U.."lify our 
·thoug.rt about me n ann h i s relat i on t o t;he 't or1 1--t h··t i s , 
our experi en e c-;,s a whole; v..rhe thl:n· t he fina l terms of . the 
rea list ' s ·· a lys i s can expla i n \'Trr~'t t hey were i ntend ed to 
v~~l l in : c s ci0usne s s and our knowledge or _t hings a nd oth-
er. m~ml.., , or iJhe t her con~c; ious;; cs8 i tsel f be t ter expla i~?-
t ~~ se .. acts; \'rheth•ar time unr space are more intelli ·i ble 
a e xperienced or a s ohje ... tive re~litie s inde pendent of ex-
per ience ; irlhether kno rl e ( ge i tsel f' '\vould va nish i f the rn.ind 
·re re constr u d in t e rm." of' V<.+ l'l i s hing temporal and spati a l 
i st~nces; \ hethe r the perma ne nce _nec ..-;J ssary t o :"i ve til>te it-
143 
s e lf a m, ·1nin,_; i s bett.er .founu in space or in consc iousness . 
The i 1.le, .l ivt an( .. lyzes conoc i ousnes s in tl ese t erms a 1l .finds 
t h3lll vra.nting not only a s a n e x l a nat ion of consc i o'...lsnesG but 
ns ;.._n expl .... na tion of themselve s . :lhr tover the se ca t e .'?;ories 
or lop:ica l neutra l entities need to convey a consistent .mean-
i ng , i t ert \. i nly i s clear th•:: t t hey must be include " i n a 
143 . G.f . Al exa nder , '3TD , Chap . I a nd I I . 
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broa der sps.n of interpretat i on . In s hort , is experience c\s 
w ole · s i mpler explanat.ion t han the hypothesis of' inde pe n -
ent , s elf- suf'.ficient sensa . w:iversal s , or phys i c , 1 entities? 
•a:~: anm,rer in t he negat i ve i .pli -lS th~t one believes tha t sim-
plicity is foun~..< onl y i n exte rna l ly re l ated t erms . ~3ut it 
~" i ght Nell be t hRt simplicity i~ found only uithin a unity i n 
divers it~y , t l at i s , in a sel f . Uo t he oe independent , exte r-
nally rel a ted entitie s o f the real ist unify our thought about 
experience as a \t h ole ? Do t hey explain the obj ctive ref'er-
eace of cor.sciousness or its un i t y , se l f -consc iousness; · mem-
ory, r e cognition , concepts , or, a gain , its lJloral, religi us 
and a est, etie expe r i e nces? Perhaps t he realist ~;ould repl y , 
:.n .~.a t most would reply, t ha t a l alysis discloses th~ fact 
1l~o4 
t h:- t re ·~ lity is not thus unified . If so ,. · l e n w.~.y ~io~. s : the 
r·eal i t burden hi s final , irreduci )le terms t<ri t h the t as.k of 
expla i ning s o much? Why d i d f.1r ~ .A l exander devot e two volumes 
in a ttempting to sho'\tr t ha t r eality is s o uni · ied that it c an 
be re,:uced to one principle O;f expl a na tion-- an obj ct.iyely 
r e a l sp~ ce-ti~e which pervrdes all conscious ness, a ll ¢~te-
•ori e s of cons ciousness? ~vhat occasioned the adven:i:J o:f the 
American school of neo- r ea l ism'? An exclusive interesn _in a n 
a na lynis which 1:rould r educe rea l ity to discrete terms posses-
..,i .~.[ ; no relevanc to t he p1·.iilos opl ica. l uest of d i s covering 
) ri cipi es ihich 1/lonld · unif y our th ught aoout t 1e v.rorld ? 
144· Cf . Perry , PPT , 313- 323. 
Hy no mo .:1ns ~ reo- rea lism ' t<l·':lS an ;J ttem. t to do a bett ~r jo 
o.f solving t 1e vex ing p oblcm3 i mrol ve d in epist::;m lo .ic: 1 
ua lism and th .... int eract ion of min" ~nd ody •. Their ne ltr"' l 
entities, they believ ,d , " f for·.led n. m~nism 1:ni cL c1oul o -
vi · te ~u .. h d i f'. icult i e s . But the neo-re~ list coul rl not stop 
here . The pressure of ext t1nding t:.he area · hieh is entit ie" 
wouL :. 1a rmonize, c mpelled him to invade the re. l ms of ethics , 
aesthetics , a nd religion, and to sho ho\·1 the o j e c t ive re.f-
er. nee of t hese real ms ,oul a ll be ad .qua ... e ly ex_,l a i e by 
145 
_is lo ,ica l entitie!'S. 
The point is, if reality is so discrete, i it l a ekB a 
rea ...,ona le amount of u ··dty, then thou:;ht and the real ' a re 
in irre . :onc ·l~:· b -, conflict .. nd the p ·lilosop deal ventar ~. is 
indeed a f r 1itless :me . The postulnt, e of phil osophy i s the 
un ity of' the l:torl• • Ph i l o o ...,hy seeks · to unify the w rl by 
prin iples which are not so comiJlex AS t he f a cts the! Sr:3 lves; 
in s h rt , it moves from t he partie· L 1r to the univers!:'\ 1 ~ 
T lis is not to say t hat · 11 terrnc· must be. inter na lly rel ted ; 
b~~ no a cts c·n be discrete . It is to s • y, i f philosophy 
i s to p -rform its t .:J.Sk , t h.!l t th •y a ve to be unifi e· to t he 
de ree that one ca n make c · nslstent ! nd u n i .fied j ude;.nent s 
ah ut t . em • 
. The i .ie a list , then , is just as interested in .:- nf' lys~s " s 
t he re r. list ., Too often :. re t he conclusions of the ;lder l:ist 
l l:-.5 .. c:. Per:t·y , PPT, .3 29- 31..,7; C'fi.IT, 
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t~ · zin·t -rp1· ... t ed 'J.Y the ea list < s ini t i a l t.H:i sumptions . The 
' bsol ·t;er.t of t. e onistic i eDlist . t he 'monc.d" o the · t ..... 
;:wn" ... t Lo per··on:ll i dealist nrc td.l prod-
CtS "naly .. 0 4' rrr:e · iff eren e 1 6 in v b OJ i do,;...liot f 
cont('tnt · on th:\t no tor o.f the l!il1Y .:.~ can st( nd '- pr-rt ro 
s j.e .ind. o e ~ ~H"i f:~ nced \:ll-ole . But it t ook an lys o..~ to d i -
~ ~ nt \·Ias ad1 i·~tedly analyti .c .. l i n 1i s t h inkin ,., . , erke-
1· y as s an· lytica l that lL~ t·1a e l eft ldth t\'O t-1n ·i i s , 
th Ci.dSiVe 1 ' e and the .. tire I::Jin , l most too d pi.l ' t 
fol"' a satisfactory i de ·-lis • 1:!e ~ h l e o en1 ~nt of rit i s h 
empi r·icis · , be . i rmi 1p; with Bohbes , · TBS t 1e offshoo·t of 
r api dly developing science on the one hand , · nd .. soci- 1 
in( i vid • li m on the o1~he_ . :Thile .t.hor. · .. a Hobbes r g"'r,ied 
hi;. se l.~; ~ ~1 ... he p lilo opher of oru c his_ , re.::~ lly hi · ocirtl 
t.tlOU~P v mbodied t' r !.'1 nkect t e of .:.n<a vi dual or.l il\ the 
s ~) i ·::t.l contr~ct ~ .. li • . _, \' ro . h.,.. not y a Kin-~ · ut y t "l • n tura 
hat I !_;el ends t'lhe .~ ~e most hilosophy · -ebins , t L i"" , 
.1i-th ~.;be ·1hole, is not to ay thnt hi.,, pl 1.1 ""opl y Ha,~ re un .. 
·ant . On th contr· ·r; Hegel, like nyo1·her p · l o!J )> ,r , 
be.rin~ ·· ith t h pnrt ·ut finds it '!ant i s• To ap p• 1 t. 
s.ensc . rtainty is to · p e" 1 to 1~he lo 'lent , not t he hi he .. ~t 
146 
elc ent · n con· ciou('n0S • An as oon · s ono be~'>'i no .... · 
l4h . He el , LOD . tr.). 35- lrO; Pl.!. ('tr .. ), 73 .... 83 . 
<..le'3 .... ri . ~ that ee ... t aint , sen "-~ ~ ~ ·1s nlr·e;.~dy een r : nsc~n ~ d 
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by o _c p ·s . 
fho ~ t e .::ri tics o '"" ert , spun ··' t syst-m o re it,.. 
h.;;. a · o -~lexancl r 1 or t' e p1 s.fa :e to the .;;.,..;;,o.........,o.==;.;;.;;;;,.-.-~ 
... (:: r e ... ul z of his pl Uoso Ly . 
ter., 
to the . a l _a._.y of ini't i a p· edication , . onl .. · y 
er e1 .y t s phil p' y h't; 
tha·~ '.:!t-'iticis Vi:.l l" dicy. BerkG1 ~yt s ide~ 1 ..,n , s ( lr :J.( y 
, .ro to· o 1. t ·ro supports: t_ at th re~l can 0 1 e 
··rm· e di ";ce ly experienced or a onsist~;;nt i n.fe!" n · e 
nly by overlook "11" the l . tter Ce .. 1 Oll Sr. y 
·crlh· 'erl eley cor;-l itte the all· cy o .f · ni t i 1 n ' ica'· · "' n • 
.. .. t , t .::. pointed ou~- a:.J..:>ve , his grt:.K\te .. )t servi e to id· <..: l :L r·l 
·T<-.Y iQ •a.fut · tion o 
co ce_ ~- • th .... t it c,_ n n .ve. r a e •. e i.::. 11cod no-~ con · st~ntly 
in· .t"r ed ~roo e~~P r l noe . Once d. sp.o in. of attar , and 
sho.-:i f'! t at all that r(arooins o the phy·~ic""'l o j t s 
col1e ~t · on of ense qua.liti s i lc i ately · pp:reh :.nd.od y t · 
Y:"!i 1 , Der' -ley beliovo th[ t . e ! ·I ;r 1 rr..ntee d fo r t.ihe '. . en ;o 
q 't··.- !.t · .. ,s " nento.l . a t ure "' ut e r k 1 ey' s difficulty "· o lot 
so n: uch t hat 1: init.t·· lly efined i d ... · , s rP t.1e m.:.1d (., 
~u.J out abov"' j but th, t he d f in ... d id ~ .: nd uind :t.n uch 
.., t y ~ s )rnc .ie .lly to t e. troy .-~.n· o r: ni. unity oet ·1n .,n 
147 . t e ~ 1, L G (tr . ) , l l-42 ; PH (tr. ) t 98-10 . 
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t he t t1o V lt ities . I· ·:~.ssurned t hat onc3! ·'1 t hing i s i ::. edi +-ely 
e xn .. -"'i ,~nv0d. - h~ n uu a f f i n it]' ~ • . t h mind w 1icr t c n havo 
t.rith not hinr.s elt e . r.fhis may tell be true. . .. ut BerkAley (l d 
not sho• th. Jt t he son$t.Un an t he a.ct f. sensine at' J.nt"lepa ... 
r· ·hle. What h ·. did show ,ma t he f, ".! t t hat se.ne.:..- oualit~ --;; ~ 
c;:;Jmo· i t' ~ere in P. substrat um ... Does f:Jerlt ... ley need Kant· or 
He -~ 1? 
i ''' eali m ap!)ly it a lso to;o t hemoel v s • rhus lli • H.,: Strang t 
e ai:lor ; t .:.n.<; on Perryt s cr iticism,. ~ ~ites : 
In order t o 1.->e in a position to say that unr · 'frt::: en~,.ss of 
a "' ob_j,~ct constitutes in any deo- ee that obj ~:tct, I must 
~~ i'tl er be a ar!~ of th~ t obj .ct wH>hout b$1np; at-'ar e of it 
or I must ar gue t . 1·:hat i't · i s• apart :f.'rorn my cons e i o' lS, ... 
ness of it._ and discex n in it~ nat~'I.Wa as I am \'l'a!'e o:f 
it t ha - i t is differant tiO!i 'OY :ta r ,.ness of :it .. But 
an .object as I am av1ar e of i t w~ll r;;ive me no GJI1dn, e 
a s ~ its n:1t tre '""part fro, my aHI11 r-~nees o .· it ~11~8 
against a ny t heory of truth o re~litv. ObviouSlY;, i£• to 
establ i sh truth • on.;:;, has t>o e;;;~~ ; .. ~pe from e::-:perif .:nce an 1 "'ome ... 
ho\1 e ~ min~ a nthin"') ... itt-ii.~sel.fn • than no -truth trti:t l ave e 
esta l1J.ish ~ct . oven tho neutxya lity O- ~nr;:.utt .. al ' e ntitia s . 'l'l.~ 
impo-~. t anCfJ of Perry' s er:ttJ. iom is not so much in being a 
cr itiqu(;, of i de nlism but in oxpos.:.ng the t-:torthle!:>sness of' 
l ' .. '"" tra~r:e, Art, (1911). 
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deduct,iOil i . the re~lm o philosop}~y- 1ll'ms , ;.rhen It us sell 
ondition of truth, tha ·' ~it must b~~ 
1l~t9 
such a::.> to a:1 · i t of its l.'~pposite l .f.:. l~1ehoo~. n, he is t:!rgu ... 
of dO abst.rnet possibility of a logi c•. 1 boomerm1g. ut by 
o.f' bein-.· circulfi .. :- in h is ptilo~Hrphi.ctll van ·ure, aB lon~ · s 
t he cir .. le includes something ; u -less , t hat i o J hir~ ;.;JySt,em 
1:r ~ 
hai'l!lonize · facts into a ne.:min~ful •.1:1.ole o4· ~~circletr .. 
If y r'eE.tlism one me;.;in c:~. theory t1nie t hol df· cor!Ce!!tS renl 
151 
:::. ;::rt :"'rom tho p :.: l ... tiicul: 1--~~ sit:':ni .fied , or ap l"t fro the 
! ; 
c-nw:Lntentl)r b i nferred f-.ro~,., sense ~·me if i"· ic r·sl:~~; ~-)r;l t 
152 
yart i ulars. 
149. 
5f' ·- . 151. 
1 52 ~ 
Bet: r e past.)in~s .judgment on 1 e rkeley• s nominali""t. one uust 
Eus~ell . PP , 1a~ . 
Hogel, Lon. 
ri"·•~-- <- i "' G" '; 8t ···•'"OlO '···i ·"'( l ,..:.--,li·"...., (D'l ""'t on·l~· ..... =.<:! ll.·~o) "'S 
"" c.~ . v. ia,. .., """' · .. t : .& ~\ -··- ... ""' ........ r... .q,~ ... , -'~ ~ - ·.:.A. .c.. ... - la 
cont r ast..:.d vri th me·t;. r:-,phyo i c5l j:"- :~::. l :tm:.. ., The neo-r.;.,t:t li ::~t 
is , f-or exPl:;n.ple; n rcalint J.n both s enses . 
PHK , I, Bee . 35 ; t!.~ -. 1 ~! I. 354, 3~~".; , 3 t~$ . 
89 
,. 
a . one pt , t ita·t is , e~ ' term c:.p,)Jy:ln,; "c.o any partieula:;.· that 
. 154 
it d _;:::.r e0 -. .'!. t otbn .. ti~~:es he i dentifies i dea wit.h i ·e ,:)~ 
155 
or ~·erlCLltic .• r".ost g0.nez ,; lly and consist.ently, I·wr.~J~v .. ~r , by 
L age of' a trianiJ',le in general . nor ~n ':'l.!Jple o~: t! ee in gen ... 
. 156 -· 
Ol':'l.1. l . The failure to gr·;,~ sp 3erl:eley' s ma::.ning of idea ;.,.t 
t his )oint (ide.: a s im~ g~ or o...;;nsution). ha "' occasioned muc 1 
15,3 .. r ::. .. .j. . 
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.en:.' o .~.. r-. • on.;:~y 
r e elo In C.k rli~ ... t l.' ~nt by no ·io · ~ 
.;. i 3t . ~ .· -:-~ er~; l cla'':J ver t~ ~ · .. ''} r .pre -eat"' in· i ..:.'·:>;::p•on ' l y 
IY particul..;:• f t he;· class , s o ondly, ,; y ~ceJ · t :L n :.:t: . n 
::3<~ .. s..:! o ·.J J •· t ··, . n 1 ni ly, ...: ... n intui . ion of t ;_: op.:::r t ion" 
15 ~t 
of o e t s min· <.n · n infe . enco of ot 1e:r .;ind~ . In h i ", 
l c• ·e1 \11ritin ,s Berkeley t ou.gl t of notions mo .. e J.n th , ' 1\.!J,-
mind o f t.io and eo .lr.l <,icate l to 'lG by _,le .n ·. 
xoojn · ss , e: uty, virtu :- • •. a:f'e the most r't~ :J. l ;J · i r.. ·':17:1 , 
i r"'elloctual a nd unc!·~ r·n~Ll ,: ar ,..,. the ,ef' "e r: o:.". r · ~\l 
t '·1an t h f l ti.l'\ , , tr· lSioV.t o ,j ·cts o .... s ·.no , ~ l h 
<' ntin-~, etubi_ity, e r.:. nnot beth vU')jOJ:GH of ~e ' en . 
much. le C! of intelleetu.e.l knot:t1 : - .,e... . J mhe l . ost 
·e:inc .:.~ hum .. n inte lect , exe:r:•ted to its utr tos·t r· , 
can only s c izo '"'omr.. ir~.. r fect trliir~ .. es oJ' ... )10 , :vi 
~de a~ "?str~g£cd fro n all t dngs cor po4 ea l , S r·.W::i •• bl , , 
i ~· .::: J.n<? · 1~ .. "' 
r ·--( .. ~'n·1n rr ·· ~ a r·"" fro,.., · ·1e ......... ~"-t; ·i "1·-· "'ir:rn"' f'~ r ' !0 <!l •• • ..., 0 ' _ , L. ~ ~.l v "' - ,.... f.J. .;. ;:> n• ._.. . ,.. ... l • 
c u t.c ~i n repuJ i ate:J tl e former .t'ovis ion , a nd reve ::. l R H r ::o-





;..··IK (Int . } I , Sec. 12; 'f.L P , , 4::2 . 
!:' I , I , .::e .... 1 4.2,. 
J R. I II , Bee . j35. 
. '! "" t i T r~e .. ,.,7 
. n , _ , • _, • 
91 
t .11 
th ~· o con p t ~ , just li ~- his d as r sem:Je i , . re.;, ... i o o , no t 
t oo ·ll f or an i ·'e .:1li 1 1hic:h arr~.U\A S ror the or ._,(ni · unity of 
and bject, con~e t .nd sation. Plc to 1:.s e rnb ic 
even ·n erk ley• s urlier ... · itin __ ; hen th 1· tt-c~r ;i' · n d 
162 
i dea s , s ert 1 po.ssi ve. s c a i le ·1unl:tti 
' 
:.-nd ·.is l r 
d-octrines r e u a d ·, velo .n . o hi s Platonic s ·er .. i • 
e keley l. gnori . ~ ,. e r le of' t he o c ,pt 
t he :fi s t of t ne r ova t '10 sen ) i n our o rtledge o ~ b-
antB their use.fulness ... rovidinr; they ox res .~ <7> 
ni ~.<. ~ rovidin , t ha t i-:> 11 t hey hav eit 
di r e · t re erenc to .... ens fac o. r t il' t tl· cy c .... n be 
163 
f~., t: t. ne acts. ~ ir1ce one c nnot hav · a senF;rtion o n 
i ' e OI t uind, ' t is t h ·nst rum n · ~hi '" k 0 i ... 
ge OGSi le , just a,.. 0 , annot e t he eye in t h 
o "' vi ... i on . • can st. 11 have ~1 met. ·ni ng ul J·totion of' ' '! 
c ·· h:..V caningf 1 notion of' mind be .:::tu..,e :le i Jtle i a c l y 
its acti vity • • ·tt.cr .;s refuted , ot e 
ecnn ve a c noept of it • . u·v oe use ·:::.he no·t on invol Vf: 
:i.nc01 l st ~ cies, · d . G ut t.or ly u . (..1 s • • The rtprincipl ., 
t 1 o ms of sr~ie nces , u· )ive:r. .. sal a~.d intelle t u· .o . 0 ff 
• 
437 ' .3 3; . • , I . 354, J O, ) u8 . 
92 
r kel Y' o noidn&lisl ~ (in t . ..-1e Jens t.. • n tlicc ted} · ns b ~~s d 
n t no uc J on a depreci · ;ion o the~ concept no i t 1.1 ~~} the 
0.1')/..4 , r i guou.s terms ·' 0 the fr~e t hi nke r and sc'hol.: ~3 ·ic , 
r ai s '·' lo 
s e . ley ;ive r. motaphysical si.:,n:L ica 1ce to ' ny 
hen · dvance " .• onstrou3 t heoric""'" .;..6 · o 11 ·1 p<lr•tic l,_ ;: ~ u:.l · 
' tl o · nhe~ i n i t - :Jut 
i ' t ' • . . the~ e . s no sucn · :l:J.ug as one prer.a. ;;~e anc 
.;>·gni +' ' ~at,iou. ~n .c od to 'nY gene:r.•a l n·1 t e ; 
s i ?'t if'y indi fferently a .• : .. e r t n er o P"' --t i ... 1 p, · 
i · e a o ••• It is 1~ t h:i.ng to e op "'" n.:~r1e consistoni;;ly 
. th~ 3 ::< .10 def i nition , nd anotl cr t;o " -::e it c.t and 
ev ·~ t":f.·i ·~ere for 'the S~!J. ra i dea ; t r e <:ma6~s t ! e ot h,r· us l ...,s ond i r. .. pr· · tiea le • .I. 'J 
"' concept i ··· me· nin;;l e"'·"' ap r t f r o the i·. • ... 
r.ln effe ... n ; or mot· on , apart fro . sotle·thin ~.; mov d ; or ~ ce 
ap·trt · r . .) som ~one ' s i me i c,t e exp .rie.ne - of tl a sense .f 
t u "-' 1, <Jr ti:. ·e apclr t f~g ti~e Ch· .!g 13 
f i d ., ~ in .. CO¥lSCious ·los ? · erkeley a.sltn . 
93 
1·0 t •. e l tl.tonic a rchetyp ,.., o·"' : ti S 1• t-1" writin._. s o .... 
v i ou .... ly ar e expose<. t o th ... v me cr "'ti 1~id s c: s . ny c n,nept 
' 'I i .. 1 i s su pc s ~d to h~ v . a 1 ~nin · t pa rt f rom the , rtieular • 
B · . "eley ::.. s douotless i noonsist ,n · a t t hi s point . 
v. thor '-:ri t i c i s 
• 
{ 1 i i d 13 rkeley n . t uphol d " vi elf of "ot.\1- s' bst.: n .. e 
tt h.: :1 i s smr'ect t o t he n· me cr ' t i<.,is ..... ·rhi>''h he di r · ·· er 
1 7 
a ,p in~·t t h~ notion"·n o_ matt ~. ? There is s ome trut in 
t hi r itic i llm .. In st~ :> isL1n~ t't·ro cl i s ..,.inct entities , ... e 
r ~ lr t e d in experi e !'!..... , : nd b y defining 'tl.e mi nd ~.s a ut i ve 
•·1it wut .. :;i ving it anytLing con tru tive to do~· .:.1ave ·ci1 me• 
.16e 
ni r 1 .... ash. of • nipul.at i r; rea ly- ~'1\-:.·de i da<.J s ( "'omr t ·· one or 
ima !~ .... s • Berkeleyt ."'"soul'' pr·· t.:cnlly drifted into :.·· tsub ... 
1'1 • :;·or Bei\.~o1.ey defined t e soul as a nsi'·!-; le , u c orn-
169 
po·· 1d d su' , Sti· n e r. He util ·· ... ed tl in estruot 4 bil ~Y of 
170 
G ul - .;u )· t ance · s an ~rgwne:'.t 'or i:tnmort<: lit~ . . Al so in 
,_ C(..ounti ~ :f'or persona l 1dent11.fy he cla i1 ed t. at 'pt~rsonr 1 
o'th not consi st in consciousness" · ·1pl ying t ha t 
171 




~·ild raises t hi·· cri t. i .... :L sr.:~ . C • 'lild , , 173 .. 
t~ s previ ousl. point .d out , Berkeley di d tr"' nscend t is 
i t in his t1 !.eory of vision and i n hi "' a z, Ul n"t .r.-or 
cohe e nce , but · t t he cost of conoist ;mcy .. 
PLK; I , Gee. 141. 
:t H , I, '"'ec . 1 1·,1. 
LC , II , 335 • 
d V<r::- · op:.. t .nt:.;; of his t h u•;l t ~ 1"~0\'lever • . rl: loy bee· .: 
174 
.• ngly sk._,.p ·t ic ~ l a ou·.:;. t~:. e natu e 0 t ,e oOUl ., ~ ven 
f.r_nciolcs , he r gG~l'"' s b"' oul a p c ct icr J.ly 
94 
the n~ t re of spL:·it ; or t'1at tc ich .fh.;ts , t .. n.t 
i · c·· r~::ot be of' its~~~ per·1ei e ' , uc only oy t ' e.::.·ect"' 
~ li~t it produceth. 
o.~ !t• other h ~ the r:ti .. d , :"'or u er<: ley , i . n.~ vt:'>:::t. e-1?4 
1 fi r:"' an ,; '"'n- ' • -:> in . at:e only . ,, itt i s ore ; - ~e : i l ""  i ~ . 
a-: lec.:l st i 1; · ~cdi:qt lY expr~rienc ._\ ~ahil . . tte i s n.n • n .... on-
t e l).J.g i ble otion of 1ind " 
ut "' i n e erl~c ley f . led t.o ex lo ··e 
t ii.e d y of 1~ .rsonalitY; t he t-.r .. i gllt of he 'r . es to 
th C ··viC • 
\ } 3o -':eleyt s viet oes ot acc~unt o p<. .• r;.; nal i • 
one o erlooks the princ 1 ·.s ,,- ich make self'-••idc.otity pos -
to i3 · el e ' ~ 
Let UEJ t•'lc, ~1u_ pose that a orson ~.1ot. i de n " · n1 
· n ""c iou., during a certa i n c.~ pace of t i ::.e , ·r / c: t-tiL. 
_'i vide into .... • .l"'eO e ·ual . rts, ilh~reo.f t he l c:, t '~ 
a:r.·e ~~?. r .. ~1 by tht::; 1 t'tors A, B, ,., .. I n the fir~ ,, rt 
o ti , t !::.e e r on gets c rtr in n ·m er o · .:.d ·lc ·~ 
172 . AL ", II , 335 • Cf' • ~ ild , , 1?1 .. 
173 . p ·,r, I, ···ec . 27. 1'1f' . 1'1 ilc.,. GB, 171. 




er1 ... eley he ~·e rac t ica lly put s the a ot i ve n mind n t·o :. a 
n Y' ... ry or e i t 111r to a·ttem t t o ent a i !'1 . s 1 · - s r .,e .te:"~· by 
l 6 
'"' num rioa l i dentity of' i de "." s,_ · r b y aoul sui st ~n .... e ? 
( .3 } Doe s not , er· ~~eley f .. :1.1 to nt. ko eon:-·i .t ·:~ nt aovli c t i ono 
of ds t i oories t-1hen "Ol13i cler i n:: the a t tribntes 0 .1 t h 3upr 
Be1.ng? This i s an i mportant erit.icis .. of Ber·kah:y . Iylr s 
ut you (Philonous } .ave ase · rt d t!at \ 
i·re oe r cei ve £ror:1 't'tit hout a re in t he mind A: ' - . 
u • · he i deas , t .e efo~ e , o ~in a.na ea .. in ·_.)s ·.· .rc 
i ' ' , ; or, i 1 ther r.-;or d ,. od s ff .-rs pn · n : 
to r.ay .:.he r e i s a !1 1r~perfection in t e di 'in'-
·i.lich OU CC'm01>llt~d f'ed • ·i ?7 SUr: t v O you 
. in ' pl a in con l'a d i ction. 
175 . t LG , II , 335. 
176 ., ALC • II, .3.3 2-J ~.g ., 
177. · LJ . , I , L 5 13 • 
erlteley d ub't · ly is cau h 1 ~' .1 · i n con·trn. t;_ hen 
.:li s t ·.-eolo .-~ical conserva t • :sm triumphe"'' .. ver ,he pl ·· in impli .... 
,., ·, · ions of ~ i.... ·t heory of: ex eri en a and :l rle.~ . lism 11 co eJ.l ... d 
-~ ... I. t ake the ollovt ·nf., e.x 1~ n· ... i ons: 
n,_ ·m o 
s y.ilpB"thetic int .-::1: cter of erkel y t s ilo ,o hy 
'itnes-.,in , in the abo ro Gtat. p ~a~tic lly 
O- 1 i· thou =>ht .. ·· e k ley h~r , • a•:> .tor . ak"n t he 
v r:Jr>y ~ ~l . )c ·1,on ·ridch hi:~ ... de .:::. li... i..:l --uilt- -nnm ly · e i e-
dL ... te o:xperion e of sense .ualities. Hi .... r utation of t -
tG depe d • · t h c st in pc rt , upon his t:r ·, ili ty to red · ce 
m tte"" to sense ·. i . ediately e xporiencod . I ex-
pe i~I~ce .:s con-Gt:l.tl ted by t\,;o p.ri i ples , h ninu .... ., it. 
p · o iv en · tions l th n ""hY ~:re tl c lr:ttt~r ti :.ni d .. o .rod? 
17~. . l H t I, 4.53- 459 . 
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Gn 1 crkaleyt s vie , ho 'l e l s e c t ld Cod pos~ess t. er· 
tlo , .rh.:cl - m st poe . -in rd r t o c th .n 
·to . -:; ... oo '• 
-· ' 
4) Doe ... not ~.~:. · eri' 1 obj _c.:t in , r1 ;)!' 
t 
\..:Vl t~ tlJ t tt l _,..i r; vf J .. --ysic :t l rn .. . t12 r.d .t. ! '0-" 
=< d pri sms , O~-· dru~;s and phyvic:.tl · ~e ~es .::,r,r.r "··.. ·y 
' '"' . .,. o· ,... •· n ·e· ·t:>· ~ n.-J -~ · "' t'1• ,..e ._ , •.. • thol~ ;~taph -~::' ~s ,_ .\~i ~ s: I79 - " . v• ,; ~ <:4 .'" u. 
i d ... 
p n·'e .1 , ~i:st if~ ~ physi ... a l obj~ t n · :r e r ... at e 
r ·· yn , o t · oJ 1 n :1 
not a ce. unt 
i iJ :~e s 8 ::.~ tl a t they a_ e i iF.me · ate_y percei :-' · ua l itiu"" 
y (kH • Ho nly enies a t teri a l su s 
to L · e. 0 q 1 tics anu thei r non- :n;;.nl e:'1 st ·nee ,. 
1 9. 
Yor·, recent i •· .... a liPts tili ·A~ tl e s ~.:t.: ... tech.~.1i ue .1.. c.s-
os1 ion in o. - ~to e .- ~c · a 
or·.:..e _ t" . Bo· e; for example , .:J.$ o'i ~c .c:t inde .w-
PE. • 36 .. •f . ::.lso rood , PR , 1" 5-166 , and 
PI·1 K, 1 f_ .t· 
' 
1 () 
b. '" . <> < •. ...:>J.w • Hoge_•s dial ecti he s ame np-pr rch .. 
.~ very .f'a ~t . .:lnd cate gory p int beyond t.1eos~~!lV'"o for t heir 
1 ~. 1 
( 5 fo ·1 doc ,, Derk,,leyf s tl eo·. ·y · l'\ -r " w ·. th s ci nti . ic 
a ncepts ~uc ::. us en .rgy, ~ lectrons , nd t L. .. li;r .. ! 
r • • 
J. • • ;.;. 
99 
dl!. <;:. • t en J. e i n l!:::.e trou· 1- a c ountinr::; .' .. e uctlve 
n ·.~ = ~.:· o. tr! · n ;•.3 :~ :i ch sci c ce reve, l s . .~ rkelc y d i d ·: r t -
t. hci : .. ::.s . On 
pas ·.~ ive s ns· t i ons t p n ' , r :1th.:. · h .. 11 ' c in., 
n 
n·ly , : er rele ~ di d 1-·a e a l'"' U~ ·ibl 
• t,·)-,,:; an~.-i a co llt\31 for ·he m. Qu l "ty .or ciene·· has · 1:-J: :, ys 
J <'J a st' Dlinr.~ l oc · • Tf 't c:.. nn t _ .cu.:e i t to qu :--.1 it -
·1· . .1.· .· "-' "'l·~····· ons •t c· ·~r · ., t-_ '"': 'n 1 
"J ,f.. \,; \-to \.I 10o , - -~ .... • • V '-' .a • .. -
qu~~titat· re rel at·ons , it has ~gnored . .,.. 
..:. . 
y r ·. r'uc rlt" it to 
by ' anti . ·' t he ,.· bject i .. ity o sons~ ata i t · s d i ff i cult 
f om ... , r$T , 43- 193 . 
H~.:: ·.,el, P ·E ( t ~ . ) , Prefr. .. e . 
99 
.; ot to r~unt t he subjecti vi ty o:t ·t.Le ... r i ary .uD l::.t~i ,z s~ch 
a "" •"otJ.·on '!'4 g:·-.. ,., ,.,......,ce rf''' J."c' · -~ Ul. · • t - ... · •,.;.( ""' , it.> j:J~ - ·• / l, . /.l J 
e.r <.::bly rel·::ited to sens .... d.;.::.ta . :3 e h <.;;_ · eons idrn"ation be~ · c -
cas ion .d the .tollo ·nn;:; st::J. t0mcnt fron Vlhitehee~d ; 
.B'o· nnt.11r a l p~lilosop;q, evBrythint; 'ercei ved. ·• s in. m. t ure • 
~ ;'e r!~ttJ not pick and choose . Fo:r· us ·the :r;·eJ Llar·t:~ of th 
aumv3t :-.>hould · q ~,s much :- ~' ::.1 rt of nature 1:1 a:-·:c! t .1e ole-. 
cu c... ~ .. l · e l ectt.l --. •:,n res b y ~t: t · ·h i_en .... : seLH.tce ·ro~!ld ex..-
plain the pheno .. u::l?-a .. t i t; .for rw. tiurr:-1 philosophy to · f~~­
rz(~ hOlt'! these v _l~:!. us elaments of !Y i;.u· ~;:; rtre t~onne ,ted . · · 
o ., :.ri .1? Berkeley has ._ point here • 
6. T _e Socia l N.:1ture Ol. Ee a l · ty 
A re ent ten1.> :ncy in i dealism h::.s b een to r.~rgue ha. t one 's 
t eferenc ..• t o an ex ern<'-1 , inda . nd .. nt order ic ~ocially de tived . 
I re did not "'lready possoos c n acquai ntance t•rith o·thE:r inds ; 
·re t-ro· J..d never refer to ~\n objee .i ve l'JO 1 • In ot 'ler t'l1ords , 
s j l_; h c).fl" .su .. : is ~ n object externa l to lrlY mine O!!ly becuuse 't-Ie 
0 lieve it ncn ') '~pprehende a nd deoeribed by a. t l er· nr nd . 
, 
''h·' 1' '' 2d " ' ' {' i t · ~ i u • k n·:-•n Jl ~. l3 t 
... o2 . ~ • touGU( • v .i. ' <.J -.c .> ... J .. ec.t n ,.l.C s. D-!1! . . ' • u 
tl:~; cruci"'~l : .., uest..:..on :'.s, are sense ·dLt.:?. snbje ~tive or . 
o:> je t. i ve o:c• both? If obj~:;ct ive , oan tloy be bstr a e ted 
£· or.1 t. .:.nu in : ener'"'l , eve.n ro1u fin:::te rdnr_! s ~ 
11 
·n ::ts tU"'gU::Kmt f )r i ~e ... l ·· n _ hr s . ~ ::-:m ~~c.. v< n d ,· 1 c1 t n. il · 
1 ~,3 
i~o ~ co and : . c.~ · .. 8: 
J. ~ a 
net o .y our L"· f~.!·cnco t o nn o · et i v . ·:~ ;)r ·x;; O' _., • r l -
pr:~.~;b:.l.:., ic (' 
· ~:.r: th'~ ~ .:.. 
· ,f r - nce t o h · !:": hence t ;e · l o .ki. 
l .. :. J .. 
ppli ·~ : t i 
.JU S :)ut 
·I? r_," ~-le:J ' 1US :3VC1o (3( ~ ~ L :; vie··? . ith 
1 (~ 5 
n • le ar ..... not i nt r•es t ed ln inve~L~i . ···t-
i n sho · n , t __ , .... t l: e ar :)a;- ic,-11y r kc -
,_oct i ·~ an · tlea ( s e nsntion or :. colle , .. t,:i.on O .:.. f:l . ~s;· t. io s ) he 
1 ~h 
0 '-· . ',J no 10 n t h8t t he object G our i dea , .re s r:tply ~:1 "ns 
t:J-· t c ~ b ject :...s ;~uc ! t h<l ~ it c . . n ent .") J:" int . so · -.on :: t s :x .. 
p··~ricnc€1 -- t .. a - it • <. • t o be 0 1· ne d •. nd Hp~: · t .fro~· ;:J · ... O"-' · :lble 
1 ... ~7 
XIJ·:: ·1 ·i 
in- .-, t .:. 
1~~ ·:· . 
·1 r.> • 
- .. 
1 r ;J. 
1 56 9 
1 ~·, . 
1 .'\ . 
; 
~ c -i i ~; rHY~ ·.i 
• 1 -:J _ •' of · <~ c o::·-: in-.> 1 ,., ;: 
~ . 
-
. :m ··ro cv t" tl .k bject 
...... ~~ . 
0 .l;pl"! :r· ~nc t r .::~0 ~1 •• . i.1d ·: 
~ ' J 1 e:r .... e · \i • on o1 
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7 ~ ,vnlu .. t ~.o.n ·_ . ci 'o elue .on .. 
~ t lo.t. our-'·• :oinr; · ce mt cRnn t e !"-endorc'i 1;1t ·tl ~ - t . 
isr-1 .q t.. e ·ill find ·. nt and n d ot on~-Y expli itly v· 1-
u :.. ti:ar r -t-? .1 but ' p:!.icitl.y or iticizin"" him ,..,ith !t ir 
n 0 .... . .. k 1 t s id al-
.t 
"\ 
· t·· () to i de lis 
n~v6at· .. . ) in ref· .tin3 once an1 
1 9 
or a 1l t he ~l ctri, · o f inhe:r··.nce 
:c t"U st:.n .. • ... tor · lis s ev r n 
o · ·t ta in respec.til iltt it h~s 1 , d ··o co s phis ti Ht d 
b.i ~.~·-pholding a lr' ghe ' d 'f l'1 n• nl .nt· J. entity a. .L .. UD• 
dL\t'emt 1 prin i __ ~ o· t i e univer. e. 
( n t~:e p .;it ive !Ji:le , . arlte1. ' s co t r ihutio to i e ... lion. 
is not !C:" r . - lcin~ t he object to scnne r:n:-lit·' GS 
·ont enJ1. . . , t h t c-o ~-:c r me • · ~. l e.··no r 
:S r h:el y bel v t e:i.r .... r> ·- 1 tu e rr1. .  
u-c n bot~.. co• _ t Be_ k"'l Y' t 1.t?tor J 
point ~ 
1 ~~9 .. 
be 
i n 
out in "'1Cti n 5, ii, t . e o 
~· te }-1 ;~({ belL"l 1r =- ' ; r,i" 
but .:..on .... of' IL -r el • 
d 
r t; 
m: e thnn 
2 
sense data • .;;~uch fa tors , ... unity, u.ctivity, rel tion re 
in.- e enc ,s 1-1hioh point beyond -,.r e immedia ·e fact s of ·tcquain .... 
erkeJ.ey ·DJ: __ .:;le it cle< ..r t !.,:'t sen""ory .facts r e 1 -
medi .. tely experi enced , he d id not pr ove their exclusive m n ... 
t a l e~~ist n .. , because he de.fin<:)d 1 idea :t an,~ r.d nd in ·tL 
\'Ta 't:Thi~h 'estr ys t he unity 0. experience . rand is pur ly 
a ct:,i ve , t-Jhile the dd. t a ar(.:l so many po.ssive lumps of bein • 
Ir::medi' e acquaintance , in itsel_, ill never e"'t blish 
t he fact t hat a datum • s t ent 'Cl l . It simply convey~ t ! e way ~W·\ ·.; 
ii ··r' id \.Ye kno •r t hings. One h .s to ~hott• as regards t l e 
tent a l nat ure of the dat , eit 1er t he sensing an~.: the thing 
sensed · e indistinguishable, t lnt t he s nsum is a kind f 
19 
3e 1sing ra h r. than & . ro rm rty of ·~; he sensum, or t ht t t he 
s ns , , if r . nti lf, its objectivit , is ine t rice: bl.y r : .. l ted 
to l:lind . hil e Berkeley took t he matte r Ot1 sub ... ,t:.l nc out f 
t he s nse d~.;.. · - a he m:::v ,rthel ess, in f<L , , if not in definition, 
ous en e t i·e in · a real n of su si~3tence. I·· sense U· lities 
are insep· rably related to i:Od , it will i.iAke r. ore th n · 
defin" t ion to secu:e th~t tie. T!1s is t he truth tte 
re.;; l i 3t ' s char ~ of initia l predict~oh . If in our e· per:i.ence 
' ~ . 
sl.;)nse d· ·ta and mim.' arc as separable · s erkeleyt s empi r ier l 
i nt •rp ·eta ti,.:;n of experience i1 plic}s , do m not have an ultin-.. 
ate 1 et. physic~ l dual ism or phJnouenalism. A gl ance t • T. 
, t a ce ' s l.nport ·; nt N'orks, The Theory .s:t.t: 'fhought a :1d E ·istence 
1 u. ,f. t h . d ..:..s cussi n o Ducasse t s criticism of f, .. oore in 
"' Q " 5$ i . 
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H Ja lism revea ls how e :1 ily 3erkeley C <::t l be utilized for a 
pheno enc:d.is • Is th re uch diff erence bet 1een · erk le t s 
vie\ts,. P·'~ r. ... i cularly v->~ith his doctrine: o£ iru ed i nte a ce; .tain-
t a.nce a nd knowle lgo by description, ·_i s dissection of e xpe ~­
ience into the apprehGnc.~ inP-", mind a nd t he passive , in~ .. rt idea , 
. . d those o.L Bertrand ur.r::..ell an .. · r• E . :-Ioor.e? By th(. time · 
• u ssell i s t hrough 't·rith ma·tter 1<1e have about as little left 
of . it as l-'Ve do with Berkele y • s intrc~rpreta tion .. 'l'he a hie:f 
diff'"'rence l i es in t he f'act t hat Russell all ov:;s t he Jassive, 
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in~.::rt i deas to float as re<i l met physical entities , 't·rhi l e 
Berke le y believes , '!."'i thout telling us ho\1 , that t 1ey re i r·-
separable from mind .. 
Unless t he ide c-~ list ca n shot·J' a mor . or. a: nic r(:~ lut ion 
bett'le n th conce .t an~ t he sens::. d t m, the i nd a nd t he 
object , both rnay slip Tttay into an inde r:end ... nt e~·d . tenco . 
It 't~~s Kant ho first propounc ed) i:n modern philosoph_ , t he 
or ~anic r·elation bet11een t he a ncept a11d th s ensation, the 
~ -· nd and .:.ts r ferent; tha t neiti H3!" is i nt elli.no;ible Ni t hout 
t he o he r . He -.. el carried t.lie argume nt f urther by con· enclin 
t uDt the ac nsc t ion not only presunposes a conc:e . t {th . Ka ntian 
ar ,ument) but t he conoept presuppose s an or.?;anic n · tvro k of 
concepts , in .::3hor t, t he conce;·yt. of t he t/hol 1 or the Absolute 
experie ce . T/e '•Till find lut12~r t L<l t Ward crit.icizes Kant n 
t .1e gr · und t 1· .. ·t he i d not suf.t;'i .. iently na r ro"'·T th g·· p b Jtwcen 
1 1 . Russell, PP, 156-15 7. 
fo!"m n.nd ' ct ; t ba t he , too • l oft the mimi divided into 




'-.. It .; s tr1 e tt ~t crkeL:y str esoed t ~e a:::t i v·· ty o .,. · :.e 
m' nd b t left t1at a ctivity supvr f l uous in tho net of kno • 
1':)2 
ledge . Its role -r;as l:LJ<, ite to t L&l. t of an umpire m.c.ni p-
ule:ti i n -> r e . dy- mr· e o ,je cti) of sense r ut .. er t han ... on · rib "in 
..::;,Ol1 ,; h ing m."'ganic to t he very existene ~ .. and intelli .ibility 
of th sense data and ottor ref e renc s o~ thought) 
\ But on t he tter h' nd , as i t will be shown , 1: · erke e y 
need3d Kant's a ctive mind , Kant needed some of Berkeley s 
i s i ght -I-· en it ca me o educiz g t lwse concepts \· hich ue r e 
' 
suppos 
192 . If ~, re i"'no e is t heo·-"y of Vl. ... J.on :;.nd c 0ncept of coherence · 
·rh i ch "'re!'·e ineons ist~nt , as ointcd out in .:.~ ec . 5,ii , 
uith hi s t :,cory o objects . 
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CHAPTER III 
RATIONALISTIC IDEALISM: · KANT'S INTERPRETATION OF 
EXPERIENCE 
, 
By refusing to give mind a genuinely constructive role in 
edge and by accepting sense qualities as ready-made, pass-
ntities, requiring nothing more for their intelligibility, 
ley left a chasm between mind and object which co.uld be 
3d only by definition--the definition of ideas as mental. 
tions may be mental, but their mental existence can never 
~ranteed by ignoring conceptual and other factors which 
ltute the unity of the self. 
-Cant on the other hand tries to show that the mind and the 
~ are organically related, such that to destroy the one 
obliterate the other. Kant's central principles were, 
-
, that no sense experience is intelligible apart from cer-
miversal and necessary concept~, and, secondly, that 
concepts, as well as all other universals, are synthetic 
~ctions of consciousness. 
hat concepts are necessary to experience, that these are 
.tirely derived from sense experience, most recent philo-
'S are willing to concede. The point is obvious to any-
.o has emancipated himself from the associational school 
chology. .Ardent realists, like Perry and Russell, not 
rant the unique function which universals play in knowl-
ut capitalize on it--capitalize on it to the extent of 
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.ing them to a unique indenendent realm of being, namely, 
:tence. 
What is not so generally conceded is that the concept is 
•oduct of thought--spontaneous constructions of a syn-
;ing mind. If concepts were passive entities there would 
reason why they could not enjoy an independent subsist-
This is why the positive features of Berkeley's system 
Lore support to a phenomenalism or even a realism than 
.o to idealism. It explains why Plato is rightly the 
· of realism, not idealism. Elevate Berkeley's theory of 
LS the act of apprehending and the sense datum as the 
'e, ready-made referent of thought and we have a ··realism 
.ngly similar to that of G~ E. Moore. Exa1nine Russell's 
1retation of the universal and one discovers how greatly 
indebted to Plato. The fact that one has a high re-
'or "idea" does not mean that he has a high regard for 
.sm. 
On the other hand, if universals not only give meaning 
data of sense but also are constructs of thought, then 
·er we find the sense datum, we find the concept and where 
.d concepts we also find mind. This is the truth of Kant. 
Before examining Kant's analysis of experience, one must 
n mind certain definitions. 
Phenomenon--the object as it a~pears to the senses • . 
Noumenon--The object as it really is as distinguished from 
.y it appears to the senses. Hence such an object, . if it 
be known, could be known only by means · of a non-sensuous 
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ion. 
ntuition--an immediate perception. 
he thing-in-itself--the real, though unknowable object, 
enomena of which are revealed to the senses. 
bject--the referent of thought; most generally the 
us rererent or thought. 
9 Problem. 
~nt's initial problem, broadly speaking, was, granted 
's physics and Euclidian geometry, what must be true a 
• That such sciences possess validity, that they have 
Jal and necessary application, was obvious for Kant. 
,re is such validity found? Can it be discovere-d in 
1se-experience, by the association of our sense impres-
No, Hume showed once for all that an analysis of our 
Lmpressions gives us probability at the most, but not 
~versa! and necessary principles on which mathematics, 
~y and physics rest. That the sun will set tonight is 
.rical induction, not a logical deduction, and conse-
' our faith that it will set is derived from the fact, 
1 necessity, that it always has set. Whatever faith 
in the scientific principle of causality we get from 
nd custom. Hume dealt with the problem of causality 
Lored · mathematics because he believed that mathematical 
·lea were deductions. 1 But Kant showed that such 
:e, THN, 42-65 • 
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inciples were not exempt .from Hums's criticism of causality-. 
thematical and geomet.rical principles are not deduced. They 
e constructed, but constructed in universal and necessary 
ys. But as our sense experience can yield only probability 
erein does the validity of such construction lie? That 
thematical principles are constructions o.f the mind, not 
auctions from given premises, is clear from the examples 
nt gives. The judgment, 7 plus 5 equals 12, is a synthetic 
n.struction, .for the number 12 is implicit neither in 7 nor 
singly or collectively. That the two numbers combined al-
ys give us 12 is a creative act of the mind, and this. a 
tori induction is only possible by the intuition of an ir-
~ersible infinite time.2 Without the intuition of the one 
r>ectional time order, the number series could have no valid-
1• The order 1, 2., 3, cannot be converted to 3, 2, 1 and 
tll retain the same mathematical meaning. The meaning then 
7 is derived from its position in the number series, and, 
~ewise, 5 and 12, and the number series itself, presupposes 
intuition of an infinite, irreversible temporal series. 
~ce, the intuition, 7 plus 5 equals 12, depends upon our 
~uition of an infinite whole of time. 
The number 7, on the contrary, is possible in one 
way only, and so likewise the number 12, which is 
produced by the synthesis of the former with 5. 
Kant, KrV, 164A. A refers t ·o the first edition, B, to 
the second edition of KrV. References to MUller's trans-
lation are also given. 
Such propositions therefore must not be called . 
axioms (for their ngmber would be endless) but 
numerical formulas. . · 
1at we find in mathematics, then, is a synthesis, wrought 
r the mind. As no synthesis derived from our sense intu-
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;ions can possess the universality and necessity which 
Lthematics demands, then the validity must be found in the 
Liversal and necessary functions of the constructive mind. 
The same holds for the principles of geometry. Geomet-
cal truths are neither deduced nor derived from sense in-
ition. No analysis of concepts of lines will ever give 
figures unless we have the intuition of an infinite space. 
e principle that two sides of a triangle are greater than 
third is not a deduction, simply because it not only pre-
pposes concepts of spaces but an intuition of an infinite 
3.ce, which gives to all concepts of spaces their meaning. 
~ geometrical principles are synthetic judgments, then, 
}ause the concept of any geometrical figure never reports 
~ presupposition which is an infinite space to which all 
[ited spaces must belong. 4 Again the mind, in one creative 
., relates its concepts of spaces (geometrical figures in 
.s instance)to its intuition of an infinite space. Try 
conceive space as limited, Kant declares. Such a con-
•tion~contradicts the very meaning of space which implies 
titlessness. Beyond your limited space what could exist 
Muller, CPR, 135; Kant, KrV, 165A. 
Kant, KrV, 25A; Muller, CPR, 20. 
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but more space ad infinitum? Hence geometrical figures pre-
suppose an intuition of one infinite space and therefore all 
geometrical truths are synthetic judgm9nts of the mind which 
relates its limited spatial concepts to its intuition of the 
spatial whole, and, therefore, geometrical truth derives its 
validity from this universal and necessary function or syn-
thesis of mind.s What we have said will . become clearer when · 
we discuss Kant's concept of space and time and again his 
deduction of the categories of quantity. 
We can see, then, that Kant's initial problem of how 
science and mathematics are possible becomes really the prob-
lem of how an intelligible experience itself is possible. 
For the truths of Science and mathematics constitute a 
large part of our experience. In discovering this we find 
that phenomena themselves, objects which we intuit by our 
senses, need the spontaneous activity of mind. Before we 
begin to trace Kant.' s analysis of experience we turn momen-
tarily to Kant's criticism of the Aristotelian logic. 
2. Analysis and Synthesis. 
That it was ·Kant and not Hegel who dealt the first blow 
o Aristotelian logic is seldom recognized. It was commonly 
hought before Kant, and even the acute Hume , 6 held the view 
ith regard to mathe~atics and geometry, that those universal 
rinciples necessary for an intelligible experience, let alone. 
• 
• 
Kant, KrV, 23-26A; Muller, CPR, 18-20 • 
Hume, THN, 42-65 • 
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the valid principles of mathematics and physical science~ 
are simply given by the laws of thought, that is~ the law 
of consistency (A is A equals A is not non-A). What Kant 
did was to show t~at deduction is only useful after we have 
truth. It is useless in gaining truth. Consistency, then, 
serves a negative, not a productive function. Inference is 
simply the elucidation of what we have already implied in 
the object under consideration. 
If I say all bodies are extended this is an ana-
lytical judgment. I need not go beyond the con-
cept connected with the name of body, in ord~r 
to find that extension is connected with it. 
3ut the problem is, what principles are necessary even to 
lntuit and conceive objects in the first place? Logic gives 
1s neither the objects nor does it enable us to determine 
rhat conditions are necessary to conceive objects. We have 
tlready seen that the truths of mathematics and geometry for 
ant depend not on analysis but on universal and necessary 
ynthetic £unctions of the mind. While sensations enable us 
o intuit objects, they do not give us the intelligibility 
equired to form concepts let alone the universal and ne-
essary concepts without which particular concepts would be 
possible.8 - We will discover this later. What needs to be 
~-
phasized here is that the common logic for Kant has only 
e negative function of consistency once a certain amount 
Kant, KrV, 7A; MUller, CPR, 6. 
Kant, KrV, _l50A; MUller, CPR, 123. 
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>f truth has been established, and this truth must be gained 
>y the synthetic activities of the mind. 9 Just what kind or 
;ynthetic activity is required constitutes Kant's main prob-
~em, and though the different kinds or activity necessary for 
;ruth which Kant disclosed in his deduction of the categories 
light be inaccurate, no criticism of Kant has yet established 
;he point that truth does not require some kind of synthetic 
rocesses. In requiring such activity, how can we say that 
ruth can be divorced from .a thinker, universals can be ab-
tracted from minds? One cannot juggle universals without 
t the same ·time juggling the thinker along with them. 
• Experience as Synthetic: the Aesthetic. 
What we have to do in discovering how an intelligible 
~perience is possible, Kant argues, is to discover first 
'w sense intuition is possible, and secondly, how concepts 
~ our sense intuitions are possible. Here we consider the 
~oblem of the Aesthetic, namely, how a sense intuition of 
1 object is thinkable. 
Sense intuitions, according to Kant, presuppose an in-
~ition or an infinite space, as was discussed in Kant's con-
pt or geometrical truth. Our intuitions or objects never 
port the .intuition of an inrinite space. How could they? 
. ~-
d we, in our sense experience, ever intuit an inrinity of 
jects in space?lO Yet, Kant argues, every intuition or a 
Kant, KrV, 6-14A; Muller, CPR, 5-10. 
Kant, KrV, 23A; Muller, CPR, 18-19. 
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.rticular space demands an intuition or an infinite space 
Space does not represent any quality or objects by 
themselves, or objects in their relation to one an-
other; i. e. space does not represent any determin-
ation which is inherent in the objects themselves, 
and would remain, even if all subjective conditions 
of intuition were removed. For no determination of 
objects, whether belonging to them absolutely or in 
relation to others can enter into our intuition be-
fore the actual existence or objects themselves, 11 that is to say, they can never be intuitions ~priori. 
op the subjective conditions, and all intuitions of spatial 
jects vanish. That space in some sense is .! priori is an 
;>ortant truth. But Kant's argument is sound only in the 
:;e of the extension of space. Kant, possessing only a super-
:ial knowledge of Berkeley, failed to realize that magni-
le, essential to the spatial concept, can only be empirically 
?ived from the sense of touch and movement. To say with-
~keley that the idea of the magnitude of space depends upon 
1se .experience is not to argue that space is objectively 
tl.12 On the contrary, Berkeley's principle only modifies 
Lt's doctrine as regards the concept of magnitude. If 
•keley · is right, if the total spatial concept depends at 
Lst in part on sense experience, this is the reverse of 
·ing that it is objectively real apart from the mind in which 
-- sensations occur. 
Muller, CFR, 20; Kant, KrV, 25A. 
cr. Chap. II. 
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Kant•s arguments for the ideality of time are similar 
~capt that time is a universal fact both of mind and its 
Jjects. The intuitions of particular times have meaning, 
3 in the case o~ space, only if they belong integrally to 
1e one infinite time. Again, to limit time is a contra-
Lction, for what would lie beyond .our limitation or boundary 
: time would be more time. 
To say that time is i~inite means no more than 
that every definite quantity of time is possible 
only b~ limitations of one time which forms the 
foundation of all times.l3 
~ain, do our sense intuitions of objects yield an intuition 
' one infinite succession? Obviously not, for events come 
td go, and we never experienced an infinity of events. 
·nsequently, time must be presupposed by a single intuition 
an in~inite time the source o:f which is the mind itselr.l4 
Kant's theory of time is di:fficult and will require a 
eat deal o:f revision by Ward as well as other idealists. 
e difficulty lies not only in his theory o:f intuition but 
the :fact, as Kant himself admits, that time is a fact com-
n to both the internal and external sense, the mind and the 
enomena to which the mind refers. To intuit a thing means 
at we have it immediately before the mind. It could be con-
ivable . that we intuit an infinite spatial whole since the 
nd, at least on the idealist view, is not spatial. But how 
• Muller,CPR, 25; Kant, KrV, 32A • 
• 
Kant, KrV, 29-42A; Muller, CPR, 24-34 • 
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ould we have an infinite succession immediately present to 
ne mind when the mind itself is successive? Had Kant, as 
ater idealists have argued, dropped the notion of a pure in-
aition or ~arm and replaced it with concept, his theory of 
ime would be more plausible. We ail have concepts of an in-
lnite time and space and it may be that any experience of 
ime or re~erence to space presuppose these concepts. In fact, 
1e truth o~ Kant lies just here, and is developed in his 
1alytic, that temporal experience and spatial reference are 
~oducts of just those synthetic acts of relating which he 
tlls functions or categories.l5 
>. Vlhile one might take issue with equating function and 
category, the two for Kant are inseparable. Thus Kant 
states: "All intuitions, being sensuous, depend on af-
fections, concepts on function. By this function I mean 
the unity of the act of arranging different represent-
ations under one common representation. Concepts are 
based therefore on the spontaneity of thought, sensuous 
intuitions on the receptivity of impressions." Muller, 
CPR, 68; Kant, KrV, 68A. Again Kant states: _"Then and 
then only do we say that we know an object, if we have 
produced synthetical unity in the manifold of intuition. 
Such unity is impossible, if the intuition could not be 
produced, according to a rule, by such a :function of 
synthesis as makes the reproduction of the manifold a 
priori necessary, and a concept in which that manifold 
is united, possible. This unity of rule determines the 
manifold and limits it to conditions which render the 
uni.ty of apperception possible, and the concept of that 
unity is really the representation of the object = x, 
which I think, by means of the predicates of a triangle." 
MUller, CPR, 87; Kant, KrV, 105A. It is extremely im-
pqrtant to remember that thought :for Kant is an active 
process. Categories are those unities which make a 
reference to an external object,bance an intelligible 
experience itself, possible. Such unities are the prod-
ucts of certain synthetic mental functions. The organic 
unity of consciousness forbids that concepts can be 
abstracted from the process of conceptualizing just as 
much as it forbids rei:fication of sensation apart from 
the act of sensing. 
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4. Experience as Synthetic: the Analytic. 
Kant wants to discover in the Analytic what conditions -
are necessary in order to conceive the objects intuited under 
the forms of space and time. If our sense intuitions presup-
pose forms which they cannot possibly reveal, it is obvious 
that our concepts of these intuited phenomena cannot be pro-
)uced by our sensa intuitions. We are not in this disserta-
~ion concerned with Kant's concept of the thing-by-itself nor 
vith his Transcendental Dialectic, not only because they re-
Jresent the less important phase of his thought, but because 
~hay are irrelevant to our central problem which has to do 
rith Kant•s doctrine of experience. 
Thought is impossible, Kant contends, without basic 
~ynthetic activities of -the mind defined as categories.l6 
Thile many concepts are not essential to certain types of 
;hinking, what concepts are so essential, Kant asks, that 
rithout them thought itself would be impossible? Interpreters 
1f Kant believe that Kant's doctrine of the categories was 
.imited to science. This view however is questionable. While 
;he original purpose of the Critique was to discover the valid-
.ty of Newton's principles, as well as mathematics and geo-
Letry, by the time Kant became really involved in the problem 
Le discovered that he was investigating something more far-
_ __.- . 
•eaching· than science, n~ely, the whole of experience. While 
his dissertation is concerned only with the categories 
6. Kant, KrV, 65-66A; Muller, CPR, 54. 
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relevant to physics and mathematics, a treatment of Kant's 
categories is never eL~austive until Kant's theory of ethics 
and aesthetics is considered, for in these fields Kant was 
also searching for a priori principles. If moral experience 
is a genuine experience, then what do we need to make it a 
valid one? That Kant's interests in the Critique were not 
merely limited to discovering t he presuppositions of physi-
cal science, is also attested by the function which the 
Analytic was supposed to serve in Kant's general doctrine of 
.. 
experience. As mentioned above, Kant, in the Analytic, wants 
to discover the presuppositions of thought. And since the 
essential feature of thought is reference to objects, the 
distinguishing feature of the Analytic lies in showing what 
is presupposed in this objective reference. 
Now the question arises whether there are not also 
antecedent concepts a priori, forming conditions 
under which alone something can be, if not seen, 
yet thought as an object in general; for in that 
case all empirical knowledge of objects would 
necessarily conform to such concepts, it being im-
possible that anything should become an object of 
experience without them. All experience contains, 
besides the intuition of the senses by which some-
thing is given, a concept also of the object, which 
is given in intuition as a phenomenon ••• if by 
them only it is possibl~ to think any object of ex-
perience, it follows that they refer by ner~ssity 
and a __ priori to all objects of experience. 
----
Now the question is whether the categories, .for Kant, can 
e simply limited to this role of objective reference. Do 
ot intuitions, or sense data, also presuppose the categories 
7. Muller, CPR, 77-78; Kant, KrV, 93A. 
l.l.8 
md a unitary self? Kantian scholars are at variance on 
;his issue. Paton and Smith answer negatively. Paton agrees 
;hat "for Kant there can be no knowledge or experience of 
1bjects--in the strict sense--apart from the categories", 
•ut argues that "this is a very different thing from saying 
hat no representations can exist for consciousness apart 
rom the categories.nl8 Smith and Lindsay hold the same view.l~ 
aird, on the other hand, believes that, for Kant, sense data 
resuppose a unitary self. Without it we would have only a 
eaning1ess manifold. 20 Passages can be quoted which support 
oth views. In support of Caird's interpretation, Kant writes: 
The internal sense, on the contrary, contains the 
mere form of intuition, but without any connection 
of the manifold in it, and therefore, as yet, no 
definite intuition, wh ich becomes possible only 
through the consciousness of the determination of 
the internal sense by the t~fnscendental act of 
the faculty of imagination. 
1 the other hand Kant states: · 
To know a thing as an object is possible only under 
two conditions. First, there must be an intuition 
by which the object is given us, though as a phenom-
enon only, secondly, there must be . a concept by which 
an object is thought as corresponding to that in-
tuition.22 
,re Kant states that an intuition, at least, is possible 






Paton, ME, 330. 
Smith, CK, XLIX; Lindsay, ~~N, 107-113 • 
Caird, CPK, I, 352-358. 
Muller, CPR, 759; Kant, KrV, 154B • 
Muller, CPR, 77; Kant, KrV, 92-93A • 
;o have intelligible perceptions and feelings? Certainly 
ensations and feeling, if meaningful at all, embody some 
·orm, intensity, quality and duration. 
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The purpose of Kant's Analogies, is just to show how the 
ategories "anticipate" sensory experience. Even the intui-
ion of qualities, obviously sensuously derived, presupposes, 
ccording to Kant, the concept c·f degree or relation.24 What 
9 more, Kant's supreme principle, the synthetic unity of ap-
3rception, the very principle of which the categories are but 
3re expressions, certainly is broader than science. It in-
Ludes, Kant argues, any intelligible experience wha.tsoever.25 
Jnse experience, or sensuous manifold, as Kant called it, 
~ sparate, temporal, factual as it is could never make for the 
tity of the self. On the other hand, sense data are meaning-
1ss apart from the unitary mind. Impressions in conscious-
ISS imply a unitary consciousness of the impressions. 2 6 But 
, have intelligible experience we need also the synthetic 
~ctions of memory (reproduction) and recognition of sense 
.tuitions and concepts.27 To argue that memory is made pos-
ble by _t~e association of the manifold sensations is to re-
ate the problem, Kant contends.28 Who is going to reproduce 
e associations which have already lapsed in time? 
How do - these three synthetic functions, self-consciousness, 
• Kant, KrV, 167; Muller, CPR; 136-137. 
• Kant, KrV, llOA; Muller, CPR, 90. 
• Kant, KrV, llOA; Muller, CPR, 91. 
• Kant, KrV, 92-lllA; Muller, CPR, 76-90. 
• Kant, KrV, 94A; Muller, CPR, 78. 
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memory and recognition "anticipate" a meaningf"ul sense ex-
perience? 
i. The Categories of Quantity: Unity, Plurality, Totality. 
Not only Newton's physics depends upon the concept of 
nass, but our ordinary dealings with things, presuppose the 
~oncept of quantity. But how do we get such a concept? From 
'bservation? 
Without a spontaneous synthesis, the concept of quantity, 
~ant maintains, would be impossible. For, again, what is a 
tuantity but a portion of the one infinite space-time intuited 
.ogically prior to sense experience?29 The essence of space 
;S to extend infinitely and to limit it without at the same 
ime acknowledging the limitation as part of this infinite 
xtension is to contradict the very meaning of space.30 But 
ince the intuitions of our objects give us only limited 
paces, the mind, then, performs two functions indispensable 
o the concept of quantity. First, it intuits the infinite 
~tension of space (the spatial form of the Aesthetic) and, 
3Condly, it invariably, according to a fixed rule, relates 
~e finite quantities of space, revealed by our senses, to 
1is pure form of infinite spatial extension.31 
.. 
Kant's argument for the temporal quantities is identical. 
· To say that time is infinite means no more than that 
Kant, KrV, 162-167A; Muller, CPR, 133-136. 
Kant, KrV, 163A; Muller, CPR, 133. 
Kant, KrV, 163A; Muller, CPR, 133-134 • 
every definite quantity of time is possible only by 
limitations of one tirre which forms the foundation 
of all times ••• This peculiar property of quan-
tities that no part . of them is the smallest possible 
part (no part indivisible) is called continuity. 
Time and space are %uanta continua, because there 
is no part o:f them nat is not enclosed between 
limits •••. no B~rt that is not itself again a 
space or a t~me. . 
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le the deduction may be valid regarding -the extensive 
ture of quantity, quantity also involves magnitude, and -
the concept o:f magnitude can be logically prior to our 
sations, _that is, our sense of touch and movement, as 
• 
keley contende~ is indeed a question. We reserve this 
blem for Ward. 
The Categories of ~uality: Reality, Limitation and 
Negation. 
The formal character of the categories of quantity 
der Kant's a priori interpretation plausible. But what 
.. 
ut qualities? Is not quality i~diately in experience? 
tainly this is the case with sense qualities as Berkeley 
ntains. Does Kant believe the content as well as the 
m or consciousness is created outright by the mind? Ob-
usly not, for Kant acQepts the sensuous manifold as 
en.33 But what does quality presuppose? According ·to 
t it .. pres.upposes degree,34 and since degree is a relation, 
is going to do the relating? The sensations of heat, 
Muller, CPR, 25; Kant, KrV, 32A. 
Kant, KrV, 175-176A; MUller, CFR, 143-144. 
Kant, KrV, 167A; Muller, CPR, 136-137. 
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~olor, etc., occur in degrees varying from zero to infinity. 
l single sensation could not report its relative position in 
;he whole range because it is a vanishing temporal event. In 
1hort, a relation presupposes a consciousness of relations. 
In the interbal sense that empirical consciousness 
can be raised from 0 to any higher degree, so that 
.an extensive quantity of intuition (for instance, an 
·illuminated plain) excites the same amount of sensa-
tion, as an aggregate of many other less illuminated 
plains. It is quite possible, therefore, to take no 
account of the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, 
and yet to represent to oneself in the mere sensation 
in any single moment a synthesis of a uniform progres~ 
sion from 0 to any given empirival consciousness. All 
sensations as such are therefore given a posteriori 
only, but their quality, in so :far as they must pos-
sess a degree, can be known a priori. It is remark-
able that o:f quantities in general we can know one 
quality only a priori, namely, their continuity, while 
with regard to quality (the real o:f phenomena) nothing 
is known to us a priori, but their intensive quantity, 
that . is, they must have a degree.35 
The three categories, reality, limitation and negation, 
re for Kant simply phases o:f the category o:f quality. The 
ategory, reality, is attributed to any quality, while a lim-
tation or negation o:f that quality constitutes the cate-
ories o:f limitation and negation.36 
ii. The Categories o:f Relation: Substance, Causality, 
Community. 
• 
It was Hume, with his devastating attack on the sacred 
--· 
MUller, CPR, 143-144; Kant, KrV, 175-176A. 
Kant, KrV, 170A; Muller, CPR, 139 • 
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rinciple of Newtonian physics, the principle of universal 
~d necessary causality, who challenged Kant to find uni-
:~rsal and necessary elements in experience, particularly 
~ientific and mathematical experience. Agreeing with Hume 
~at necessary causation cannot be found in sense experience, 
1t insisting that experience as a whole, as well as science, 
:tnnot get along without it, Kant concludes that the principle 
~ found in a fixed function of the mind.37 What is true of 
:tusality is true of substance and community. 
The category of substance demands two conditions: First, 
1e mind, by its own spontaneity, must organize the rleeting 
npressions into a concept, reproduce the concept in memory, 
1d recognize the event when it occurs in a ruture experience.38 
~herwise the identity of the concept could never be estab-
Lshed and meaning would vanish, for we cannot get perman-
1ce in change unless the mind puts it there by means of its 
:-inciples of unity, that is, its concepts. 39 However, Kant 
~ unstable about his deduction of substance. He sometimes 
~jects the scholastic notion of inherence and at other times 
~instates it. 
I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, 
but also .the man of common understanding, has ad-
mitted this permanence as a substratum of all change 
of phenomena ••• But I nowhere find even the at-
tempt of a proof of this very synthetical proposi-
tion, and it occupieS but seldom that place which 
Kant, KrV, 211A; Muller,. CPR, 171-172. 
Kant, KrV, 156-159A; Muller, CPR, 128-129. 
Kant, KrV, 158; Muller, CFR, 129. 
it ought to occupy at the head of the pure and en-
tirely a priori existing laws of nature. In fact 
the proposition that substance is permanent is 
. tautological, because that permanence is the only 
ground why we apply the category of substance to 
a phenomenon, and it ought first to have been 
proved that there is in all phenomena something 
permanent while the changeable is only a determin-
ation of its existence. But as such a proof can 
never be given dogmatically and as deduced from 
concepts, because it refers to a synthetical propo-
sition a priori, and as no one ever thought that 
such a proposition could be valid only in refer-
ence to possible experience, and could therefore 
be proved only by a deduction of the possibility 
of experience, we need not wonder that,_ though it 
served as the foundation of all experience (being 
felt to be indispensable to every kind of empiri-
cal knowledge), it has never been established by 
proof.40 . 
But on the other hand Kant argues: 
On this permanence depends also the right under-
standing of the concept of change. To arise and . 
to perish are not changes of that which arises or 
perishes. Change is a mode of existence, which 
follows another mode of existence of the same ob-
ject. Hence whatever changes is permanent, and 
its condition only changes]fl ••• It is therefore 
only in substance that change can be perceived. 
Arising or perishing absolutely, and not refer-
ring merely to a det.ermination of the permanent 
can never become a possible perception, because 
it is the permanent only which renders the repre-
sentation of a transition from one state to 
another, from not being to being, possible, wh~ch 
(changes) consequently can only be known empir-
ically, as alternating determinations of what 
is permanent.42 
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This~{mdoubtedly is. to resort to the Scholastic doctrine of 
inherence occasioned by Kant's faulty conception of time. 
. -
Kant's whole deduction of the categories rests on the active 
40. MUller, CPR, 150-151; Kant, KrV, 184-185A. 
41. Muller, CPR, 153; Kant, KrV, 187A. 
42. Muller, CPR, 153; Kant, KrV, l88A. 
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1ynthesis of mind, and synthesis depends upon the reality 
>f succession. The truth of Kant's above statement is the 
'act that time cannot be experienced without something per-
lanent. But is the permanence found in time itself or is it 
liscovered in the unifying acts of mind, its self-conscious-
.ess, memory, recognition, its real duration as Ward and Berg-
on call it?43 The logic of Ka~t's general position would _ 
ompel him to assert that permanence is produced by the syn-
heses of self-consciousness, memory, and recognition. It 
s important to remember, however, the distinction already 
.entioned in the discussion of Berkeley, between a category 
ecessary for knowledge and a category necessary for exist-
nee. That Kant may have held to the doctrine of substance 
s not to argue that he embraced a concept of substance in-
ependent of all minds, and this for two reasons: First, he 
efused to declare metaphysical principles, and, secondly, 
e insisted that substance, however it is to be understood, 
s always an a priori concept of mind. 
Turning to Kant's deduction of necessary causation, he 
~gues that Hums's reference to habit and custom is not an 
~curate report of what the scientist discovers or of what we 
ll experience in our every day occurrences.44 When observ- . 
~g a ball hit .by a bat we do not say, Kant would argue, 
3ecause in my experience a ball has always moved upon being 
s. Cf. Bergson, 298-299, 308-309, 317-318, 354-364. 
t. Kant, KrV, 9l-92A; MUller, CPR, 76. 
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struck by a bat, this does not necessarily have to be the 
case." Rather, according to Kan t, we say unconditionally 
that this must necessarily be the case. But why? Not from 
a minute analysis of balls and bats, because we cannot ex-
amine all possible balls and bats. Facts in experience are 
reached inductively, not deductively, and inductive judg-
ment can give us at best probabi l ity, not the universality 
and necessity which causality requires. The category of 
causality is produced by the synthetic act of the mind which 
combines the successive events in the one irreversible tam-
poral order. It is our intuition of this time order,- and 
the reproduction and recognition of events in this order, 
according to regular rules that I ascribe a universal and 
necessary cause to everything, Kant contends. If time were 
~ot irreversible, if we could go back as well as forward then 
~ausality would be a farce. The eart could pull the horse, 
the house build the man. That msmory and recognition are 
1ecessary to an experience of causality is obvious.45 
And thus I ask with reference to that empirical 
rule of association, which must always be admit-
ted if we say that everything in the succession 
of events is so entirely subject to rules that 
nothing ever happens without something preced-
ing it on which it always follows, --What does 
~t .rest on, if it is a law of nature, nay, how 
is that very association possible? You call the 
ground for the association of the manifold, so 
far as it i~ contained in the objects themselves, 
the affinity of the manifold. I ask, therefore, 
how do you make that permanent affinity by which 
5. Kant, KrV, 110-114A; Muller, CPR, 90-95. 
phenomena stand, nay, must stand, under permanent 
laws conceivable to yourself? According to my prin-
ciples it is easily conceivable. All possible phen-
omena belong, as representations, to the whole of 
our possible self-consciousness. From this; as a 
transcendental representation, numerical identity 
is inseparable and a priori certain, because noth-
ing can become knowledge except by means of that 
original apperception. As this identity must neces-
sarily enter into the synthesis of the whole of the 
manifold of phenomena, if that synthesis is to be-
come empirical knowledge, it follows that the phen-
omena are subject to conditions a priori to which 
their synthesis (in apprehension) must always con-
form. The representation of a general condition ac-
cording to which something manifold can be arranged 
(with uniformity) is called a rule, if it must be 
so arranged, a law. All phenomena stand in a per-
manent connection according to necessary laws, and 
thus possess that transcendental affinity of which 
the empirical is a mere consequence. 46 -
Of course Hum:e accepted the irreversible time order. 
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hat he failed to realize was that this order could never re-
roduce itself to a passive mind. An event, when it occurs, 
anishes and certainly could never reproduce itself in the 
resent as a past event. The laws of association, Kant urges, 
3ver explain memory simply because they presuppose it. If 
~ event could reproduce itself it would be accomplishing a 
C'eat deal. But to reproduce i tsel.f as the past ·-event is 
3king too much for an event or an association of events 
> accomplish. It would be possible only if time were not 
ral, but then . there would no longer be an event. 47 
-----. 
Kant's deduction of the third category of relation is 
.. 
. milar to that of substance and causality. The interaction 
' events, events which vanish as soon as they occur, 
• 
• 
Miiller, CPR, 92-93; Kant, KrV, 112-113A, • 
Kant, KrV, 156-159A; Muller, CPR, 127-130 • 
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presupposes a unitary mind which is capable of relating past, 
present and simultaneous events. 
Things are coexistent in so far as they exist at one 
and the same time. But how can we know that they ex-
ist at one and the same time? Only if the order in 
the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is in-
different, that is, if I may advance from A through B, 
C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A· For, if the 
synthesis were successive in time (in the order be-
ginning with A and ending with E), it would be impos-
sible to begin the apprehension with the perception 
of E and to go backwards to A, because A belongs to 
past.tim~~ and can no longer be an object of appre-
henslon. 
iv. The Categories of Modality. 
Kant's final categories, the categories of modality, 
namely, existence and non-existence, possibility and impos-
sibility, necessity and contingency, are deduced from his 
general theory of experience. What agrees with the formal 
conditions of experience, Kant holds, is possible. That is, 
nothing is possible unless it conforms to the synthetic 
principles, i. e., the categorical functions of mind. 
It is therefore the possibilityof experience which 
alone gives objective reality to all our knowledge 
a priori. Experience, however, depends upon the 
synthetical unity of phenomena, that is, on a syn-
thesis according to concepts of the object of phenom-
ena in general. Without it, it would not even be 
knowledge, out only a rhapsody of perceptions, which 
1rould never grow into a connected text according to 
· the rules of an altogether coherent (possible) con-
sciousness, nor into a transcendental and necessary 
unity of apperception. Experience depends therefore 
on a priori principles of its form, that is, on 
general rules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, 
8. - MUller, CFR, 172; Kant, KrV, 211A. _ 
and the objective reality of these (rules) can al-
ways be shown by their being the necessary condi-
tions of all experience; nay, even in the possibil-
ity of all experience. Without such a relation 
synthetical propositions a priori would be quite 
impossible, because they have no third medium, that 
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is, no object in which the synthetical unity 2~ their 
concepts could prove their objective reality. 
"Vlhat is connected with the material conditions of experi-
ence is real," Kant . ar-gues.50 "That which, in its connection 
~ 
with the real, is determined by universal conditions of ex-
perience, is (exists as) necessary. 1151 In other words~ a 
.. 
thing can never be given to consciousness if it is unintel-
ligible, and in so far as it is given it is necessary. This 
Line of reasoning .is similar to Royce's argument against ag-
:losticism. One cannot know that there is an unknowable, for 
--
ln so far as it is known it is already knowable. The argu-
nent is interesting but its validity is another problem. 
5. Criticisms 
Hans Reichenbach contends that we are witnessing in all 
1uarters of contemporary philosophy the "disintegration of 
~he synthetic a priori. n52 -The advent of the new physics and 
~eometry has antiquated ·:Kant's epistemology, constru-cted as 
lt was on Newtonian physics and Euclidian geometry. 
_How has- the discovery of non-Euclidian geometry affected 
~he synthetic a priori? What the discovery shows, Reichenbach 
t9. Muller, CPR, 128; Kant, KrV, 156-157A. 
50. Muller, CPR, 178; Kant~ KrV, 218A. 
>1. Muller, CPR, 178; Kant, KrV, 218A. 
>2. Reichenbach, RSP, 125. 
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about . face ancl sa.;;i' , "I told you. o. u In de t , r m· na.nc.r s ' ows 
th t nature is tel clog cal , not echnn:tc 1 , afte r al l . 
nut tho Ke.r.tian 1.deo.list , too, has resource s to ab sorb 
the shoel' of modern physic and geo etry . The essenti l 
rr;ess ge of Kn.nt .:s h is .. )rinciple of t he synthetic u.nity of 
sel ~ Dnta or sen. e are utterly b l ind :l t hout a Utl' tary , 
ha:t•d at u ll teral da:f'e a.sa o1 .. ·~ant 's c ... te gories , the y only 
,. 
58. 'J.lhl s is an im~ortant qual1..t•ioat1on eakc ~ting r.:~eich n ... 
baeht s critic-ism of Kant . Cf . l. i.e l nbach, PSP , 183-
186 . 
Q9 . 3eic nbach, ~~r , 164 . 
tn•a applicable to modern physics is il"'~celeva 1t ~~o Tha •6ul 
point :Ls ·thut they "mPe a~.)pltcaole to i;{.e tonts ph;tls!.cs 1 11 ... 
lu.stra:t l ug how gren. t. l ;:,.· t;he conlir•ol, of nu..tul"e presuppos.ea 
~·he re :.-.1 problem .. ~:O.r ce:t ;,go:t"~ies , pb.ll9coph:toally .speak~ 
:tng , is not so lilUcb. ·. hat eate6or~~.es th.ts or that :r•tHllt! of 
" 
tht.,ught ( thout,h t his i s inipo:s:>ts.nt) p1~esupposas , but :tlJ.at 
eatagor:te s (!lra essen tial fo."' axpo1, .. ienc<t as a. whole • Kant t s 
ans11er t o thi:a pi·oblEJ:::n , ign<:n·•ing hi s dErpe.nd.ence on tho soiitnoe 
of h is time and t he pHc~liariti~:~s of his ~cate gorical deduc• 
t . .. 1.0!1$ ' 
Again it was his em~:d .. r-ioi sm. 1.n sp:tto of the f'e.ct that Kant 
. s.s not alwe.ys e <£m.s is tent about this point , partieulo.rly 1n 
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eont.rr:>a·t. "!.on to :i,Jealisrn ,. I ant •a -t heory of tha e:ynthotie a 
priori ·· is not es J~a.d as Re ichcnba,eh Sll;ppo . as . 
T' l · '?'•~nv- f· l' Y•"'{· t- o VBn t f o .r.•~t"" F0'!''"!.1' or r":Bl:l"""'11t i'l ..o. ~ch""n--- .,j, J...l.. ... l.::;,; .--w- ·.,1 !.J .a . ~ . ..,_ "\.,li.,;L 0 ....;; -v ' _, '--.JQ • ..... .,~ , v  Q 
vex•ssli ty and neeessit:/ of causa.li ty simply means that an 
:i.ntelligi ble exp rlence doman.ds · the. t one attributes to an 
event necestH:.ry ant.ct~·adent or caUfHh He did !10t contend 
thu t t'be .ntecedent h~.s. tc· bE. t;b s ame event or grtF.ps of 
eve:nts , .l:e ~.mportant point of Ke.nt t s analysis 1.s the f'act 
t ha t t'1e 1•td'erence tQ n antseedent wemld be impossible l'lith• 
out t·~rto PI'6H.mpposad cm:;;d:i tl.ont;i;; Fi-rst, n r•eferon<.'~ e to the 
t.)tHlt ( a:n..teeode nt) pJ•eat.p1:,onen seJ.f .. eonseiousness , reprod.ue-
t:ton at:.d l"'cognition of cH ncepts1 and, se·c ondly, an int :.1t1on 
of" an inf~_;::!. ta , temporal n.n1 t '!" !n which ono oan pl oe the 
event ~. n. a s tngla• u.nita:t•y , tempo al ord;;n<t of ovo:nts . A 
time expe rience itso.lf . I t a nertieular time eanno, be 
rere x':;. .. ad to the ::me i nt nl te ti:., a , the:~l the f lo of t:tme 
vani.shes . . .. ut not onl::t dt:.NH1 tinte depend upon such an in .. 
t ui tl.on , hut also 'i.l,pon t he ayn.tht):ti.c unt ties of the m.ind 
( the syntht~tio unity ot a ppercep tion Qnd the eynthetio 
functi ons ·jt the other eatagoriaa) by which tha t ·emporal 
·flow is caught :tn a uni tary species pre!HH1t . t30 In short, 
Kant was not a t t I;;pting t o validate· "the i clea. t hat a eause 
----
13 
He was attempting to diaoover the pl"'es.uppoait l ons of the 
p odtiot of :raL1' • 
c pt acL.i t :;edly unde rived from stlnse ex-perience. As time 
p:r~esupposas So'lJJ.e k:t.nd of pel:t."manonoe , so Pl"'Ob abili ty pres.np~ 
poses s or!.la type of" ne -~es3i ty ithout h ich the idea of p1."'0b• 
ability would d · t ndle into chaos. 0r1e r11u~t r•er.1ember• too, 
t ha.t . ·r·obability , .fo:t., Rant ,. 'as -lso an a prior•1 c oncept :, 62 
an d no o.ria would argue that physios could gat along i thout 
tl1at. 
Finally , while mode rn physics operates under dlffet'"6nt 
p1-1nc ples than. t i ose of the categories cited by Kant , ce:fi..., 
egories •hieh wez>S .:t'ounded ()n the older physics of Ue#ton, 
1t still operates under prin·ciples hieh ffan.tieipate'' ex.-
perienc'e ,just as vividly as the Kantlan principles r. ere 
s up J:.. osod to ttant :l. o.:l.pa tetl sans -data.. Thus C ssi:ver• not 
·(')nly au important 1nterprote3:' of Ka.11t and historian o£ phi• 
l!;)s ophy, but a ph.iloaopher ot science wr1test 
61. 
62 . 
::n olda~ . h:ysioe ·;aa for the .· ost part a physic 
ot .. ~'Wbols in th:ts sens t 1 t tried to represent 
the nature of' evHry objeet or event lnvestteated 
i r.t a corrospondin.g me<',haa ieal ruodel , whole sin le 
t t m·s passed a.s replicas of the details and 
pJ.•oper•tle a of' 'i:iha objoat . !.~ od.$.!"l': prr.1\'d ..  cs has _n .. 
e reasingly renounced this procedure , and fi»om a 
ph;; ics of l1. ta 1;,a: i,Jict~~res h.atJ be co :e a physit'!~ 
of principles . Its de'\re lopment 1n the nin~teenth 
e~ntt~ry \i8 a.ic;tlalizad by J;;he dit.JQOV· ry a nd the 
p raoiae. fot llUlation of -eV•3t~a.l principle'"' • suoh 
s ?.:arnotts r~:,··Llciple , ·he p:r.in<".:.it- le vf t he con-
servation of t1:nePgy _, the _ principle of l<H~st aet:!r:m 
ar.ld s o o • A prL;.ciple i.s neith.er $: :mel"e SJ1lO aea 
o:t facts noll $olely an ep1t mization of single 
la·s . I t CO:l"ai:!:J.s L, its me a _:tne; t ·e elai1~ ot 
*'al aya a:nd unl vel.,Sa.l.ly1t, which experience ~s 
such is never rarz>ant~d i n maring. Instead of 
deriving a principle rliractly :from. xperienc~ e 
us e 1 t as a cri t rion of expexo .. le:nca ~' Principle s 
co nstitute the fi xed points of the compass t hat 
ar . r'a(r.lirad for sttecessful ~.rte-ntat:ton in t h-e 
wo:r>ld of' phenome na_. 'I'he:t are not so mueh assex---
tions about ~. ;~t;- irical taets as t•:uzims by which we 
interpret these !'e.cte in ot-der to bring t h em to-
gether• into a compl e te anc coherent wh ole • • ._o3 
I t is: not trlle, therei'ore , that the science { n1od• 
e1 .. n ptFsics) consists ()f two strata, as 1 t were: 
simple observation and the resul t s ot measurem.ent 
ba in(); in tJ::te ot~e. ~ th~ o 1•-1 c e built upon 1;he s~ l n. 
t he o t he r. Obao!"'Vet t on and me asurement, ·prto:r to 
a l l theor-y, and indopo ... dent or -i t a e.ss umpt. io:ns . 
a ~.--e it::po~mibla. nothing o1' the sort is ever• givan 
as a tact; it is l'"&tho:r a theoreti·cal ahn t~ao·t;ion 
which upon critical analysis t urns out at once to 
be pu:t'G illus i•'n• 64 
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Ka n t •u1s not dealL1g iVi'lih curviSd s paces._ Bather was be 
dealing · i t h t h e p lane .Jurfaca and certain l y his deduet1.ons 
have s ome se,_.bltance of V;Stlidit;.r in t~at realra~. Obviously the 
na: '1 geoinetl";l presuppose$ a new set or a p rio:ri p rinciples . 
tt assumes eur,red spaces . bent light raya, none of h1ch can 
be empirically tta stad. I n this respoe t Re ichenbaeh is ri ght 
i n oallitl} __ · ge omotey l:'<.Z: lat1 ve. B1.1t r.•ela ti vs t o . ha t? ftela• 
tive to .a s(:)riea oi' def ined r-·el,...tions b.ich _. . as Reichenbach 
63 t t~sair- r ~ rK _ { tr.} , IV ,. 110•1-ll. 
64 t Caiili ~i l"~:r· • PK ~ (tx- . ) ; IV t lll...-112~ 
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admits • can never be tested . curved spaces , l i ght :r ys , are 
never experien ced . They , like Kant ' s cate gories. are presup-
posed concepts , c oncepts essential to the ne geometry. 
r..aybe there are a hundred diffe rent t ypee of surface 
that require t hi;J.. t rnany systems of geome try and prine :l.ples, 
bat when one is dealing i t h t he plane surface, or assumes 
it; · straight line ls still the shortest di stance bet een 
t o points. . Now e do not reach t h is i nsight by obs ervation-. 
Rather , obs ervat ion p resupposes it. The truth or this geo• 
matrical proposition de pends upon pres11ppos.ed insights ot 
the mind , Firat , the jud E:,"'ll~Emt is synt he tic, not a::le.lytical , 
No ana l ysis or lines and points wi ll p:t•oduce the judgment. 
The tru t h is no t con tained 1 t hat is , in tbe premises , "This 
is a l ine" or "These a:r~e t o pointsn as t he· eoncept o!" mor• 
tali t y i s contained in "men" i n t he judgment t hat nAll men 
are mortal •" o observn t .ion oJ:• e xpe Pime n t wi ll ever verify 
t he truth , no t onl y beeaus · no o · e over obs erved. a straight 
line ov a poi n t, but i f he did he could neve r e xamine an 
.infinite nwnbe r of straight l i.ne s c ormecting t o points to 
. \ 
ve rify his t hesis. \Finall y , the a prior i natuz-e or the 
t.ruth is attosted by t he fact that it p:res l.pposes a spatial 
concept of an L.f'i n i t o space hi eh no discrete sense refer• 
ence to a particul ar ge mne t rieal fi gure , for example , could 
reve 1 , this , it i s hoped , i llustrate s Kant 's principle of 
synthesis and tl1e .e. pl:>:lori,. valid of c o'llrse, 1n the parti• 
cu l a r ~r~a, . 1 ·· h hi oh he as dealing 1 Euclidian geon1etry and 
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~·fcwton1an pbye1ee ., But a• Ca~sirer has pO:tt;ltE:Jd out,. no l"aalm 
can get along without certain principles llhieh tJ::lat realm doe$ 
-· no t y ield 'but on the con trary h!oh it pt'tl s ttpposea,. 
One ho at t empts to establi sh ma:thematics or geometry 
on an ernp1r1eal basis will never explain the logical -certain-
ty o£ the ma.tbe ·natieal and geometr-1 tl&.1 intui t1onst Fe-w ar .. 
gumen ts have been mora perstll.as1ve than those ot Berkeley. 
Yet mu~h ot t h e fol"ce or t hose al"gument·s :r·ests upon h 1a us.-
agfl of t ho term "idea'"'• V.fb. n Be·rkeley argues t hat the •tdea" 
or :tn.fini ty is math~nnat 1oally and ge ometrioally usela.ss,. hi s 
eottt. ntion is sound only if one identities , tt1dea" i th :tm ge • 
Obviously no one e·ve r had an imago o-r a billionth ot an inch 
but o rt inly ho ha$ a. con-cep t of _t. Vii tbout t he ~on.C,ept 
of infinity what would he.ppon t o the d1.ff'el"ant 1al ealcu.lu~? 
~lha.tevor else mathematical juiJgrnents may bo , their' va• 
lidity ie not derived trorn aens.e experience.- ~to atld1 tion 
or two o'b Jeots with two other objects will ever establish 
t he necea~u'l i"'y truth that togethe-ra they make four, tor ·the 
simple :reason t hat we cannot count all posaibl~ objects-. 
t beat induct:lon ~an give probabilit , but more t han 
probabilit y :ts i nvolved in the thematical intuit ion that 
two plus tv1o equals fou·r . · ·:nat is more , once we g t the 
i nsight no e.l'nount of sense ve r i.ficatlon adds to the. conv1c•· 
tion ot :tts tt'lith . 65 Wl1en one gets 1r1t o algebra the s1tua .. 
t lon gots worse -. 
We begin 'by ahowi n:g tha t a certain theore-m holda 
good for the nu.mbe:r lJ proc$ed to show that -i f it 
be valid fo't' any numbel?' n••l• it 1s valid also 
f'or the follo ing number n; anq in this way ·con• 
vi'nce ourselves tha:t it 1$ true tor all whole _n\1"11• 
bars, '!'his meth od of proof by reouPs i on 1 which 
for.tns the PQot of avery a.rttm,eticsl calc-ulat i on; 
we cannot fail to recogni ze a.s mathe·mat i oal deduc .... 
tion i n 1 ts 31taplest and pu~est form • . 'l'be disti11"" 
gi.lishing feature or the prooedu.:ve is that it con .. 
ta.ins fin 1nf1~1 te numb.er of hypothet i cal s yllo ;isms ,. 
eompre ss~d, as it were, into a s:t ngle i'om.ula. 
s ueh . an aoh1eveme nt 1 which e.tfords a survey of 
t h e i n.fi ni te _ sa:r1ea ot numbor$ at a glanoa.1 appoavs not to be p0$&1ble vii t h t he t ype of inouctJ.on em• 
ployed i n tha emp1r1eal sciences. There we staz-t 
from the oons ideration of a s1ngle· oaae J go. on 
t o prove many oases; in ordert .finally, by an 
ev~r p~~arious proceaa ot 1n.re:I'$ncQ and with a . 
aort of sudde n jump , to eoneltlde with an asaet-t1on 
that is supposed to apply t o "'all easastt *' ExpEJr• 
1enee eould show onl y t hut a certai n proposition 
is true. for . the f! :t->s t t~n , or rlundr•ed, or thous and 
l'ltt.>nber s •. bu t it c ould never asaaa~ anyt h i ng abou t 
the l imi tless se i~l.es of numb~rs, · 
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If one beliaves that K.antts deduction of the categories 
1s dead; · let h L n wi tness t he »ationalist1c moVEHI~nt in the 
roeeen.t de velopments in mathematical the ory., .Begi nning 1th 
Poincare/ and c on t i nuin g more recently with r.;o.n tor and Ber• 
trand Russell. Kant has r eceived ove!'Whalming sup!.ort. Kan t 
uphe ld two .i' ,1ndrunental t heses t·egar tl i ng t be eo.tngories.; · First;. 
they arc .aynthesea ...... not the p:rodue t s ot ax.talysis. Secondly; 
t h ey are . unive r sal and r;.ecessaey truths undePi ved trom sena 
experience-...- a priori cone pta which a valid mather.ma.ties and 
phy.s1os pre.s upposas. I n the !"Galra of mathamst1os 1 both theae:s 
are strongly maintained by this re oen.t movement i n mathemati.., 
cal the ory-. 
On the _question whether lll.Qthemat ieal ttouths are syn ... 
th.etie 1 or ... na.· y tiaul ,jud.gmant.s 1. Poinearo/ wr1toa: 
~:.hen: a have to include an endles · numbe ~ ot de duo• 
t_ons in on single fol'mula ., !lhcn we are f a ea· to , 
tsce 1th t ho 1n!'1n1te 1 the principle of eontradic• 
t ... on falls down just as expe l."le oe provas 1 t1:1 lf to 
.... 1 
b6 in&utf;t.c;:.ient. ThiB' rule 1 t hen, hlob ia unat• 
taina.ble e 1 thar \)y e~t .erience or- by analytic l proof, . 
1a t he e .x:e ~plar of a synthetic judgment a pr1 . r1 •. 
·~lhy d es this jud~lent fo:rc e· i t self upon us w11ih 
1rres1st,lble evid nee'? P:rec i&. sely be-cause it .. a s se r ts 
noth:tng abou t the nature of' t hings but only about 
an or-iginal facul ty o:t mind . Fo" the mi nd recognizes 
it.f.t oave.c i t y t o Iiepeat a cert 1n act contL ually,-
onc:e. it has become c onvinced of t he poss1b111 t y. or 
such an act_. But the mind do•s have an 1~d1 t e 
1t.i.t~it1.on of t h is pQss ib'llit'yJ axper1ance only ar-
tords the oppo-rt.u91 t y to e rnploy 1 t s nd so to beeome 
conaoi lua of 1t.6 
tiore reoantl y , Bart~and Huss.ell def~nds i th PoincarE( .. and 
Kant t he s ynthetic and ~ priox-1 nature of t he 1;11. thomntieal 
judgtnan t.- R gardlng hie defen · e ot Kant t a lnterpr t a t 1on 
or mathematical and geoi:notrical p:t'opoS.itions as synt be t1a 
judgtrtents, Ru.,·sell rite st 
Kant undou·) tedly de et"Ve S. ered1t fol:' twr.> things t· · 
firot .for having perc ived t ha t e hllVtl a priori 
kno lodge which i s not purely annlytic., :t • e .. , 
such the.·t . the oppos1 t wot1l d be a~l.f-e·o·ntrad1otory ; 
anrl S(\condly , f or havilJg made e-vident the Ph-lo~ 
~;toph1e:al importance of tl~e theor1" of knowledge~0 
• • • He poi n ted out q,ui t~ trul y that 7 and $ have 
to be put t oget h.er t o give twelve; t he 1dea ot 
t· elv · is not cont~ain.ad in t hem, . nor e""en 1n tn• 
i dl! a or adding t nom. togetbe' x:'~t 69 
67 • l?oineare~ SH,. 19. Quoted from C$.SSil"tn•,: Pir (tr .) 1 IV, 78 • 
sa. Russell. PP, 12?*128. 
69 . Rusaell1 PP , 130. 
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Re gard ing t he e. prior 1 nature ot• t he. mat hemat i cal judginent 
Russell . r1 t ·es: 
All putte mat hema t i cs i s a p r icrP1t l ike logic, This· 
was stl'en.uouslydenied by t he s mpii'ical ph1losophe:rs 
who ma.1nta1ned that experience was a.a much t ho source 
ot our kn.o · ledge o·r arlthmeti.<: aa ot our kno ledge: of 
geography. They ma intained ·t hat · by :vopeat d e·xp ~i· 
ence or seeing two t hings o.nd two other t hings» and 
finding t hat al together t hey maae .four t hi ngs, 8 
were lead by i nduction t o t he conel us1on t hat t o 
t hings and two other t h i ngs •ould e;lttaye make !'o\U" 
t hings altogether. If, however, t hia were the source. 
ot our kl::to ledge t ha t t o and two are t our, we s-hould 
proceed diff erently in persuadi11g ourselves of its 
tr-.1 t h trom the · y in which wo do actually proceed .• 
I n f'aet., .a cer tain number ot 1ustancea are nae d .d' to 
make us t h i nk of two abstraotl:y-1 rather t han o£ two 
coi ns or t :o books. or two people or t .o of any other 
speo1t1ed ki nd,. , But na soon. a s we a r e able to divest 
our t houghts of irre levant particularity ,~ we beoorlle 
able t o see t he eene r 1 pr inciple t hat t wo and two 
are. r~c;mr; ·an ¥" one -ins t anoe is seen t o be tutcal and . th~ exam1:ns.t l.on of othe r i ns t ances becomes unnecassal"7•70 
Thus our knowledge of t he, _gene r al propo itions .ot 
matbomtltioa (and t he aam.e applies t <:? logic) must be 
accounted t ·ol' otherw'ise t han by Otll' (me r ely p rob ble) 
knowledge of empi.r!e#l generalizations such as nall 
men ar e movtal11 ._'7J. 
The d 1.fferenoe between Ru.s sell and Kant lies in t heir in• 
terprQtationtt ot mind.- For Kan t t he a pr i ori is .a produet o:t 
t he synthetJiz i ng mind. For Ruaaell, t he a prior i ·uni vol·sale 
a re rigid, floa t i ns; s ubsis.t ent be ings J.tke sensa. · They are 
on l y t houghts when we ar e t hinking abou.t t hem.. Ttl~ r eal ts .. 
s ue between Kant ~U:'ld Thlssell, t hen, is 1irhether propos1 t1on& 
are more basic t hun ·t tle unit y or t be self as a p:tt1no1ple or-
explanation .• 
70• nusae:ll, PP , 170'*' 
? l ,. Rusael.l, Pl) , 131• 
·a th this theory of un1 versals as a baekgx-ound, Russell 
Qlic1 t .s t · o crit i cisms of Kant t s t he ory of the concept. 
F'1rst, in making judgments , one 18 not refer-ring to hi1 
t houghts but to non- mental l"'eferenoes of thoughts. .Thus 
he s.tates; 
Apart from the spoc i 1 doctrines advocated by Kant, 
t is very · common among philo&ophe rs to regaru what 
ia a priori al! in s ome s nee mental , as conecrnod 
rather with the way we mttst think . tha with ny tact 
of' the outer world72 • • • ,qo hat makes 1 t natuP 1 
to call this principle ( th• law of contl"ad.1.ct1o·n) a 
l'aw or thought is that it ia by thought rather than 
by out ard observation that e persuade ours lvea · 
of its· neoessaey truth . ih n ws see thtit a tree 1s 
a beech, we do not need to look gain in ordel" to 
a.sc rtain hetheif. it is al$0 ·1ot a beech; thought 
alone tnakea us . know that th1a is 1ntposslble, But 
the c onolue ton t he.t the law ot oontradiot:ton 1& a 
law of thought is nevertheless erroneous . lhat e 
bellove b.en we 11 ve the law ot eontrad1etton, 
is not that the mind 18 so ma.de so that 1 t muat 
believe the law or eontrad1otion., The l . ot con• . 
·trad1ction is a belief about thing , not only 
bout thoughts •• • A s1m1l~S rg"unen.t ppl1es to 
any other priori judgment .•. • • The tact that 
our minds are so constituted as to believe th t 
two and two are fo ur, thoueh 1 t 1a t:rue 1 is em• 
phat1oally not whnt we assert when. we assert that 
two and two are four.. Thus our a priori knowl.-
edge, 1r it is not erroneous;. 1 not erely 
knowledge about the oonat1tution of our .1inda.,. 
but 1!J a pplicable to hat ver the worl .d may o·on• 
ta1n both hat is mental and what 1_ non ... mental.74 
There is a .s lperf1e1al flaw in Russ llts argument which 
sho1~ld b mentioned before discusa1ng t he mein import of h1s 
or1t1oi sm••nam. ·l y a confusion bet een psyehology and lo 1e. 
72. Russell , PP- 136. 
75. Russell .. PP ~ 137• 
74. Russell , PP• 138-139. 
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ussell oems to hol d the _pontaneo:t.la1 uncritical p&yehol ogi -
cal rGnc t 1on s 1n s ome ay havin · priority over t h$ ·Critical 
eo:tlso :·ousnass . But t his is beside t h point . 'l'he point ia 
t ha t 1\ant nev·er questl.oned t he obje·ctive. r of' tu•ence· of t hout;ht . 
Rus·sell se~ms t o t hink that thought .oan got along w1 t hout 
re.ferenee , even when insisting t h t 1 t is mora t ho.n t hat,. et 
even when t hinking ab ut t hought, the t hinking cannot be ident :i. -
tled with the t 1ought,. Which at tha t part i cu.la~ mo nen t ia 1 ts 
referenc:e . .rhe objective reterenoe of t hough t consti t ute s t he 
ve cy nat ure of t hinking itsel f* Thus when Russell state s 
t hat in judging that t o and t o are rou:r ·e are not malting 
a judg.ment about our thoushts 1s obvi ousl y tru for t he si1 ple 
ranson t hat a judgm~nt is refe~nce.70 he n we make a judg• 
n t about , h n t is involv d 'hen we say t hat two and tw'o make 
f our a reference i s sti l .l expl i cit i n t he judgment but t h 1$ 
time it is of a m:ontaJ. natu~ , t hat is, · our tho1lght about 
t :-t:t.s artlo l a:v e p1stem(') log1cal problem. The eakne ·s.s ot 
Russell* s cri t1c1em is t hat he did not state h is ()o.se· strongly 
enough • 
Returning t o Kant , when he aPgues for the a priori, h i s 
rwt c ont nding t ha t the mi.nd e.reato s 1 ts obJect or t hat the 
object 1s of a mental nature , 11' we dare use the &."!l.b iguous 
t erm ttman~ 1" •. The sense- data a~ extra-ment al , for l{ant , 
in t he sense of be ing given or presented to t ..:1e consciousness . 
In his n.1ortt recent doctrines F.iussell revi ses his view. 
Symbolic lo.si ·O !'#Jsts on t ho t he ory t hat judgmonts can 
exclude t he objective refe r ence. Sinoe ha equa tes 
Jnathema t 1cs w~ th loe;1o, the s le holds for mathematics . 
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ath r than rr.aktng ,judgments , e:xeep t in the oase. of th1ea, 
about yth1ng sup :t>:!ensuous , Kan t insisted thnt ju e-aents 
ar . valid onl y , · •.ben t hey havo this oxtrn-m.ental sensuous 
l.~eretoenc • Kant's point a that while a.ense ... data do. not 
m:.oe ·sarily d v nd upon mind for t heir xiste.nce (tbo gh 
t hey co~1ld as fax• ss nt ' s a gn.ost1o1sm was c oncerned) t hey 
do depend upon mind fo:r- their 1nt ll:t ;:}ibility .. In other 
words, t h self and the not-self are cn"g nieally related in 
a y hioh e n not be s vered 1thout: dest1•oying both .. 1 nee 
to argue for a n()n• mentol ~ntlty is to discuss someth'i~g · ith 
no meaning. The t rm mental 14 ambiguous and he been ex• 
plo1 tad by the idealist and historic l <n-•1 tie alike • An 
i dealist ho interpret · "mental" as anything inseparably re-
lated t o min, h ch rel .. tion o.on t1tutEts in pattt, at least. 
its ver'J esaenoo, outflanks cr1tici m.s sueh as those o£ ilua• 
sall. ut if JY m ntal one eans sl .ply one's own thoughts 
or objective thought~ ( thou.ghts or a Stlpreme mind) t ilan he 
is involved in difficulties-. Even b re. , though, the dis• 
tinction u1ust bo made between the thoughts o!' the kno er and 
t r'O t houghts ot the Absol ute, or God, or what have you. F'or 
ex ~~.pla , the o'bjeotiv · reference o-r the indiv1dual •·a thought, 
wh le nevorth less an bsolut tho e· ~t,. wo~ l.d be obviously 
extra-me. tal in th . sense t hat it was not the 1ndlvid.ual'• , 
private thought. ..~uch confusio coul d be avoided 1.f both t he 
i d alist and h is antagon1st would t ell us whose particular 
t hought they !'6 talking ab ut ; whether t hey are s peaking from 
t he point of view of the individual or the Absolu te; whether · 
1 6 
t hey are r e!'e r- in"; t o minds o :r · i nd i n gon ral. 
Tl p oblem f or the l d. al l st l s t o inte ~ ~~e t t he extra-
m.ent a l refe r en t of thought in a y h i oh ill no t destroy 
t he organ i c :r>elut ionsh :lp be t ·a en mi ntl and 1 ts r e.fe l"a t . 
. F t t ar had t o be d i spos d or be cause i t made nowl. dg m• 
po s ib1 o• But as pointed out ear l ier- h i le rke ley ·ot 
r id of s ub ... tance ., h e defln0d sen se and mind i n a ay wh ch 
ma de t he poss i b i l i .t y or knowladgo d itfieult ;t f or knowl edge 
pree ~., :::·poses an ore a.."l1 c uni t y bo tween 1ni nd and 1 ta ob .}a ot h ioh 
t he Ba r e le1 n s ys t em n e ver t;r..laran teed. 
'ha. t i s la ar , ~. t any rat • 1 s tn f' ot t h a. t t h e x tx-a .. 
men tal r ef eren ce of t hough t odds t o •. rathe r t han detraots 
fro_ • t he a r gument t hat t h e y a ·re o r ,1a n ically rela ted; j ust 
as dive s i t y oem s t 1t u to e t h me .n i ~ or uni t y . ·It s uch e~ 
not th. eas bot h o•1l d be un:tntell1 ~"' ible. Con cepts , 1 t h o t 
ptn•c.e p ts re e mp t y ,. Fe :rce pts with u.t con cep ts a re bl in ., 
So much fo r Puasell'S t'lrs t . c·r i t i e1s of Kant 's i nter• 
pr e tat i on of the a pl~iorit. His seoon , eri t i e1am is that 
t he <Dns tancy of' m:l. nd c nno t be depended upo~h Russell 
wou.l dn tt have needed t his oritiois r t h one cited ·aboye 
·. e e b 11e ved to be ·va11 · , t or the simple Ntason t h t the 
forme!• i mplie s t h t all is ri ght with Kan t ts i nterpreta tion 
save t he unst ble po 1tion which mind hol ds in the un1vor se . 
fJ:·hu a nus sell r i t e s a 
part from mi nor gr oun ds on h i eh Kant•s ph1.losophy 
may be criticized, t h e r e i s one main ob jection which 
seems .fatal t o arty a t temp t to deal with t h e prob lem 
( 
of priori kno lo·dge by h i me t hod • The thin~ to 
be accounted for is our oertai.nty t hat the facts 
must al ~aye c on o _,_ to logic nd ari. thmetic, To 
say that lo )'ic and arithme tic a.re contributed by 
us does .not a:coount for this., our nature 1s as 
_uoh a fsct of t he oxtsting · orl d e.s anyt hing and 
there c.a..n be no ee r ta.inty tha t it 111 rEn11 i n con -
tant. It m.1ght happen if K.ant 1s righ t that t o-
mol"'ro ot: r n turo wo~.1ld ao change aa t o make t o 
a·nd two become five. Th1s possibility seems never 
to have occurred to him, ye t 1t 1 · one h1:. ch uttel"'• 
ly estroys the ce tain.t y and un1ve sal1 ty wh ich he 
is anxto!ls to vtnu1 cnte for arithm tical propos!• 
t 1ons.78 
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Before answ rins t his ch rge , let hat as said above e re• 
peat d . T e 1 in doeS. n·ot create tt,s object on Kan tt$ vie · ,. 
I t simply preseribes the form by wh ich obj cts can be ean~ 
1ngful or inte 111 dble. Deduct all form, and one still haa 
a res! uum of sGn&uou~S c·ontent. But since sense. a11d eoncept1 
mind · nd phenom.en.a s.re org n :te· lly related to the extant that 
one w uld be meaningless wi thou.t the other, nus sell t s crt tiel sm. 
n v rth. less h s f.oree an.d .1u t be :('aoe.d.. : hat .. t sa ll over• 
looks ta t · e f ct thst if mind ·ould change so that t o and t o 
make f'!•;e e o 1ld no longer have mi 1-d . IIe assum s th t the 
m nd is an ent.1ty hich hna such and such charac toristles hi ch 
could be dropped o~~ occa.aion. On t be contrary, t o mind is an 
organic unity , the mat he. tie 1, loeic~l 1nt~1tions of hicb 
cona t i tute an easenti 1 part of' its n3ture • .drop one category 
of mlnd ar1d e destroy t hera all.. Th 1i d does not have 
oo o pta 'btt t t hinks conceptually. , hen I ant r>e:to:tAred to co 1 ... 
seioueness, he a s not ref ~-; rr1ng t o t he qapr:le ious oonsciott ness 
Rus el.lt Pf , 135. 
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of t he fi nit i nd i vidual but t o essential, perntanan t f atures 
of n:ind , L s hort , to mi nd l n ge neral. 77 Back ot the above 
eri ticisras, however, lies a t o tally d if'ferent p: 1losophy or 
m nd, 
~houghts nd f eel ings, miD.dS a-nd pnys1os.l ob-
jects exist. But univ~ rsals do not exist i n 
t is sens ; s 1al l y tha t t 1ey suos1st or 
have being, hez:te "b ing" 1s opposed to "ex.• 
ist·ance" as be i ng t ilneles • he orl of 
unive r sals may also be described as the ot•ld 
of b h lS • The orld of b 1ng 1 unch e ·ahle 1 
rigid, exact, delightful t o tb.e m th m.otician, 
t h e logician , t h e. builde ·r ot ne tapnysioal 
systome, a93 all \'tho love per.feot1on :more 
than life* 
The problem 1s whether the eoncept 18 a passive ent 'ity 
or process of mind: hather m..Ln.d is or is not a U:.'liversaliz ... 
ing a gent., The aot.1ve n · ture ~Jf mind in Kant•s interpret• 
at i on of' t he concept has already b en treated and it -o 1ld 
be useless to b~1rden the reader with a long ~i tel'at i on. 
Kan t deduced t he catogo~iea from t h ree synthetic functions 
of consci ousness~ memory., recognit i on and self oonaciousnasa .. 
utiliz i ng , it is true, t he table of jud~ents ae a model. It 
is a m_at ke t o exagge ra te t h e rol wh ich the latter p layed. in 
K&.&"lt 's deduc t1on.79 Even though some or his categori es are 
rbitrary accommodations to the table of judgments, he de it 
quite clear t hat h is categories we.re syntheses ,. This inevi tab.ly 
77 . For a persuasive interpretation of this aspect of ant t :s 
t h ought, Cf • · i n elbau:i ~ HP • 532•550. 
Russell• PP• 156. 
Kan t d votes ut 14 pages to t h is phase of the deduc• 
t i on . c:r ... !{ant ,. KrV, 70"!"94A; .. til ler Cl~R , 58·70 . 
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fo l lowed f.ro:m the tenor o:f Kant'$ philosophy . Hume chal• 
lenged Kant by sh~Witg that t he connection bet een cause ~d 
effect w.as · synthetic • . Kant aocepted the eh alle ge not only 
by a reeing 1th H· eon t he qusst!on of causality but apply-
in it to the realms of ma themattes and geometry , n 4pplica-
t ion bi ch even Bume :refus d to make , But if mat nemat ical 
and geome trical judgmen ts sre s ynthes s , · ho is goin~ to ke 
the synthesis? Syntheses prasuppose intellige nt age n ts .. rrh.e 
i mportan t point, 1n dealirll! 1th Rusaall's t heory or concepts , 
is th""'t once one admits tha t msthomatieal propositi on s are 
synthat e, not analytical,. an tid _l~sion r dily n. de by R s• 
se11 , 80 o e · is lrsady on the plane of an otive conscio s ness: 
ao. An dr i.ssion of h is earl! r works . :,:or · centl y __ · ssell 
argues that mathemat ics is i de ntic 1 ith logic in being 
an lyt ic l . Bu t 1 by .n lytic Fiussell must maan non-
empirical., not tautologic 1.., Cert 1nly Uu.ssell in his 
rn·ora recent ri ting ould .not hold that mathematical 
Ju.dgrnent cou l d be reduced to the type of' inference cited 
by Kant as a n l y t1oal = all bodies re extended, this i s 
a. body• t her fore t h is body is ext nded . Kan t , rV, 7A , 
r"_uller. era, s. { hough ant c oncerned hia self 0 ly 
ith the judgment "all bod ies ~;,re e .. t fJndadn , the real 
issue has to do i th 1nfereno s as ell as jud .rlan ts) , 
If mat ·ematics con s is ted of as ~1 s of such t utolo ·ies, 
t he .:. ; S A • C • ....: il 0 ndid l y r _. rks , "it WO :.lld uOt b . 
t linking at all and even its en mias dm1t it t o 
b that . " ' '" ing , I DE t 25'7• 
As Ewing poi ts out. ·the t n eno t o overlook the 
· possibil1 t y of s ynthetio a priol'i ju gmt:lnts is based on 
a coni'usion or logi .cal 1np11cation ith logi c 1 i n clus ion . 
The proposi tion t h t t he atun of the angl e s of a ny tr1,-
angl i s oqu l to 180° 1s certainly more advan ce (syn• 
thetio) than the infe1• .nc• t h t is . ade of ood be -
cause is a wooden t bl.. In th form r x a . ple the 
s bject inrJlud s the predicat ,. Cf'. B ing , I ). ,. 257 • 
Tne pob t is, th. .. t onc:e admit th~ t •to oan have 
v l i d inf·or•ences hich ore not tautolog i e s then we have 
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t he i ea of "'assive , subsisten t Wl1.ve.rsals ..... uld need an 
overh ullng. n ussQll 's th.e o l"Y or subsistent, non- mental 
lo · l.~ a.l enti tios ha _ · cogency onl y ith r ela t;io"l to a. alytieal 
jud jnents , p?.rticul e.rly t he laws of thou .. ht (!. enti t y 1 contr -
di ction, unt_,. ist.r i b l ted dd . le te ! >• But even these, t l e st 
on :an t •-s view presuppose othait c ta gorie • particularly unity , 
plurality, tot l ity, reality., negatlon, ltm1t tioo nd the a 
priori i ntuitions of time nd space. 11 1at , for exampl~ oul d 
the law or cont radiction or identity b without tne experio .oe 
or tim .? Id nt. t y c ould not b 
changa J c ntr ad iotions woald o 
stabl1shed tor not i ng oul.d 
uperfluous tor th re would be 
no t ! i g to coa.tr diet . Con eq entl;r, even with a't~ lllysis ;. e 
are brought b ck to synthesis , if for no other reason that i ta 
posalb'f 11 t y depends pon the synth tic fune t _(mfl of t e othei 
c .s. tegol"'ia • 
already admil; t ad that synth tio 
possible. Kant rightly oont nded 
( in h ts oaaa .1u Bl!tar~:~e ) are· to be 
involve real pr.oa ress, not mere l y 
1a. ali"Ei dy have i n the pr h-is·es . 
r,uller>, CPR , 6-12. 
priori judgment s are 
t ha t 1f i nf ranees 
valuab l e . they mus t 
~ reahu.i't'l 1rtg o.f ·hat 
(Kant , Krv . 7·16 ; 
The issue between r a.tione.lism and empi rio.ism, a s 
~ in . correctly obs ·rves, is not whether ideas h ve b en 
de rive 4 trom e xperience, but whethe r synthetic a priori judements are possible . "The idea of n b r may be em-
pirical in the sense that we c oul d no t understand bat 
as mean.t by 1numbor·• .· cept t h:-ough having P< r oe i ved 
tn1ngs eapable of' enumeration, but it ay st i ll be the 
cas tha t e can s ee a priori the truth of many p .. opo-
siti ns about number hich y ield genuine l y new kno l.-
edge .. Wh a t ie gtve n. i n . xp rionce mny lo,_.ically 1 ply 
s .omething that io not so g iven." ·, ing , If):tl' 1 251 . The 
r ea 'e r is u::? .od to refer to A. C, l':wing t s e xc llent d is• 
eus ... ion of t h is wh ole problen1 ir.~: F ... w1nr; , I DE , 250· 260 a nd 
Ewin~.,. , CK , 1-27 . · · 
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In short , then , a univer-sal mus t b t hought "toP the 
s . tS reason a · pur pose must lJe pu:tt:p_o~ec!., or rou l y for t he 
same r oason a.s a .frown must b frown d . tt Sl 
If e allow any universals an independent ex1stenoa , 
Hocking states, woul d have to allow them 11. 
h re ar too many of the. l Every conceivabl e idea 
~1u t s ubsist 1 th t realm • • • ·. 1 t h such a world 
of id ·a s our t hought ca.n do nothing . I t .. a sembl e 
• .. • a. library of music Qontaining all possible 
co~ltO i tions . ri tt n and un: ~ri. tten, eve ry eornb i n• 
at:ton of t ono t l at et:L"'l be m de on B.:..11y in. trum nt1 
t ... ,. very no:t ion ot a compos! tion••Whl ch i1 plie s the 
:ttojeotlon of i nnumerable posa1b111t1en•-destroyed , 
in· 1n1 t e re s ource rendered usole:us ll.l."ld me ~1.1ng .... 
l s by its unselectiv t otality ••• an end l ess 
" s up r.foot t ion of us eless infor •. t1on,tt32 
Little time needs to b spent h6re on the other problema 
and defects ·of Kant•a i nte rpret t ·..:.on ot e.xperlan.ce, ~ t hey 
will be adequntely discus sed by the other 1 eal1s ts about to 
be examined. It will b helpful to t e nt1on aom of t :1 m, 
however, t o g ive t he reader a point of ref r en e . 
1 ., Is Kant 's distinction be t een sense end concept 
valid? That i s; e. 0 not other :f'aotors involved hich Kant 
fails t o cons~der? 
11, Are antts eat go 1es un1ve~sal and necessa ='Y in 
all possible Poal ms of expert nee? Is t ha a tegocy or qu•nt -
1 ty , necessary to phys ic&, necessary also to the real· . of 
e t h ics and values? Or a "~"ain causality? I s net the t'aot of 
81. Hoekin r, Tr, 365 . 
2 . Hook1n· J, TP, 366· 367 " 
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gro t h an tithe tic$1 t o a system of' ready- made .rr. .. ontal .:functions 
or categories ( ·ard)? 
. ' 
i! • Are not J{ant•s thre~·:f'old syntheses of' imagination, 
a~ per·oeption and intuition the product o-f a f'ae11lty psychol-
ogy (\ ·ard)? 
tv. Does not Kant lapse baok to an out moded Scholasti• 
cism i n advanc ing t heory of tin un changi.ng. e go? I s not s u ch 
s. doctrine a denial of his ph ilosophy--a · .p!'odllot or h is alus• 
1 ,.,e t heory o t lB "th1ng ... in•:t tself"?e3 
v. Is no t Kant's oonoopt of time ba·s ed on a fa' lty con• . 
struetion, particular.ly i n c o11tending• .fir st, t hat time does 
not . ohange and. secondl y, tha t ehe.nga and time atte not 1d$n• 
tical·? Thus rote Kan t: 
·Transcendental aesthotie cannot count the eoneept or 
ehango ar:'long 1 ts a p~io.:--1 data because time 1 tse;Lf 
doe not change . but only something which 1e in time. 
F~r th1$• the pel'*ception of something exi sting a,nd 
of tne suceesalon o~ ita de te r.m!nat!ons , i n other 
word . , expel'ienee • :t s ,J?equ1red8 .... • For change does 
not et!'ect time 1 tself' • but only- t)he n omen.a in time ( noli is coexistence a mode of tim• ,itself, because 
in it no pet., ts can be ooex:t atant1 b"Jit sucoesslve 
only ). It we rrere to ascribe s. suecsasion to time 
its-elf,_ it woul .be necessary t o admi t anottgr t1rae 
i n whieh such sueees::n.on would .-e possible,. 
vi. H·ow e.an Kant t s theory t:Jr an a prio 1 1ntu1 tion ot 




0 i de ·>lism, it c ;n be ca lle d. a true s ynt hesis only i f one 
~HlC·.:.P ' S ~" : .. rc. ' s i nt::: pretation <Ji' t hB tm think ro . 
Acco~ding t o =r""' rd , c1n i de .:.li"'m must rest n t ~e co - J.u ·i on 
t 11 t ._e i nd an~ t. he ob .. i re c t re or ani c;.· lly reL;. ~je ::.l i n th0 
1 
un:i.ty of cxp .J."i ence . 
From rca :.t , U;: r maint a i .r· s • \"J"e do no-c at ·!;~dn the or."ani c 
unity r.e :~ uir ~.d bec(.•ust he anal]Z · d ex. eri e nce int the dis-
pa ,...·te ele:. ·.nts o.f f'o m a nd s :;.nse . Yet 'X. ~r1. "'n .:e c u.nnot 
be no !Struct ·d ":lt·t ifici.: l l.y . I t i s a l ·n.ys t her - . · r ero 
to be developed , no dov.bt , but n )t to be analyzed i n · "tray 
2 
Vihi e 1 1.01ill ,_estroy it r i mrrl'-' nent unity. )'jut Kant evertl1 l ess 
di d sho~r , ~1ard argue s , t hat kno ·.rl e G pr . supr)sed ~ ur:. it·=~ ry 
se l f , i n s p i t e of t he .(>act t ha t 1e a.nalyz~d tr1e kno· •lec e 
s i t u . ..:t t i on into e lements 1·1. i cl· mad e such a unity i)r~ ct ic ~ lly 
3 
i r. possi ble . The synt het.ic u .lity of apperception, t here ore, 
perien~e 
l rl ,ich ~ ard d e velops i n his r econstruc tion of i dea l i sm . 
Be-ke l ey , on ·the other hand , ·w·a""' r i ght ( ' a r d believes) 
in his ~~m- i ic:.: 1 :me th ~:: l)f' appealing t o i mmed i a t e experi ence 
lQ ··~rd, 
2. '.·;ard , 
3 • . a r d , 
II . 2o·· r .- , • ' . ~ _ .u! .. 
II , 183-1 6 . 
II, 184 . 
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but, t'lron.;.;; i n hi s ·theory of' t he s e nse datum. Uhile erkeley · 
"t·ra s just ified , ac ,:': ordinr: to ~:- .;::. rd , in ma inta ininJ thAt objects 
a r·e imme i a tely given in consciousne ss ~ he err ed in df") r i.ning 
the.. s su· j e c·(ji ve s t a tes .. 'Eo de ine . ense dut a ~::.s !fin he 
mind~ expos·es idealism to t he 1. os t aeve.st <J ·t.in ·:, crit icis m--
deva "' t a ting becnuse such .a defini.tion des troys consciousness 
altoge~· her. Tht..ts ~'lard sta tes: 
I ..: experie :1.ee ;rer c ·~h.roug.~. out s ub j ecti ve , ot me e l y 
t··'ould · the term subjec t ive 1 tse lf e meaningless ~ no't 
me r ely v.oul · the conception of the ob j th)ti ve ne 'il\,r ;.. rise , 
but~ the entir ely i m1,. e r sona l <.ncl intransi ·tiw~ t i.a t r>"" • 
ua i ned, "though it; mi ght b~:~ des.oribed a s absolute be ... 
co .in _, co:tld no~ be called even sol:ipsism , 1~"'"4s t of' al l 
· e<· l exper:t~~nce &4 
Kant • s p r i ncipl e of s ; nt-hetic unity and 11erl~. ,]_ ,~ ' s 
e rn.pi r icBl method • ~liard develoPs a n: ble nc s in his i der list 
cons t.r uctiion . \'Jhat . he h£lS to s ho\'1 i s how t he ob,je .. t de· ends 
upon t.he subject , a nd hm'V t he subject depends upon ::.he ob j e c t. 
in a t:Ja y t:·1at neither ca n be treated a s a separa te en··;ity. 
'et c t the s ame time 1:Jard must a l so show th'·~ t ne i t her t he 
mind nor t he object e C!.h be , redu ced t;o t he ot;her . In o... r 
t-1ords, hmi can a n ide .::;. lism escape from subjec t i vis ,~ and. a t 
t he ~ane time · stay c l ear "' ret:l i sm? 
1 •. ~i<lrd ' s -;m:pi r ic:.1 l f·lethod . 
Uha t i s .: t he start ing point · ') f philc:n::;ophy? I s · t ex.peri0nce 
NA, II~ 289, · 
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e · erie n e, c ncr .,te i n i:"vidu ::. l cons J.:ousness ,)r the a st ·; c -
:;.i ns f "'Cience? t<:~ king h i s cue fr Jl'l Berk ey, bG l ie 
t h ·'. t one .. ust be P:in , for ~i const ruc t ive . ::!.l osophy, vlith t he 
5 
i rmnedL1te facts f c nsciouon ss . Nhere e lse can one be o;i ~? 
'l'o be :- i ll \t:ith tl e abstra c·tions of s :~ ience ,. i s t .o i nvert t he 
tr e or er .. Ju ch abstractions h ·: ve me ;ning only t o experi -
ence. Thr:~ i nte l l ectual f o.r m must hav · t;tte concre ~..e f i ll i r ,. 
6 
of my o'tvn r e a l experience . tt This i s true e ven of t he ost 
a .~ tract sci entific elabor;~ tions . 
The f ur·t her t'·lis intellectua l · r-oce · s e , t e s, t 1e m r e 
a£ s !'act t'1e result; " s f or inst~u:ce i f 't1e · e.,· to c. <' y , 
T e s un ivl:1rns t he ston., but. •. t herea l undul~ tions nro-
dt.c . tnolecuJ.a r :vibrat i ons.. :Ytil l, hmJever f·~· r -u - ~ - p -
er•~ t ions e xt e nd t t heir resul ts r e on .y v :: li · r objec-
t i ve provi ded t .ey :re ~ t ultit ote y on ·~ b' sic i !l'l Jedi-
cr ·e exp ~rience • • • Re l a tions necessarL y presut~nose 
.fund::~m .. nta; nd t hougr r.rre e:uinot a:' an ... e t o u i v~rs<'ll 
e..; .. p r:t.ence u i tt}out r 1: tions t~H~re is not h ing but th'1s~~ 
rundnme 1ta of J.n, ivi du1. l exper1. ·:~nee to adva nc. f r m • 
.. ard t s e tpiricism belongs t o th · t corr:pa rnti v ,. y rec .nt 
mo ·-~ent in i dea l ism t-TLich stresses the priority o th j hi s -
toric ;.:. l ov r g:~ inst the t heoreticr- 1 . In tte rii ' ;.Le f the 
nineteenth century , uhen historic ~..: 1 .. ·ense be ~Ji n to find it:> 
5 . W0r d , f · ~ II , 97·123. 
6 . · ~ar' , N:\ , II, l SI~ .• 
7 • u ; JT l QJ. lc:J ~ '" B '1 R 1 'l~ • '• h • 1&1:' , ! ! <~ , . ..~., '' "f·- --D::: . uz . r aa · ey, -~ ., -~-.,~ ... , , 1.n \·1n 1.c • 
r dl ey cont Jnds t .a t rela tion s a re contr~ .:Cc ,.,o ,,. b "'th 
·Jith reference to ter s and other relat i ons . Cf . ~lso 
Art, 337, in t'lhicl.· he solves t he rLldl 1)oth .:.n t h · sub ... 
r a tional l eve l OJ. inuned if.1 +- e experien e nnd the . 1per• 
rt: tiont 1 e ;{per ie nce of t . Absol ute exp .ri ence i n rh ich 
bot'. immac~ i· cy < n ' 11e tli a c y a e r t a i. . ed but tr. nB cende-~d. 
'f. Br ,:3. ·lE~ Y ' s interpreta tion oi~ i rnmediacy t<Ji t 1 t i ;.;t of 
der~son , CE , 67 f • . 
s 
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' . y , \'le h· ve t hinke r s lil e Windelb&nd a nd .ickert distin ,ui s h-
in~ ~ et ~ een t he conce ptu~l and t he his t orical. To dec uce t he 
l a t t er f r om the f or t:ter, to com~.- ress concr e t e, in~ i v i dua l ex-
peri ence into , n .bst r . c t scientific sc 1e me i s to i nvert t he 
rea l order. History de als with t h e concrete • s c i ence dth 
t 1e bstra ct. History pre s uppose s freedom , science necess ity. 
His tory presuppose s value '1-"lhile science i gnores it. · In short, 
scie nce ha s rne ·:ming only as i t se r ves hu.man ends . __ s an a b-
$ 
solute me c! a niom it is me ri1 n i ngles s • 
. l:<'ror t l e refl ct i ve ( teleolo p::ica l) judgMent a s prius to 
t he me chanica l jud ~mcnt t he 'lay is e a sy; fro m t he me-c han-
ica l a s 9prius to t he refl e '" t i ve t here is strictly rio ~my ut a ll . 
Sci nee, ~ ard states, 
ha s left t he historica l so lon ·. aside t hat it is be -
i nning to f orget t ha. t ex erien.oe in itsel.f is his t orica l 
t :::~ 1 1. \4Je ha ve , t :!e refore, on t. '1e o t her hand to insi st 
t hat it is historica l :llt-o,ether; a nd t e f a ct is ·ha lly 
on~ t.t e is no p:a i ns a ying . Yes, t l e actua l is wholly 
'historical; a nd s o f a r, too, it .;s ' t he unknot·r le in t ie 
strict sense of knowing'; in its concrete fulnesa , th tis 
to s y, it has defied a nd t'lill ever defy 1.1 our t t empts 
a t .dequa te formule tion, ·- n d precisely on t his ac vount 
must scie nc: i gnore itt so longl ds the i denl of s i~t>' nce 
is c aleulat 1.on and measurement •. 
Heginning , then, wi th t he histo~ica l, with t he concrete 
experie nce o f the ind i vi dua l whe t do we f ind ? But first ~rhat 
do re not fi nd? 
0 • . 
9 .. 
l u . 
·t· r 
. ' b n d , 
TGr d , 
; ;·rd , 
NA, Ill 293. On t h h istorica l metho d 
HP (trJ, 1 ... 23 ; G , 2lff; Ricke t, Kl , 
NA, II, 273 ~ 
Nrl , II, 281-282 . 
cr. ,. ~~indel­
a s s i m. 
1 1 
2 . ..he Revolt ;-.?'B. ins · U~Lism . 
·.·e do no· 
of' min ... ' a nd matter., .hoeve1,. expcr i -:"1-".;:.;d pure s _ c-.: ·· ~ s , u;· if' r 
11 
tit.e , br · na , i n ... rt mn.ss an • en -::r .~s? l'ard aslm . .ven i f' one 
t ::r r- o m. othvr non- mantr.< l ent ity the priority . _,he a -
stra cti s of s ci ence ar~ concepts an: as c n_apts Lhey pre-
suppose 1~ ~d s .. ~ ~ 1 tu.i· . lis .. , "Jar<:1 mai nt i ns, i n \l' d ·; . b e -
01""' ·v~. ::. ~.; illusion t a · e.x eric J .. c is c~uoe • But the:. ca ·,e :ory 
o:f \~ :::< ·e: l ity , 1;ard 1ainta 4ns , is valid on_y wi :.hin exp "r i e n ce . 
! t can ne er be appli · d to Gxperi t;:Jnce in ·the ser · e tl ::.. t thn 
l at. 'vGr i s s meho -; syntheti cally ... onstructe , 
· · us" l ity 1 ;ica l .y prevu; po .... s re··,lit , not ·. e a l ·.y 
~ ...  usa lit:.y . B t. s b j ct a n obj r:.~ct in thE tmi ·~y ·Jf 
exp~rience i s t h . ::r.•eal ,. . ~~ It e ordinarily e mpl y t·l ~! 
c :-.:t.a gory of c. Uoaalit} to r o 2t. , one .::.rt of 8 "': a ··ie e 
to a not.1.er , a chart. -,e to an ante e d · nt chan .:e. 
i ts very f rrn J.- resu po ::-·es · di st,inc·;;i \ :1. • lin ·_per- . . ~· · 
i nee ; · d ac o ~di · 1y t 1i' relat ivity~- i thin ;... xper iwnce 
c: c se <-•"t i~e -v-ery mome -.·· u hen the par tJ c i.n i( es ·; · t} 
t he v.rhole . 
If n t dua l is , then , : .hat do I'Te ftna in c::lncret c , i m-
, udi. te ex.perien e '? f..ccording to t·r . ,rd w f ind a du· .lity i n 
·· :tity , an i n:te .al , not an eJc:t 'I'na l u;:- lism. If i.te i a.ve a 




' J ' 
II , 1 '" ( - J. .. )L 
I~ , 11$ .. 
l6Z 
unity of 
t !1~1 1~ 0 o: j "Ct CiHl be independent 0 min ·1 , and , S9 l~On ~ ., j 
' 
t l ; .. :~ -~ L 0 ob,ie .. t c ;;n be eJ.::plain:'d wholly :i.n t,erms o? the s ub ..-
C~l·,;J.l s a critique o.f 1:1turalisn, th0 second, ;., crltiq 10 of 
~·ant's de c..iuction of t. 0 cat .... gori~s ~ 
1'he best lv~ y of t<:~ cklin{~; this problem is to c'i ~';euss ~·.rard ' s 
inte· p_·etation of t. he sci-:::mtifi c ce.tegorie~ , as t Le ·· '1:iJ .. l em• 
:__. ·.d:t tlh~·: essential eatures of -'11'~ .. -:'.t t·re commohl y e"nr t; as 
11physical objectstr . Let it be clec..r thro u.gl: out t b<.:t t ·.·~a rd i s 
not at tomptin~S to !)T'ove the..t the cnteP.:;O"(' i{.:? ::-1 '-'·re n pri ri ,. 
Lil~e ~ er ''"' l ey, is he contend in~ th. t to trErt tl em •-~ ,., indo-
P'"'n~leav e. tit ies unr e l <::!te(.. to tuind they ~re mea . ine;less ,. 
I f space be taken an indep ndent , in.fin:.te uhole t he 
agY'0eS t;h.a'c the onCeJ)t of t he third dimens ·.on "·rould be im-
possible .-li:t hout w.uveme nt , vfi'thout the ei::perit~nce of a ·1hare 1 
t o t':lh i c! 
s ) h ... :.:·e 
1 3 
U A 
constitut ~ it nn 
. -
no -
Rr t ' __ .r t han · e ing an ·ndep m. ent V· .cu· . t·r 1ict contc · .s -11 
., ,.. 
-J 
i"' &t ior s fo ur ar. i vi t i eo constit tt. ~ t ~ ~ ounda r:lJ~ f o"' s .;:;.c e . 
i d ;,_ny 01 e ever 0 .p·:o.r i }_ C in i .i t;; rl i Visi 1.1 • ty? r, uld 
e :p_ ie::1ce ever b;:;. co .structed on su .. J term~? I nfin · te d -
c nee t · eri r ~ .}:_ e r·ie n~.~e . t r -n ... 
ep ~ s r bpn ce is .asy ~ ~r.m t b- t.o tl e 
i i .. Ti .e 
1'o const-~ue c nsc · .. ousne .s~; in t ernm of sci en :L ''ic -::, ·~ 1e 




! rd , lP. , I I , 14.} • 
\\·~·.r•rt , i·~ .. ·~ , II , l;.}i: . . 'f. 
[7~ (r~v~J , 142-163 . 
1'd r , · l ;~ , II, 14.3 -14 · . 
.c. ·me, 
16 
~-roul l no 4 • only con·tr:.:,dict t: e t :i.r.:e idea bu'{j destr oy· con .... 
scio ISness a l t o:;;ethor .. lint:tcipa t.i .-;-, Bergson , t.;.u" 3r .;tw" 
t h:.:; t experi e nced ti .10 is the foundati n of a l l oo nee. ts o.f 
ti.'Le" Expe!"ienced ti ;1:e invol es duration , a po : tion 
n t. .. :lint in ti~·~e . In t.he scientific V!3rsion o:·. time, "eve~ 
ry · iura~J.o:n resolves into su 1;:;ession and tl ere i'l no nunc 
17 -
~an.:::. .~: A mere se ries of "nm.·rs" vmuld not only .'XiVG us no 
e nt.:i t~y . 'i1he tempora l order c ·, n eoome disti nct only tlu·ough 
1~ 
su~ j '.;; ~.; t;i ve selee't ·on .':!.sed on i.nt,ere ·-~ts . l n such rt~striction 
~nd e!'lpitasi ... 'H3 ha ~t3 a. oc G of ttention and t i t is' y the ir 
s ccessivG occupation of' t his f ocus t hat perceptions obt, in 
19 
defi nite t i me marks . .. 
H _ e one f i nds ~·;·ard i!! agreement ~V'ith that. general .:ev·~-
m .. . t \"Ihich turns o experienced tir.l"' for a soluti)n to "~he 
ridc.les involved in an independently real scient ific tine . 
R yce ' s com~ept. of' t,he ti:·.· 2; ::m, Bergsonts the o:r•y of dur a-
L\;ioti , Botvn ..... ' s trea tr!mnt of t·1"" problem · J: cha .1g~ an·· i c .;.,!'1-
20 
tity are es~entially one in principle . 
i: i~ Causality .. 
T" 
.u:J.K e BerJ:celey, \ ·.: rd __ ir ds t he ri~in of the ~on eryt of 
cau ~:>al ity i n ·the inc.ivi( ua J. t o expori <;;nce of v::.lition a nd his 
; ; ~ 
17 . 
lt. • 1 ., 
- :.~· . 
2u~ 
, • .., .... ;"l 1-.~A II 1 1·8· 
• • <.d. \A f ~-~ ' . t ... .. 
•· d l'l ! -r 117 . .::. r , .._-.,,l. , .1 1 ~o · . 
Ward, NA, II, 147. 
Bergson, CE, 1-8; Bowne, 
111-151. 
MET, 164-194; Royce, WI, II, 
165 
' nterc: c tion 'Vl i t!1 . _i s r 110\"JS . ~iAW 1hic~ tri . s ~ l a ce 
.rsonalit J in an cc ss o.ry ~ inC.e . endG_t cuusn. l or r everses 
t 2G true rn·ocess . In n -:- tu "", --,s Hum:;; .!_-q• 
n. J.l, e fi ,.- nly cha n rene t d "coexist. Jncos "' n, ucces-
' 
' ?1 
'' i ons . f An ef.- ici8nt cause , l'/c\· d !! a · nt " . .:.:;::s , "is t naces-
s .:::.:ci l urd.1'or,r1 in its c.c'cion , an ' uni f r ... i t y of sec u "·n ~.; -·s 
2;~ 
n J t c l r·~ t l y :lnlply such Co.US'l l i ! ·t O_ ::.1 c t i.v • " Hdle vre d is-
cover n ef'fic i en·'-; c usal · ty in tr ings , rtle n :. verth l e ss at ... 
t r·i') :..:te to t h vr. s u CHU alit a s a r j ect io. of our xne-
,., '1. 
~~' 
·:.·:. "1 ... · .f t~ :::-en y . 
It ~> nys"t e1Tli..·l t ic unity D.nd i 1v ,..ri c .-,1~ conform·· ty t.o l'1U is 
t ry .. r e in e pe ::1ae 1t of 1 t . Th·~ arto t of em)ir'i :1l materi 1 
t;lct a l ly r-ws i L;ilc1.ted c:u1 red1. ced to l r: T,., i. ·"' sur..1.. 1 .l.n c mparison 
25 
-, i -. :.1 ·.he v· c•t a .. ;:,unt t ha t stL 1 re n in" cruJ.e a nd intr~ .. cta. le .. 
Tl e conception of nat .1re as n ind pen:.~ :· t ren l . •::> ... l a · T 
21 . Cf. Ward, NA, II, 240-241. 
22 . Ward, NA, II, 241. 
2; . Ward, NA, II, 238-239. 
?!. ·~ ..... . Ward, NA, II, 232. 




causality Lee us ~ ie re c,_ us· 1 at;ents and seek to unif' our 
. ~ 
experi nco . \Je ttribu t~e reeul.:Jrity t o natur J b c ·· us e 
"Ytant to simplif y our . t~ec·tlin£;s -litl1 nature . But 
if man had never made l uw.s he could never kno ,, la ·t , and 
if he 1ere not a free a ~,ent he cotlld neithe r mnke l aws 
-----
n r obey t he m ••• _ bsurd is it to argue tl:n.. in postulat-
ing regulal·ity in na ture as t he one ground of ratio. a l 
exper i e nce \'Te are deprived o.f all ower e. nd initia tiv r 
b ~ cause in a systom of universal and nece~ sary 1 3 \1' noth-
L g can · e ::irbitr~ ry a.ncl t here c;' n be no 0 & s . If .t he oonc~ption of mac ht.nism enables us t o summariz .... det ·J ils 
t hat ' ·tould othert"'ise be1·rilder us thi s caru'1ot rer uce us to 
p rts of a a chi 1e and elevate th , t into a n absolutu f :.;.te . 
The very f a ct t hat it is our co nce ption, th t 'lfie devist~d 
it a nd use it , see · ···s i mperfect ions an: amenC.: t. em , sh e1iJ'S 
·v 1at :te are outs ide a ud a ' ove · t: 2~ts a rior c o~ldition ar; l not its hel pless conse iUence . · 
· If ·~ he objt:l Ctive factor of exp ·rienc3 canno·.:; be 'regar ded 
.:< s independent of e .·pe ience can it be reg::i :-d r~d a .... 
., b . t . ? 
.:>U ,) e C .J.V-. 
4 . Nature Not Purely Sub j ective : vlar rt ' s Criticis 1 of' 
Kant *s Deduction o f the Uategories . 
•'rvll t'll ~ t has a l r.e··· dy been sa id r E:gP.rd ing •Jard t s inter-
retation of th ~ categori · s it follov;s that t l.ey C<:lnn t be 
a privri to e:x:perier ce . Rat her are t hey t 1e p. oduct of 
e.-{perience in t he s ame sense as Berkeley' s categories "'ie. e 
derived .r om e perier ce . 
Kami , acc:ordi i g to \'lard , l acked an historica l sense , t he 
27 
c mmo·:1 defect of hi s era . Ra tl r t han fin i ng in t e w_ .ole 
26, lard , NA , II, 251 . 
27. :lard , NA , II , 190 . 
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o£ experience itself a clue to the sol ution of the vexing 
epistetslolo F?.~ ical proble s Kant retrea t s to the fo r mal eleme nts 
of t hough t . He fail ed to see th<. t the forma l is inse ar able 
.from t he volitional ; that cona tion , feel ing , presentation 
28 
form an inseparable whol e . Thinki ng. i s doing . "From our 
st ndooint ,.re have no diff icul ty in see i n•; t h::l t a ctivi t y i s 
. 29 
t he mai n. fea ture of exper i ence . " 
l e may say ,enernlly of Kant ' s philosophy t" at i t · i s 
marked by one characterist ic defect of e i ghtef}:nth.;.c e n-
tury t hought -· a ra t of his t oric sense . 3uch a e fect 
l'Tas the natural ••• consequence of the state of" knm·lledge 
at t.ll e time. rhe mathemat ical sci<ences hac a . tr~me,·n<l,qus 
st,,rt ; t he biol ogica l sc i r-m ces ha.r dl y existed ~ history 
was he l d to be essent i al l y unsc i ont i f ic , and a b 1ild i ng 
or a. tot-In ·'"'urnishcld the tYP'} of t·th;;l t a co npl ete d s ystem 
of knowledge 't'Tould be " Shar p d i visior1s , lin~ and rule , 
syn: ,etry of COPlpartments . • • are the l ead in~ i deas of 
Kant ' s Ar chitectonic. The concept ion of evolution ~ · s 
placed the present century on a better pl atform, an~l the 
next , we trust , may quite outgrot-T the duali m of r eason 
a rid experi'1nce as \•Tell a s the dualism of matter a nd mind , 
both whj~h re owe to the mathematica l ration~list, Des-
0 cartes . 
The ca tegory i s an el abora tion , i dealization of ex erience , 
not a n a priori el e·ment \-Jhi oh expHrie nce pre supposes . He can 
move from an e. perienced t i me to the concept of a n infini~e , 
temporal whol e . Can Ne move from the l atter to consciousne ss ? 
tr e ca n progress from the s oace of experi ence , the space of 
o ·v ·!lle nt . n." our mani nulation of objects , t o the o cept of a n 
2 S • \1 a r d , ~A , I I , 191 . 
29 . Ward , NA, II , 191 . 
.3 • iard , .A, II , . 190- 191. 
1 
i nfinitely extended ure s a ce . 'a n . e revers e the ornerY 
Can consciousness be spa ti: l or inf i nitely di visil l e? A a in , 
t-.re ca n progress from p~~rsona.l identity to t he eonce t of' sub .. 
stanGe but ca n ue move from substance to consciousness? Can 
cons ciousness be e f ined a n "unchc, ngi ng Ego" or is i t.s sub-
stc nce simply t he na ture , unity <:1 n purpa..,es of its activ-
ity? War d ' s contri but ion to i dealism lies in sho\\fin \'tha t 
happens rhen ,,.ve construct t he 1.·10rld a nd mind in terms · of ab ... 
stra ct conce pts rather t han in t erms of ex e r ience itsel • 
To :eso ~1 . e from t h nihilism invol v d in the ca te ~o r-ies of' 
sp·ce and time (abstrncted from consciousnes ) one must. be in 
\'lith concrete experience . t ard, like :[indelband , Rickert , 
a n ' to a certa in extent .Hegel, and more r ecently De\'t y, Berg-
son , J a mes, ~vhite' ead , Bradley re presents an effort to equate 
t he · 1 e a l 'dth t he e xpe ienced . "The t h inf"S knot-m , "' t Ard 
sta t es , s u ch as m.,.. t c ri 1 permanenc , rnechaniea l necessity , 
\ 
natural l aw ttwill not acco:·nt fo r tl~e kno ,Ter . Ca n ·1e find 31 .. 
anythi "1:::-r in the kno ·rer that wi ll a ccount for them?" 
War d ' s criticism of Kant t s ca tegor ies i s ubtle a nd it is 
. . 
i mport ant to kno\'1 \•rhat the issue is , and just ·~hat. t he critic-
ism involves . It is a cri t. icism both of Kant and of natura l -
i sm . this i s not to s a y t 1 t Kant ' s deduction had natu.r.alis .... 
tic irnplicr:·t i ons . Hut what t he nat: _<:\ list does i s to q(?nvert 
t1e Kcntian ca te ories into inde pendent re a litie s and de f i ne 
consciousness ancl nature in t e rms of these . So when \'lard 
31 . Ward , PA, II , 229. 
1 9 
criticizes the a priori conce pts \'lhich Kant belie ved !Tere 
products of tho·ught , he is at t he same t i me cr it i c i z i ng thf~ 
naturalist \V"ho e levates t hem to non .... menta l ent i ties . 
The essential di fference betr,;een ·~lard and Kant i s i den-
t ic .. 1 w'ith the difference bet1.·reen Berkeley and Kant . I dea -
i sm , for Kant . rests on the presupposed factors of mt nct which 
·ake nature i ntelligi ble. Idealism for \'Jard and Berkeley r ests 
on the meaninglessness of' .a ttempting t o construct na tul'!·a' a r d 
i. ts categories apart from concrete expe r i ence. T!"hile . t he 
g~ne ral results are i dentical the di fference of .nethoa :· f~ 
a; · . 
. ·. · . 
r adical . Empiricism has taken other roads t han ide~iliSni ' and 
eevtn i nly rat ionalism has bra nched out i nto at l east t.'lizo oth-
er direc t ion •3. 
'I'he differ nee bet ~een the t\'lo mothods i s so r adical 
t h - t W.:~ rd ht:. s to s pend much t;tme not only in refutin,:. Kant L 
com~er.t of the <:' )ri ori but h i s gener a l theory of e~per~~ 
eil::!e on \'lhich it rests • t\fa rd t s criticism c ::.tn be summarized 
under f our points ·• 
Fi rst , l'th i le Kant trie t o bridge the gap b et\'reen i'orm 
and sense he still fa iled to demonstr :,te t he organic \ln;ty 
of mi nd. . f~~ _d.i sti P.gu!.shed too shar ply bet '\I'Jeen the two, . ,.,hich 
~ia rd believes was a car r y-over o:f t he older d alism between .. 
32 . .. 
mind and matter. Rat 1er t han a ccepting experi ence from t he 
sta rt, Kant (Ward believes} · trif.~d to manufacture exnerience 
out . of e l e me nts never experi enced .. 
32 . \'!s. r a , NA, II , 132 . 
170 
"t'rh tever deve lopme nt s or d i f f erent i a tion '-1 n int ividua l 
experience may und ~reo , i t does not become but a l·t;t ys is 
a unity. ' ensat ions are not like gra ins thQt t . e sub- ( 
,ject pic: s up , but cha,1ges in an objective continuum 
t hct t i s al\-rays there a s an unbroJJn \'Thole , hol·rever in-
definite as respe cts boundB.rie~ • 
. Secondly , Kant ' s interpretat ion of e xperience i gnore$ 
the continuity of consciousness . !t is pla.us i ble only i;f 
one defi 1es the sensation a s formless., Frou pure m t~e·~- .t o 
hich a ll for m i s i n liff erent , tt <'\nd pur e form to \thich ~11 
. 34 
matter is indi fferent ; h.o ·1 is a definite r esult ossible.?" 
Sensa tions ( · ccordin~ to r d ) have for m; t hey tave in• 
tens ity , qu etlity, e x·'·e nsity , as Bradl ey says , 
35 
"what"·. a s 
.. · 
., 
well a s a "that" . ~or are sense da ta i sol t ed . They are 
. changes in what t ard calls an "objective continuum" . 
The so-called pure sensati on of cer tain psychologi sts 
i s pure abstr·- ctio;1 ; a s much so as t he mass po i nt 
of the physi<~ '!. :>t , but without perh ps t he same war rant 
on t he score of utility • The Y.rhole doctrine of the 
-~radual elabora tion of pe r ception out of purely sub~ jective materia l is f a)g being relegc; ted to t he reg ion 
of psycholo ~ical myth . 
Thirdly, Kant stressed only the formal a s pects of ex .. 





It i s scarcely an exagp:era tion to s ay that the objects 
of e xperi e 1ce are not primarily objects of knot-.rled ~e , 
ut objects of conation ••• For though an object must be 
cognized before it e '· n be liked o:r d isliked , sti ll i 
i s 1·rith t hese Uw. t the s tbject a cqu i r es a closer and 
\~Tard , Nl , II , 112 . 
Hard , iA 1 I I , 132 .. 
Hard , NA , I T 116; rt . · ( 1911), 561-563 . _, 
tard , N. ' II , 116 . 
37 
preciser a ... qut.1.intan .. e . 
171 
~·inal1y \'lard eri tioizes the doctrina of nthe t '1ing in 
itself" as completely baseless . It tms po inted out i n . Chap-
ter II tl at no philosopher made u gr r-· t~r tl!'P:e. al ( thoi;.~h · un .... 
h,.:.oJed} to conunon s .Jnse than Berke: ~Y · :·,kepticism , :·.r 7. .ley 
ma.inta:l...ns , arises f'ron. supposing "'-L~~~ so·nsr.ti r:· ns are ;~· 'i'l-pe· r • 
u ces nf something constant • rit>r' , Whe"l our sensations .. of 
the suppoS •- '~ nsas.ett thing vary thPn we distrust our s nses 
r· ·ther than. ques·~ion the reality of ··· .at uncha l _Jing ent:l ·:--. y 
\·tl ioh ensations are intended to reveal . Drop yuur ocn(! p-
tion of ai uncb.- n ;>:iru~ sub:_, tratum an~· skeptiei~ m ~' uL} n -.ver 
-'iri .:.-:..:; . \7ha·.:.. is th ::. real tulip or t.be r(.H~l brc.?td? Just those 
so ~sat ions of ··:olor, ta;;te, odor , f'~elin-:, \'thich the m~:.n on 
t he .:.;t .. :eet _ .. · s al't>fn.ys t ... :~c:n v':l be the rea.l tulip or the real 
· reud . 
!n hi criticism of the nthing in its ... :J '" ··iard e :lnita.l-
iz~s on tlr 3 BerkLdei"ln te"'chin-~ . It is a carr-- - o•rr; · ·)f the 
fals~ dualism of matter and mind . 
\Jho h"S ever peu:oi ved m. ss-poihts in motion , vort,~x 
atoms , or ether,.· 1 u .dulations? The •;,rhole purport of -----
th.: ~ ; is tlvlt tl'l .' Y are i daal co1 cepticns, not per~ ~ptions ; 
! ot pro~erly a ppea - .nces a t o.l l but only s mbols : ) ': p r ... 
L; -:-~i. ti 1ns ·:hi h a re the rea l appenrr:'l. ces .. /,ud \·ThE.:n :·cience 
~r·~ !'f! .. ts this and, i nverting th' 1 true ord .r, decl l J'.;;;· per-
~p-tions to · e t homsel ves the symbols and its O\'ffi ;;.b-
e t;ra cts tha true pheno .. ena • it perpetr" tc~s the absurdity 
·re h· ve ~' oft. n stign; t ized of phenor•~ann ger ~ .. ·sut 
i-:' ·:re decline to call ar ythi ng an appear"'.:.nce , unless it 
_._ .-. ei th e:r r.>.:rce i ved o: · perceptible, \rrh.y then shoul't ,.re 
------
178 
at · ac: 1 to it the bad sense o con ealin,. ra tb·n .._ ~1' n t e 
goo : ~ . ... mse o. r e ·, ~~ ing'l •Jhy shoul appear.::t .nc '"~' n t be 
re r:.~ lity· nay t-~k t else C'1n t r· ~Y ">e? Ho 1 c n r ·.t :l i. r 
a . pe, :'.:"·, r,hine forth , 'nd :re t 1" ~nain tot: lly a nd i"o ·e r r 
beyond the k nO'\'Tl j G of those to \'lho l i t appe. rs? :..:..et 
u:.-.> turn, as t'l ha ·..., done bef re , t o the c :; so ,,re .k ... o 
b' st-- the co nunj,cation o.f o l~ h m.~ n mind "' · t: a oth r ~ 3t'-
_ • T ·:.- Un.:ty of ~xpe ·.~:uw :e ... 
If the objeet can ot exist n p<::.rt fr01 ... the su j ec -,, . ~.or 
the ,;:)ubject ap rt fro t e ob~iect then 'rTc have 
... 
tithin t .. unit y of exner· ._. e . In short t··G 1·1ave 1 'l o< ... 
je . ..... ive sir:1e t the s tbject con· .. iousne3s ~ l ' a slib.jec-; i : e 
side to the object cons~iout.~'"m . Tt:o r 1 u~stiona arif:~ . iirst , 
"\:lh.: t c .n~t .tut.ec the oojn. ·<:. ive sidJ to t he sub,ject ·o·on cl us -
ness a nt' secondly) •· ! ·• t constitu·;;e~-3 ~~he S'')jective s i de t o 
the obj .:·.::. c :>nseio sness? The fir"'t probleJn l-te d i f1Cus~.\ here, 
while t ;·c second , ·rhile it f ordc -:.he ba ... i of '!"" .~. d t i de 9. l--
is and _ -3 constr•:tct i. ' }... of Kan .... ' s synthetic a prior i , ro r e -
s rve f r t :·~e next section . 
ol) ~e ct ~ont · · ibute to th sub:ect? F'i t, 
trre do n0t crc ,~ te ob-l .cts . They ·: ....... given-- given ir. · . ..~· :· ·· 'qu · te 
liter . 1 sen ··e of ob "e c't l. ve sense data . 'fhey in _ · \'Ia ; ( '. c-
c oJ. .. .ling to '1 .r ) can be :-: ubjecti ve chan, es or modifiva tions. 
o·. ~:;~e ~ ontrary, s::ns<.;. t, ions are genuine objects , t hicl· , thou ; h 
i r ~3 -- ~ :--a._ ly t o nL1d, c .: n n~ver be regarded as "in th"" 
' 3 ~ 
mL·~d 1 .. In tr is se.ns r~ , :rar is very close to t e English 
:; ,:\ . \-la:!?d, N' , II , 276 . 
3 .... \~~ard, ·A , 2$9; .rt . (1 :111), 548- 550 . 
realists , pa rticul- rly . ussell , r-1oore nd le .,ander , h ile 
at variano 1;ith the Am6 rica n eritie&l r ~ lists who contend 
that e • ther by me nc of esse nces (Strong and 3untay:: na) or 
aubjecti ve sens<--.tions ( Pr;- tt and Love .joy} we refer t an· o:z:-
tern·~l V'crld . The extern~ l-.rorld • i s , at l east • sense dat a 
in .an objecti ve continuUl!l .. \ ith Be keley , .ard < gree ~ ·t hat 
4 
senoo da ta reveal, not conct,al tht.?l external lttorl d . 
Secondly , in the interaet :i.on of man ~. ith 'his sur r('?undin _.s 
objective chan . eo involve s ubjecti Vi~ changeo . 
P. s e'~P""ri nee extends in obj ct ·v .... I''! n. ,e , it chnnge-3· 
in its subj ,ctive character . t·le :.•d r·:nce fron b re 
eonsciousness to self-consciousness , ~rom lcso re~ 
.flective to mor e re·lect:tv, forms of this .. ;' our 
ac<11.~a1 t' nee t"lith oth r solve,., extends , t.1e better · e 
kn t· our mm self . The more we real i ze tbe p-~- . nence , 
individuality, efficiency and purpo. i veness of . lf , t e 
mor the me::-e cont; nua o · perception and - S"''ociatiori · e-
ome an or ered ...-.ror ld of di st;inct thi n --;s . Thus universa l 
experience , like in i vidual , is grm·rth and develo tJmen t , 
not cut ..... -nd -dried4I ort.in0' aecord i np to re· dy-m~de , har i.lnd fast forms . · 
6 . T e Jubjective A ~pEH~t of tb.e Ob ject Consciou .o.o nes .. . 
a r d ' s Ide·.l lisr.1 : A l~ construction of Kc nt' s Principle 
of ~ynti esis . 
\·.ard ' s idea lism hus been impl i cit , and in any cases ex .. 
... l ic:it, throu .,. out t·his <iocussion ,. For i f t .e object and 




·a rd , 
N ~ II, 2~9 ; Ar t. (1911) , 54$-549 . 
, I~ , 195 . 
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ons ciousness t hen it is useless to t alk about independentl y 
rea l o jects, or mc, tters , or neutral entiti0s . ~:here . one 
f inds a n object he finds a s A. E . Taylor ca lls it, an ex-
perienced matter of fact . But positively, to make the ca s e 
for i de ·· lism stronger , ;Ja r d emphas izes th .. .factors v.rhich the 
sub ject contributes to our consciousneos of objects . · , .. ·., 
· :, The mine' contributes t o the exte rna l u or l d in t hrE)e > 
. . . . 
spec;ific \'tays. It a ttributes to n:'il t ure its unity,, caus.ality 
a nd . re i;"";Ularity. The concept of the unity of na ture would be 
:l~poss:i,.ble apart from the unity of sel -c. nsciousnoss.:•:.:··· .\'fard 
utilizes effe tivaly Kant's syntJk,tio unity but insis ts· tha t 
·.' ,, . 
such un,ity i s as muc h t he product of interest, desire., , nd 
42 
will as it i s ~o gnition. 
gai , the concept of the regularity of na ture presupposes 
a n a cqua i ntc...nce 'l:·ti th l a\'t 1:1hich in turn presuppos ·, s so iet;y 
43 
and f';OVernment . "If man had never mede l aws he could never 
knol-l l ~ 'tr , and i f he vre r e not a f ree agent he coul d neither 
44 
mc;~.ke l aw·s nor obey them. n 
Finally, t he concept of t he cc usality of nature pre-
supposes an i mmed i a te ::lcqtla i ntance of causalit y \"h ich e 
f ind in volition . As Hurue showed , a ll nature re veal s is 
sequence , yet we a ttribute causality to nature. It was 
pointed out i n the d i s c u.s..;J i on of Kant t l a t t .1e .faet t hc.t 
1.-2 . l;l·rd , rl!. , 236 . 
43 . Gf' . Royce ' s vie ·r of tre socirl nature of the self' and-
e~ lity , WI , II, 1~96 . 
44. Wa rd , ~A , I I , 251. 
175 
physics h<: s a a ndoned t he notion of n·cessary causat i on does 
not we i : h aP.:ainst the necess ity o f tha t nc,tion for our x -
perience as a t·rhole . · he detP i ls o.f t ha t a r gument t- e will 
not e.nter . What i s i mport . ..:nt h .. r e is that 1:~ard i .... i n . com• 
pl ete a ·:sreernent on t hat point . t atements about occurre nces 
of physica l objects involve the notion of act i vit y .a nd pas -
sivity ; for example , ' The fire burnt t he log . ' But how does 
t he notion of . a cti · .. ity or causality ge t there i.f the indue .... 
tio s of science can only render possibil ity? It ets there 
because \"'e , ·~nth an i mmedi ate ~ c quanitance with t he Cc; usa l -
45 
ity of' volition ; put it t he1e by analogy . Hence \'lard is at 
onJ \tith ooth Berkeley and Kant ; l'.'ith Berke ley in find ing t he 
seat of' t he notion of causH.l:lty in vol i tion , with Kant in 
findin~ a n i ntelligi le ex -r i ence i rnpo .::>sibl o t-titl out at -
tribut in c-;~ causality to thinl!S . Thus the ca te gor i es of :ur.ity , 
regul~ r ity a n · c ausa lity on War d • s view a re pres ur.positions 
o.f experience in t he sen• .. e that obje c t "' presuppose mind . ut 
not in the sense t hat t hey are a prior i principl~s • 
.tt rom t he above analys is , a f ull•f l edge d i de a l ism nat -
ura lly follo\'TS. Since \'le do not o r i g inate object .., but merely 
organize t he m and yet Si nce . t hey ~ ill unde,r~.9 u UC h treatment 
t hen na ture is both c onf'orr.ta.ble . t o human i nt ~llt ;.;ence n~d 
amenable t o human ends . As t ere i s n > sense . p· rt .from t he 
s .... nsible •.!orld so t he r e is no intell i gi ble l'lorld apart ·rrom 
46 
intellige nce . 
· 45. Wnr , r ~ , II , 23S . 
46 . t·fa rd , \ 11 , II, 274 . 
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To conculde t hi s part of the exposition, one ca n say 
tht t •la r d ' s i deHlism is a genuine synthesis of Kant i n and 
Berke l e i a n t hought i.f one :vants h i s i hterpreta t ion of' the 
47 
tt'IO thin:kers . \'J'ith Berkeley he agreed t !:l t one t s philos - · 
ophy must be g in 1·.dth t he given , in short , Pith concrete 
individual experi ence . 
Thoug1t f.ives us o J_y sc i enca , not exi s t ence ;. r: 
ca nnot 1 by piling up pro ~ os itio~1s , secure tli G s i ":.ple.st 
p · sition . Thou·ht again o,i vc s us onl y the uni versal, 
t he relational ; from the 'particul:-'.r' ~ l'lhich is the .· 
' aurd ' f'or it-- or t he real meetin _,. po int or subject 
of relat i ons .... it must start, but to t his p·rticul nr 
it ~an ~ v . r retur·n s--ve by tra ve r s ing an inter i nable 
ser1es . · . 
,· .. 
Unlike Berkeley , he conte nds t h; t the ob j ect is not ·· a 
. ' 
• f • :!' 
subjec t. i re state . 
rath Kant he a 0 reed t.h~ t ce t a in ca tegorie s a re nocess~ ry 
to a n intelli Y,i ble experi ence but r a t '"er than bei ng a priori, 
t hey evolve v.ri th experience . ~. ith Kant . t oo, he a _rees t hat 
t' e uniformit y , r e gulari t y an' c ::~.us., 1 i ty \vh i c h · ~le attribute 
to n a t ure a n · 1o1hich const itutes t he underlying resunpositions 
of scien .. e r e the proc. uct of synthetic mental activities. 
7. Evaluation a nd uonclusion. 
Th~ str n gth of Wa rd ' s i dea lism lies in h i s convinctng 
4T~ Thi s question i l l be cliscus sed resontly . 
J+ R .~ \! rd , NA, II, 282 . 
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defe.nse of the empi r ic <ll Pletl od . Is it bett e r to begin ith 
abn·tr<-~ ctions f r o , experi ence or with \.,he unity of experi ence 
itsel f ? Can ,,.te move .from s cient i f ic time t o experienced time; 
from scient i f i c spr.tce t o the sp·- ce of exper ience ; f rom · n ·~e­
essa r y ca usation to consciousness? Or do the di.fficulti~ s 
i nvolved in such concepts f ind t heir s olution only in .t'he 
conc rete expe r ience of the unitary consciousness? In s:hort ; 
can COI'\SCiousness b .... tter be explained in terms oe independent-
lY :real cate gori es or ca n t hese cate ories better be. explained 
i n, t erms of conscious experi ence ? It was this probl em ~1hich 
. ~' . ' . 
pr.iroarily i nterested ~ ·· rd a nd f"e'ft i dea lists he ve better suc-
ceeded in handling it. 
t hile both Ber keley .::. nd .vard emplo .red the empiric 1 method , 
~fard transcende d Berke ley in showinr: hoN t he ob ject ive- . and 
subjective factors 1)£ experience contribute to t he organic 
u•dty o.f consc i ousness . To t rea t e i th,3r independently i s t o 
commit t h ·. f'alla cy of "re-ificat ion" . r. atever e l se obje cts 
mig 1t be t hey are an aspec t of some one ' s experi ence ·. 
On t he other h<-J. nd ~~ard ' s analys is occas i ons mu ch criticism. 
1. Much of the stre ngth of War d 's de.fense of the unity 
of the obje·ct. a nd subject rests upon t e conviction t ha t t he 
obje~t is i mmedi a tel y ~iven in consciousn~ss . Otherwise t he 
a r gument woul d be po intles s . Ideal is ,1, for We rd ; rests upon 
t he conclusion t hat t he ob ject and subj ~ct de pend upon each 
other to the degree tha t to sepa r r te t het. is to de s·troy t hem ., 
;.. nd hi s argument is valid only if \'~hat he ca lls th~~ object, 
or t he "objective continuum" rea lly is the object and not 
me r ely a psychologica l st t e. 
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But i s t'lard r i ght in believing , first, t hat t he obje ct 
is a sensum, and secondly , t hat the sensum is not a psycho-
. 49 
logica l s tate? The first problem has a l :r.e ady been t r eated 
50 
in connection \1ith Berkeley' s view. It \tas concluded t hat 
.. 
t he obje ct cannot be e quated trith a s ensum or group or- s~ns r:t 
. . . . 
f'or t he following reasons. Fi rst t meani ngful sense ED<:perience 
pr esuppoS!o!S ca tegori es .. In a.o far as objective re.fer~~c:e in-
volves ca t egories , t he sensory facts have a l ready been ·tra.n ... 
scended . I mmedi ately a cquainted 1.:1i th sense qualiti ~ s , W:e re .. 
l a t .e them to objects t-thich 1·1e describe in terms of ca tegories . 
Secondl y , t he exi stence and our knowl edge of othe r selVes 
co:unts aga inst any i dentif icat i on of t he object with se~se 
data . This argument ; it \~as discovered, did not a.f.fect 'Berke • 
l e y 's view because he not only made alloliance .for non- sen-
suous objects but accounted for our knowledge of other · :s elves. 
liard , on the other hand , does n(.'> t square his t heory of the 
''presentational continuwn't liith t he existence of other selves . 
The situation, . too, is more a .ute in \lard 's ca se because he 
hol ds to a metaphysica l plur alism.. If t he unity of experience 
.. 
demar"d s a n epistemolog i cal monism why does i t also not dernand 
49. \'lard , l\rt •. (1911), 555•556 ; \!Jard t NA ,. II, ~H;$·2 -~9 . 
50~ Uf. Chap . II, 69- 81. 
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a metaphysical rno1.1ism rath .Jr than t he pluralism vrhich l·lard 
51 
advocat.es . What is irumedi a tely given , 1 a r d mainta ins , 1s 
' 52 
all--rays a du.:qity \~tithin the unity of experience.. It is never 
a dualism of mi~d and l~tter. But if thi~ is the ca se.i t hen 
... -·:·' 
persons ,. as ob,ject,s eitber of a deity or of other person~ , 
l·JO.uld have to be experienced . \'lard ' s vielrt of duality i~ ex ... 
••; 
perience is vague . He could .only escape .from t he above_::,dif-
\ ... : <" ·: ' 
ri'culty by showing tha t experience involves a reference" :to 
.- -. 
objects \~hich poL11t beyond that i mmediate f a ct of· s ubjective 
,·-· .. 
e;)Cperie nce . 
· The t hird argument agai nst e pistemic monism ci:.Hlcerns ac-
tivit / . Ho\'t does Wa rd account for the a ctivity \'Thich ~o-_ience 
a nd. metaphys ics reveal to be immanent in t hings , if th~( . ob-
ject is merely a collection of sense qualities selecte~.from 
53 
a "presentational continuum''? 
So much for itlard ' s e pistemic fl onism. The que s tion no\.z is 
\~hether sensations a re or are not subject ive states . .gain 
the problem is diff icult in V ard t s ca se becauoe he seems t o 
entertain two hypotheses .rhich seem to he contradictory. 
l'i'ir st, objec ts a re i mmedi ately given to cons ciousness from 
54 
an ''ob jective continuum" but yet are not sychic states. 
51 .. cr. \"lard , RE~ Chap . I-I~I .. 
52 . iard , NA , II,. 112,. . _ . 
53 •. \Card is much more sus. eptible to t he conventional -a rgu-
me r;..ts against epistemic monism , cited in Uhap. I! 1 . 69- t:n , 
t ha_n Berkeley,. bec <::. use t·Jard believes ~hz,\t secsatimls are . 
. obje~Jts a nd not subjec-t ive sta t.es . 
54 . \la rd , N,:, , II, 288- 289; tvard, Art . (1911}, 555 -5 56 . 
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Even if vlard could solve this problem ,, he "t·muld still have 
dif'.ficulty squaring his t heory of' presenta tion with his gen-
era l doctrine of experience ~ One of 1'lard ' s epistemologi cal 
proJects ~ras to escape from t he dualis m of mind and mat t~er 
b y shol'ting t hat tthat we hav.a immediately g iven is a duality 
55 
within the unity of experience . While thi s 1 ay be true, · at. 
l east in some sense it is inconsistent with Ward ' s bel:lef 
th~~t sensations are not subjective s t ates but the objects 
themselves . Yet , as ~krd contends, i .f everything i s · eiD,br aced 
. . 
td.t hin t he unity of experience then on · a rdt s view t hey· 'must 
be ~ubjective modifications. In short , if' t hey are experi-. 
enced , they a r e subjective . The problem is n:)t solved ~y the 
term "duality in the unity of experience1' , for duality or no , 
we a re still dea ling \"li t h ex erie nee . And if' sensations are 
objects , and if objects are subjective , it is superfluous to 
produce argume nts to s hO't'lf ho\'lf t he subjective and objective 
factors collaborate to produce a unified experience ; to shovr,. 
in s hort , hol'l the object a,nd subject are organi cally related 
in a -v;ay as to a rgue for some type of i dealism. The argument 
i s vital only in attacking t he assumption t hat objects and 
subject are both e pistemologically and met a phys i c · lly inde-
pe·ndent entities . \'Jhile thi s assumption becomes t he ob jeet 
of tuard ' s attack. and l'lhile ~rard b ·~~ lieved t hat he wa s. refut-
ing the argume nt b y show·ing the mutua l depenc e 'l Ce o.f t he 




i i .. Ferr y criticizes 1:lard ' s me t r· odolo ·>· ica l i nter retation 
of science on the ground that since n~ture is re snonsive to 
s cientif ic · symbolism, t herefore scienc e must reveal t e n!iture 
57 
of the rea l. . lard grants t he point, in the sense t hat sci en• 
tific conce ts descr ibe the · t•tay t . i np.:s beha ve . But it does 
n t tell us tV"ha t n ture in itself' i s . It can reduce n ture 
to form.ul e only by excludin}: t l te discrete a nd intrac t a le, 
a nd value . 1'he fact t hat n · ture respon is to our fo rmulae 
sho~TS , ii ar d contends , t hat nature i s intelli gi ble nnd con-
for mable to human e nds -- t hat man and nature for m an or .,anic 
unit y . \1'ard loes not criticize e x . r: riN<~ntal s cienc ; but only 
philosophies of' sci·~" · ~ ·= \'fh i ch a t t empt to reduce ua litative 
relations to quantit ~· t ive ones . ' a r d , like He ;~el before h i r;, , 
contends thtt t uantit .at. ive ca tegories presuppose qualita tive 
ones , a td these in t urn pre s uppose a n experie nced " hole . ~ ith 
Hegel , \' ar d believes thr: t t he right st:' "' ting point of philos-
ophy i s t he concrete u nity of pe rsonality and a ny interpretation 
56 . Vard , NA , II, 289 . 
57. Perry, PPT , 76-8;:~ . 
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of man or n n.ture t'fhi ch severs th . t un ity is in~ dequate . 
iii . "Jard ' 3 criticism of Kant is not entirely satisfa c-
tory . Fhen D. G,. Ritchi e crit icizes \lard ' s theory of knol'7-
l e t ge on the gro !ll.1d tha t he i Jnores the· role of the co ·1ce t 
by deri \ri ng i t f'rom lo'\'ler for ms of e xperience , such ~s sen-
58 
sory d ta and percepts , \ rd replie s : 
To t his, I thi nk , t he best arswer is t at a urely 
conceptual experience is ' empty' ••• I have never t ken 
t his absolute d i sjuncti on of sense and thought a s valid: 
on t he contrary, t h i s too is part of the dua l ism I am 
se .... king to r~fute . 'rha t s uch dua lism of ' ·em iric ::~ l' and 
'ra tional' is no t absolut e i s ho m y th fact t " t t ' .e 
hunk1.n r a ce h:: s trCl nscend~d it, ann t he proce . s5~s now-adays , psyc ;·, ol o l~· ically , and in t he ma in, plai n . · 
Yet 'lr •. · Ritch i e is I believe justif ied i n h i s crit icism. !n 
St;ite of liard ' s st tement t o the contra ry, t he concept, t ard 
t rgues throuohout , i ·s a n idea lization wrought from experience 
but contributing no orJc,ani c f'unct ion t o the possibility o:f 
experi e nce . 3uch a vie'" loe ically follows f rom a doctrine of 
the "obje ctive continuum" , in which t he object is i mme di ately 
presented to the mind , more or less nready- maden . Yet to 
t ake t he unity of personality serious ly,. conceptual elements 
must be imrr~nent in the lo ror as 1ell as the hi g e r str at a o:f 
experience . It i s true, hot-lever, t hat t he conce ")t played an 
i portant role , in Wa r d ' s epistemolo~y, Hs a n i dealiza tion b : 
\thich \'1e uni.fy nature into an intelli ibl e order . Al s o t hi s 
5r . Ri tchie, Art . (190 ) , 265 . Ci t ed f'rom ·ar d , NA , I I , 290 . 
59. \ c rd , NA , I I , 290 . 
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i s t he case of 'lar d's re-inter pr e t rt t. ion of the synthet i c 
u:nity. But; a .,a in, we are deed ing ·lith t he higher, not the 
loti'er a s pects of expe r i e nce_. 
To t ake Kant 's doctrine ·literall y, t hen \'lard t s · criti-
cism of' tha t. t hinke r on t he ground t,ha t he a rbitra rily dis-
sected e xpet .. i enee into t wo disp<;:\r a t e ele r;e nts i s vt lid•' . But 
if one t ake s the spir i t of Kant ' s t heor y, namely; th"' t per --
cepts wi t hou t concept s a re !:>lind ,. tha t e very r efererjc·e -t o 
o'oject.s involve · conceptual fa~tors, t h.en t he 
cr i t i que is gr ea tly lessened . 
Yet when \la r d a r gues in a nother conne¢t ion t hA.t s en ... 
sa.t ions ,ave for m, duration, intensity a.s aga i ns t t he s~ n.,; 
s a t.iona l t heory of t he atomic • i na r t i cul ate s ensation i oo.' he 
not t acitly yie l ding: to Kant? Kant •s point, taken broa~ly, 
wa s. t ha t no s en-sa t ion c an be abstracted f rom conceptua.l ·_~l- .. 
ements . 
While Hard excludes t he a priori, s hol>ring t h --.. t t he s o-
called catego r i e s a re de'.'ela.p nent s of experi ence in our inte r-
a ct ion \'lith e nviron ;e nt , ca n such a t he ory :;:,c cot.mt f or ma t h-
e m, t ic.a l, logi cal and geometr ical principl~s ? lhile the syn-
t hetic a priori hft s been elimi nate d , with a:t least some · shmi' 
o:f reason, f rm11 all ot her r ea l ms , yet no phi losophy , to my 
knot'fledge, bas beer.. e.ff e ct!. ':e i _t reducing ma the ma t ica l a nd 
lOgical principl es to empi r ica l derivations . This ha s a nd 
1 " 
will continue to be t he stron~hold of r a tionalism, a nd par-
60 
ticularly of r a tionE· listic i de lism. 
ard , as pointed out in t he exposition , crit i cizes Kant 's 
e:xagE; "'ration of: t he intellectual over ag~ inst t he volitional 
:·.· 
and val uational aspects of experie nce . ut nev rthel .... ss 
Critic e _f. ~· udgment i n ' hich both eval uation an· voli.t.~on 
played i upor t ant roles . Even in his <;ritique 2£. Pure ::R~6ion , 
volition we: s granted an impor t ant tre ? l a ti ve" functiori·~ · 
· iv . In r e ducing rea liyy to a c·t i vity , what becomes: of' the 
.. 
. ·•-', 
cd.nt~nt of ex:peri(~ nce , parti cula r ly the sense dat .:o ? ·.' Ei'-<a c-
ti'Vity presuppos ·; s a pa ss ive f a tor in conscio sness , do 
sens e ualities , on ~~ rd ' s vi ew , assume t hi e role? In makin 
meta physical applications of hi s interpret tion o.f exp.rience 
t ard fail s to r el ate cle rly thes~ two e l e ments of ex erience . 
· T-hey must be recognized a s both essential to t he unita ry sel ... . 
60 . Cf . Ch np . III, 135• l4e. la.rd ' s t heor y of the 1 ob.1ect ive 
continuum" in ·rhich t he object io i r:Jmedi a tely _ i ven in 
experience , a nd in 'ttThich both subject a nd object a r e 
complementa ry , is ve y c l os e to Ue ti'ey ' s t heory of .·· .x-
per ience ·1 s mun in r·espons e to his environment . Cf . De · ey , 
EN, Cha p . i .:.:tnd II . . .. 




1. Empirical Idealism. 
Berkeley' s contribution to i dealism lies , .first , in his 
method, secondly,' in his refutation of rea lism • . He argu?d 
rightly tha t philosophy must begin "t·Tith the immedi ately ·ex-
p r::: rienced and that infe1:-enues must be based on tha t experi -
ence.. 'i'!hi.le Ber keley exploited his empi r ica l met hod to the 
fullest in :r"epudi· t in ... matter, when it came to his construc-
tive i dealism he only uarti ally succeeded . Berkeley ahotted 
conclus ively thn.t sense dat a do not inhere .in objects . Hi s 
refuta tion of realism has not been tre.nscended . If one is 
to hold to the e vistence of a physiec-l ·:Jbject· he ba s to main-
t ain t ha t either it has the sense qualities "!.•Thich \"le perceive 
or t hr:. t it has not . If it has all of the perceived qualities, 
t hen , Berkeley contends, the function t1hich the phys ic:?. l ob-
.iect i s supposed to serve is destroyed . The pur pose of' the 
phys ica l obje ct i s to unify the sense qualities into a "thi ngn , 
to serve a s a substr, tum. To attribute to the physica l ob-
ject the multiplicity of perceived qualities is to resta te 
the problem tiThich the physio.::: l object i s supposed to solve . 
On the other hand , i .f the physical object ha s none of t he 
qualities , t hen , .Berkeley ma i ntains , \1 e a r e dea ling with an 
unknot'ITilble . fi'rame an i dea of a qual i ty cor-responding t .o. r ed 1 
another corres t ondi ng to round , anoth,~r corresponding to sou,~re , 
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hich :.;. t t he .. -,arne t ·- ·e i s n i tl er red , n' .. r round , or s u •. r e . 
In short, a ba ndoning em"'~iricism , ~·;e advocate an " I kno"'t not 
·th-c-t " for our met aphysica l principl e " vre have experienced 
s ense qualities , 'lmt have· Ne ever experienced t hi s unkno 1a ble 
physica l ob j~ct? T Jhile we l '1 ve not ex erie need other. minds* 
,.,~ t least ha ve a definite, intelli ibl concept of o:t 1er 
minds for t he simple r e a son tha t we e xperi nee our o'l'rn con-
sciousness ,. 
Berkeley1 s a r gume nt s a re qui te r e.lev&nt to t y e s ··?f · :mod-
ern realiDm. •Jhile more sophistica t ed t han the realis.ti~ 
s:i~;tems of Berkeley ' s time the y have not · been abl , to -e s ca pe 
·;··, 
: '· f~i,:t, th~ lilernma whi ch Berkeley hel d to be a t the root ·o · 11 
r eal i s .1 . 
Thus G. E • .t•!oore a nd 3 . Alexa nder uphold t~'e view tha t 
1 
sense qualities inher e in objects . They attempt to circum-
vent t he dilemma proposed b y Berkeley ; by a theory of s el ection. 
The s ens e organ is supposed to select which quality ~o per-
cei ved . But such a t heory only r e s t n t e s one hor n of t ·he 
. . . 
dilem na . For the obj ct I see a s green a nd t he colo~~· blinded 
p _.rs on see s as r e d , on such an hypothe oi s , i s both green a nd 
red at the s a m'3 time a nd at -'-he s ame pJ.<:t ce, whic l i s something 
of' a contra rliction . 
Rus sell a nd Price uphold t he other hynothesis, n mely, 
1. r oore , "The ta t us of " .ns e Dat n i n Y..oor e , PS ; Alexander , 
STD , Bk. I II , Chaps. VII , VI II . 
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thc>,t t he physical object has none or the perce ived qualit ie s . 
· hey. are the effe·c t of the interaction o.f the phys i cal ob ... 
3 ject and sense organ , soma to-centric,- as Price <:nlls it . : 
But Berlc:eley' s argument still hol ds.. The · physic:;a. l object has -~' 
qualit,ies correspond i ng to sense qualities but not identified 
with them. But \t'hat c an be like a sensa tion and not b~: :_6. 
4 
cen,sation , Berkeley asks ? In short , we are appealing .t ;o i g ... 
~ 
norance, to a n unknot1able not only not e~perience.d but ... :-i:Pcom~ 
.. · .' .. 
prehensible. The task of philosophy i s to deal td~h ~ Ji~ · kno\m , 
notthe unknown . This is Berkeleyt-s empiricism. 
· F'ew philosophers have made a greater appeal{ t hou . .,h for 
. . 
t l e most part i gnored) tp cow11on sense than :Berkeley.· · V'hile 
realism · is s upposed to be t he philosophical cmmterp· .. rt of 
t he "plain man' s" view of the external uorld , by t he time it 
gets t hrough vri t the physical object it is not so plain as 
the "pl a in man° v:lould think. It has destroyed about e ve-r yth ing 
\"lhich the ttplain mantt would '!.<Jish to defend . When a mnn is 
hungry · realism ort·ers hi m ttreal" bread, not the bread "''hich 
he ·feels , smells and tastes . 
But Berkeley \1-tas not so success£'.11 l'Tith his posi·ti ve de .. 
fense of i dealism. First , he f a iled t .o sho~r the organic re• 
l a tion bet\veen mind and sensation . Bec ... use he defined mind 
as active and t he sensation as an inert, rigid being , t he · unity 
2. Price ; Pim , 60 , 145 , 273 ff . Russell, PP ~ 32, 46- 53~ 
':! Price, p ;::R , 145 .. ,. . 
4 .. G.f . Chap.., II . 
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of consci usness elu ed him . Reducing the physic·l o jeet 
to a congeries of sensations and contend:i,ng t l1at these are 
imr.aed iately experienced , erkeley lieved thJ t he had proved 
their mental nature and conse uently his idec l .;sm ,. nut if' 
the sense de.:: tum is inoeparabl e f'r J , t he act of sensin~ • tho 
i dealist mu .. t go furt .er . He must sho\'1 a more vit~l r ..... l .:: tion 
bettr1een t he t\'lo • otherwise t hey may slip a\·tay into nn inde-
pendent existence . ~ hile Berkeley doe:; speak of 'the m nd ' s 
activity , for t he most p rt he allo~ed th :· t uct.ivit Y to .re-
a in superflu U.a in t e .. ct o.f kn ledr:e. · The activity of 
m:tnd to~~·a limited to th:.:-: t of a n umpi· e , judging , manipul" ting 
ready• ma de i deas (s"-nsa tions } rather than eontributi.n ;;;orne-
t hing org- nic to t he very existence and intelli .. ibillty of 
sense data , 
: econdly, reduc ing the object to a collection o:f sensations , 
and a t t emptinP" to s quare this · t h his t heory of vision ·. nd 
t he fact of error , he w s compelled to t a ke ·~ccount of r tion-
a.listic , coherent , and · ctive f'eatures of e:x:p rience , }?ut a t 
the cost of consistr:mcy .. B~rkeley tri ed to appe 1 to " ·ommon 
sense" by shmrl.ng that an object is constituted by just those 
sense .ua lities 1· Ihich t .1e "pla in ma nn i denti f ies ttith t~in~s . 
He believed he transcended "common sense" only in contending 
that objectq are a part of the experie.nce of some mind·.- · But 
he .. forsook "common s ense" in other directions . In his 'theor v 
of vi ~ion he he ld that dist ~nce and magnitude a r e i nfere nces , 
not i mr:edi· tely P"i Ven da t a . To a ccount for err or he maint:.J ined 
t hat only coherent sense qualities yield truth . In so f r a s 
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t he objective r eference involves such inferences and . j udgments 
a s point beyond the i mmedi atel y sensed , Berkeley coul d no longer 
l clc n ·:; ify the ob j ect vlith t h e i mmed.ie-<.t ely sensed da t a • . ~ ith 
t hi s ':h.e e mpirica l base of his ide.:~Jism was weakened . 
2. ~3tionalist ic Idealism. ..: . 
- ·_ Phi losophy must begi n, as Berkeley r i ghtly corit.~nd¢a~ with 
·.· ,· 
concrete experience . 
e~pei·te nce · revea l? 
But the question is t l'!rhat do~1 s ·aot1erete 
.. : -~-
If by r at iona! i sm i s me<mt a n a tte:r pt to 
de{iuc~ t he universe fr m a system of ne cess ary pri nci · 1~s , t hen 
r at-ionalism i s opp0 s ~-d to empir icism. But :i.f one means·· by 
r a tionalism an at t empt to discover some presuppositions: o£ 
e Jq>erienee t hen it is not necess arily antagonist ic to e mpir..o 
icism. The problem is 't'lhether s uch principles ca n be ·found 
from a n a nfd ys is of' consciousness . 
It is concerning the question ot: wha.t constitutes t he ob-
jective reference whi ch distinguish·s the Kant i an f r om .t he 
tler kcle!a n approach to i dea lism. lt'or Kant , a re er ence_ to 
external objects pres uppose s a unified or d":-r \-lhich sense e x-
perience , by its very discre teness , cannot a ccount f or. This 
unified system is constituted b y universa l c-.nd necess r y prin-
ciples or concepts of un i tywhich Kant called categories . 
Hence t he mind , by me."lns -:; f t he s e immanent pri nciples , organ-
izes temporal a nd spatial refer ences into auantities , quc:~l--­
ita.tive experiences int o de..;rees , simultaneous and changing 
events into the concepts of substa nce , causalit y a nd inter-
a c t i on . Every possible experienee must cqnf or m to the se a 
priori functions of thou ~ht . \' hile Kant !.lnd mi:lny rea lists 
l 0 
ar:rre e on t he nece sG ity of ca t e ,gori.es f or a n intelli ,i le e x-
. . -
peri nee , ··_rhat distintr,uishes them is the fact t h<c t for I" nt 
t l··ey can be neither i nde pendent universals nor phy ic ' 1 en-
tit_··S. They a re dependent upor:: an <i.:,tive , unitary self .. 
consciousn ss . 
'or Ber keley, s ense dat a a re pas..., i ve, ready..-m de bei,.ngs . 
~·or Kant , t he y presup1 .. ose an intuition 'f an infini.~ e tem-
P ral a nd spati 1 rhole , to \'lhich , in order t o ~t ... n. in a u-
nified experience , one rel ates hi s p· tic ·lar sense i ripres-
sion.s . 
Berkeley' s i deal i sm is b a sed , in part , on sho~in~ t he 
mea nL p;l e ssness of a ny cate aory se Darated from conscio us 
experienc~ . Kant arrived at his i de - lism b y att emptinp; to 
demonstrate the me <l ninglessness of any expe r i e nce ap.::·rt f r om 
ca tegories of exp_rience . K· nt t~nscended Herkeley in em-
phas i zin ... t e unity of the s lf and the conceptual factors 
pre supposed in objec t ive reference , while lierkeley transcended 
K- nt in his refutation of the nthing- in- itsel n . 
Kar1t ' s si :..nif icant contr 'i.bution to i deal:tsm lies in shm·r-
ing tha t experience presupposes a ur.ita ry consciousness , nd 
th·,t objects have no meaning apr:1rt from their relat ion t o ~on-
sciousness in gener 1 . 
Ka nt ' s ar gument is valid re g r l c,.,s of t he va lidity of 
his particular c ,:tte r~ories . Kant \rras de ···li . \"lith t be pro lem 
of the uni versal a nd particular a nd showed not only t hat each 
i mplie t he otter , b ut t -. at a r <=> rt f'ron t he unity of' experion e , 
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they r e e ·; ningles s . 
Recent develop , e nts in t ;;.e m .. :.. them.~.t i ~ al, physica a n d lo r:-
icc 1 scL .. nce s have not occa sioned t he nctisintegration of t. e 
s ynthetic a p,iori" . · hough modern science may not depend 
upon ~ · · nt ' s po.r ticul·.tr ca t e gori s, it neverthel e ss depends 
upon catc gor i. .. s or hypotheses . The inc r eas ingl y i mportant 
role of hypotheses and symbols in contemporary sci ence sub .. 
stantia tes Kant's claim t ha t f a ct ~ nd concept are mutua-lly 
dependent. This applies t o t he ne~'l geometry ns ~!!e ll : as to 
recent scient i f ic theori s of causa lity. The principle of 
''indetermina ncy" do s not ; dvers e ly · ffect Ka nt ' s treat !_ •• nt 
of ca usality, for Kant \ras simply trying to d i s cover t e 
lecessa r y conditions for our r eference to the \•lorld as r 
system of . conneeted events , not a system of hi dden c auses. 
Reference to antecedents presupposes a synthesizin . , unitar y 
self an d the int ui t ion of a n infinite, i r r.ever..,ible • spatia .. 
temporal whol e to 'li h ich one can rel<. ... e events an d r e nder t he m 
coherent. 
i-.ttempts to r educe mathemat ics to either em i r ica l or 
a nalytical judgment s ha ve not been ent i r ely succes sf'ul. In 
t he one case t he self-evi dent . nai~ure of' the mathemat ica l i n -
fere nce i s i _nored \V'hile in t he ot her the temporal a nd spa-
tia l presu Dositions ( the synt he t ic na tur e of mat 1ematical 
i nferences) are overlooked . .ny i nference t·Thich cl i ms t o e 
universal ~ nd necessa ry a nd uhi h cl aims t .o be more t han a 
t utology yields a s ynth .. t ic a priori . judr;ment. 
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1 realis t lli'to ma L .t a i ns t he inde ende ,t r eality of' uni-
versals can do so only on t he a sumption t hat concepts · re 
• s tatic entities , r athe r t han constructions of t hougLt., But 
t he mi ni docs not conta in ready-m~de concepts . Th~ mind is 
, conceptualizing consciousness i nvolving the process~'s _. o.f 
juggm.nt , relation and di scriminat ion . 
··. 
3\ .: vard ' s Synthesis . 
hat as l asting v · l ue in 1a.rd t s synthesis is ~~t:/.:.~h 
much t he actual synthesis or J3erkeley and 1\ant \<thich ·:~'la'rd 
. .:, .. ' 
did co 1str<uct but his .further development of the empi~io 1 
. ... • > . . 
r• ethod. 1·;ar d ' s inadequa te t r e ::- t m· nt o.f - ant , pl us t le<ob-
S.Cl;lrities ·of his epis temo1ogica l monism e re .... tly reduced· t he 
value of his uork a s a reconstruct ion of empiric 1 · nd r a -
tionalistic idealism. 
'l'he strength of ~lard ' s idealism lies in hi s convincing 
defen e of t he empirical method . Is it bett er to egin tith 
a n abstract ion from exnerie ce or l'rith t ;'e u~: ity o£ experie nce 
its l f? Can we mova from ocientif ic time to experi enced time ; 
f rom s cientific s pace to the s pace of' ex erience ; f'rom nee-
a s s ry c~usation t o conscious ne s s? Or do the diff iculties 
i nvolved in such concept s f'ind t! eir solution only in t he 
concrete exper ience of t he unita ry consc ·' ousness? In short, 
can consciousness better be expla ined in terms of independent-
l y re 1 categories or can t hese ca tegories better be expla ined 
i n ter s of cons ci ous experience? 
Hlilo both Berke ley and Ward employed t he empirica l 
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method , lard transcended - erkeley in shm-ting ho 1 the ob-
jective and sub ject ive fac t ors of experience contribute to 
the organic uni ty of consciousness . To treat e i ther inde-
pendently i s to conlinit the f a lla cy of " r e-if ication". ~/hat ­
ever else ob j ects mi ght be t hey are a n aspect of someone ' s 
experience. But like Ber keley , lard ' s argume nt i .s weakened 
by i dentifyi ng the obje ct \'li th sense- data , vthich , in the case 
of Ua rd , re sel e ct .from an "objective continuwn" . !(ant :; in 
this respect , transce nded both tard and Berkeley. 
Wha t can be concluded conce.rni ng the nature of experience 
a 1d its bea r ing upon i dealism? 
1., Experi ence i s a unified , active , purpose.ful \-vhole. i n 
\'rhioh senss da t a and :for mal factors are mutua lly dependent . 
2 . Categorie s such as time and space have meanir! , only 
i n rel ation to consciousness . 
3 , The objective reference of experi e nce is not to a 
mere sens da tum but t o an object transcendinp~ the i mmedi ately 
senc.ed . Th .... refore , an idea l ism \-vhich reduces the object to 
a c ollection of s e11se qualities i s i nvalid . \Jhile r e .ference 
to objects involves categories, thi s does not necessarily 
mean t ha t objects are cross s e ctions of universal s or t hat 
t he mind c r e a tes ob j-ets . It does mean that knmm ob j ects , 
whatever e l se t hey may he, be:3 r an e s s ent i a l relations} i p to 
our minds , and th t a ll ob j ects are the experi ence of some 
mind . 
4. I.f one defines rationalism as an attempt to deduce 
experi ence, then r at iona l i sm and empi r icism are in conflict. 
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But i f' r ationalism involves si.;:, ' lY a particul a r theory 
concerning the importa nt role of the concept i n ex erience 
cmd existence , thHn i ts truth depends upon i tiS a.d", . uacy to 
t he facts. Kant ' s emphasi s upon the unity of the sel £ "' S a 
condi t ion of k:nov1l edge, t he concept as: a condition for a n 
i ntell i gible sens~:. exper-i e nce and a r e f erence t o external 
·, . 
objects , strengt hens , not •·reakens , the empi r ica l pri nciple 
. ; '•. 
of .s eeking com'!)rehensive whole s . His r tiona. l ism wa s are- · 
act i on a ga i ns t t hose rat ionalists -~ parti cul.s.r l y J..,eibniz a nd 
\IJ'olff , who a ttempted to deduce t he "tororld from self ... eviden t 
pr inciples. 
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EXPER IEnCE Arl~ IDE LIS 
AS TREli TED BY BERKEI,EY,. KANT AND J A.JES : 'ARD 
ABSTR CT 
Idea lism is t he theory t hat real ity is experience. By ex-
perience i s meant t he whole of consciousness. I n t he hi tory 
of modern idealism t wo differ ent aspects of experience have 
been emphas ized in the interpreta tion of idealism: t he empirical 
and t he r a tion lis tie. The purpose ot this dis sertation is to 
examine; compare and evaluate t hese t wo i nt er preta tions. 
The empirica l ideal i t constructs his philosophy on i m-
medi te experience nd valid. infer ences :from such experience. 
Berkeley, as a r epr esent a tive of the empirica l method, argued 
t hat o~e is i mmedi tely acqua inted only with sense qualit ies 
and t he activities of hi s cons ciousness. Since t he phys ica l 
object is neither immedia tely given to consciousness nor valid-
ly interred from the f acta of i mmedi a te experience, it is non-
existent. Berkeley holds t h t such c t egories as time, sub-
s t ance, space, motion are intelligible only in relation to con-
sciousness. Experience is not in an independent time , subs t ance, 
apace or motion . These are cons tituents of experience. To be 
is to be experienced. 
any criticisms of Berkeley rest on misconceptions. First, 
he was not a subjectivist. Sensations are not ere ted by minds. 
God ' s ideas are t he ir archetypes which are communic. t ed by God's 
will. The problem f or Berkeley w s whether sensations ( obj.ects) 
can exi s t in~ependently of all mind. He conclude t hat t heir 
source mus t be tra.oed to t he divine mind. The objective r eferen ce 
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of consciousness is t hus accounted for. 
Secondly., Berkeley's t heory of archetypes and hi s theory 
ot spirits and t ber notions released. hi m from s ome of the dif-
ficulties ot epistemic moni sm. 
Thirdly., to oh r e Berkele y ith expla1tin our 11e ocentric 
p.redicament " is unjuatif1o.bly to regard :Ber celey 's conclusion 
as an "initi 1 predieation.n 
Fourthly., at no time as B.erkel y a nominalist. He simp ... 
l y insis ted tha t universals, t . have meani ng , must be rel ted 
to particulars . 
Berkeley' s ref utation of realism has never been trans cen -
ed• A reo.lis t mus t ar · e t ha t either t he phys ical object has 
the sense q . 11 ties we perceive or it has not. I t it has these . 
quallties , then, Berkel ey rightly ar gues, its f unction has been 
destroyed. For matter was to serve as unity or a subs tra tum 
of sense qualities. To attribute to it t he multiplicity of per-
ce ived. qualities i s t o res t a te t he problem , hich the hypothes is 
ot matter i s suppos es to solve. Yet , it m tter lacks these qua.l-
i ties , t hen , Ber keley m i n t · i ns , we are deal in~. wit an unknow-
able. It i s i nconceivable for a t hing to corre~pond t o red a~d 
not be red. od r n re lis ts, vith their . ore sophi st ica t ed t heo-
ries of t he phys ical object, have been unable to esc pe f'rom t his 
dilemma . Alexander and fr ore, :ith their "3elective hypothesis", 
t ake t he f or mer horn o.t t he dilemma. , :fhile Russell and. Price, 
ith t heir "gener a tive hypothes i s" , t ake the latter . 
:But Berkeley as not s o successf ul with his positive defense 
of idea lism. Firs t, he f a iled to show the organic rela tion be-
t een mind and sensation. Because he defined mind. as a ctive and 
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the sensation as n inert , ri.,.,.1d bei11 ; the unity o:f' oon.- cious -
neas el ied him. Reduein the phy'sicc.l object to a congeries of 
sens· tions n.d. contending that these are immedia t ely experienced , 
Berkeley believed t hat he h!ld .proved their mental na ture and con• 
se uently his idea lism. But if the sense d tum is i nsepar ble 
from the act of sensing, the 1deal1 t us t go further . He must 
show a more vita l rela tion .between t he two, other 1se t hey may 
slip m• y int<;> . n independent exis t ence . hile Berkeley does 
spea~- of the mind's activity , for t he most Part he allo·ted that 
activity to remain superfluous in the aot of' knowledge. The a c ... 
tivity of' mind was limited to that ot an umpire , judging, man-
n1pulat1ng ready-made ideas (sensations) r a ther than cont r i b• 
uting something organic to th(7 very exis tenee and 1ntelli0 i b ili-
t y Of' sense data . 
Secondly , re 'eing t he object to a col lection of se sa-
tiona, and a ttempti.ng to s ua.re this ith his theory of vi3ion 
and t he fact of error, Berkeley as co pelled to take account 
of r tio11alis tio, coherent and activ~ features of experience , 
but at t he cost of cons istency • . Berkeley t r iei to ppeal to 
"common sense' by showin , that an object is Just t hose sense 
qualities which t he 11Pl ain man" identifies wit things . He 
believed he tro.ns cen ed "coQlmon sensen only in contending th·t 
objects are a part of' t he experience o some mind . But he 
forsoo l'" "co mon sense" i n other directions . In his t heory of 
vis ion he held t hatdistanceand mae,.rnitude are inferences, -not 
i mmediately given ~ ta . To a ccount for error he maint ained t hat 
only coherent en, e q . lities yield trt th . In so f ar as. the 
objective r efer ence i nvolves such inferences and jud ents as 
po i nt beyond t he i ,me · 1 t e.l y s ensed, Berke l ey coul d no lo_ er 
i dent ify the ob j ec t ith the i t! edi te l y sensed dat • · ith t h i s 
t he empirica l b e of hi s ide lism w - we<\lcene • 
It i s concerni ng just t h i s q 11 es tion of what cons titutes t e 
objective r eference which d i s tinguishes the .r..antian :from t he 
Berkeleian appro ch to idea lism . For Kant , a refe~nce to ex~ 
t ernal o'bj ecto presupposes a unified order hich sense experien ce , 
by ita very discreteness , cannot account f or . Thi s unified sys -
tem i s constituted by univer .al and necessary principl es or can-
oe ts of unity which Kant .eal l od categories . Hence t he mind, 
by me ns of t hese i mmanent principles , organizes tempora l an 
spat i a l references i nto q .. ntities , qual itative experiences i n -
to degrees, s i multane ous and chang i ng event s i nto t e concepts 
of s ubst n ee , caus lity nd i ntera ction . Every pos . ible ex -
perience U3t confcr m to t he..,.e priori func tions of t hou,.ght. 
t'lhile Kant and many realis t ~~ ee on t 1e ne cessity of oa t -
eBories for an i nt elli ,.,.ible experienc.e , hat distin..,.u i shea them 
i s t ha t f or Kant t hey can be nei h r i ndepen ent universals nor 
phys ica l entities . They are dependent u.pon an active , unitary 
self-consciousness. 
For Berkeley , sense dat a r e pass ive , re dy•made beings . 
For Kant t hey pres u. pose a.n i nt u ition of an infinite temporal 
and. s pati 1 ole , to ~hioh , i n order to a ttain a unified ex-
perienoe , one rcla. tes his p .. rticul r sens e i mpress ion3 . 
Berkeley ' s i dealism i s b sed, i n pe.rt,. on sho i ng the mean-
inglesaness of any oate ~ory separated. from conscious experience . 
Kant rrived a t hi s ide lism by ttempting to demonstrate t he 
mea.ni n les snes s of any experience apart from oa te aries of 
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ex:per i encc • nt t r anscended Berkeley i n em~haa izing the Wlity· 
of' -the ael:f' ani the conceptual factors .:presupposed in objeo~tive 
r eference . I n this rea:pect . nt's ar gument is valid r egard-
less of the val i ity of hi s particular categories , Be.r lteley 
trn.ns cended. <a11t i n hi s :refu:ta tion of t he rJthing ... i n-1 t self' . " 
'Recent developments in t he ma thematical . physical and 
logical sci ences have not occasioned. the "d1s1ntegr tion of 
the synthetio a priori. u Though moder n s cience ma y not depend 
upon KAnt's part icul ar categories _, it 11evert heleas d.epend.s up-
on cate o:t-1es or hypotheses . The i noreasingly imPClrtnnt role 
of hypotheses a.nJ. symbols in contemporary scier1ce substa.ntio.tes 
Kant 'a cla i m t.tu: t fact and. aon~e.Pt are mutually t1eponde11t.. Thi s 
·' . 
appl ie ·~ to the new geometry as .,ell as to recent scientific theo· 
ries o:r causality. The npr inciple o-:f indetermina.neyn does not 
_I 
a. versely atf'eot Kant' s treatment of cau.aa.li ti., for Kant ' as 
s 1mply try i ng to discover t h neoessnry c-ondition:~ for our ref-
erence to t he ;vorld as a system of connected e"'j~ents • not a a -
tem of hidden oausea. Re:ferenee to antecoients presupp osES a syn-
t hesizing , unitary salt and the i ntuition of an infinite , ir-
r .eversible spatio-temporal r ~hole to • hich one can r ela te events 
ani render t hem coherent. 
Attempts to reduce mathematics to ·either emp iric1.1 or ana-
lytical judgments have :not b·een entirely succebsful.- I n t he one 
case t he s elf-evident nature of the mat hema tica l inference is 
ignored hile in t he other case the temporal and spatial presup-
positions (the synt het ic nature of mathematical in:t'erenoes) are 
overlo.oked. Any i nference which cla ims to be u.niversa.l ani\. neo-
' 
essar y and vhich cla i ms to be more than a tautology y1eld.s a 
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aynt.etic a priori judgme~t. 
A real is t -1ho mainta ins the independent rea lity of un i-
versa ls oan do so only on the assumption that concepts are 
static entities , r a t her t l1 cons tructions .of thought . But 
t he min does not oont .a i n ready• made concepts .. The mi nd is a 
oonoeptualizin~, cons ciousness i nvolving the processes of j d -
ment, re le.tion an dis crimina t i on . 
'lh ile 'lard ' s idea lism is presen ted e.s synt hesis of J3er l~e-
ley and Kant • 1 ts a ctual va l\le l ies not so much i n t _ e aynt 1es i s 
hich ·ta r d did cons truct .. hut i n t he :further development of the 
emp irica l method. ~Jard. ' s i na.:ie uate tre ~ t ,nt of Kant , plus t he 
obscurities of his epiatemi o menism • $2'eatly : reduced t 1.e value 
o:f' his \vork as a reconstruction of empirical and rationalist i c 
i dea lism . 
The. strength of "ard ' s idealism lies i n hi s convincing 
defense of t he empirical method" Is it bette;r:o to begi n ith an 
ab. traction f rom experience or wit h t e unity of expe:t-1ence it-
self? Can we move from scientifie ti e to experi enced ti e; 
:trom scientif ic space to t he s pa.ee of experience; from nect:1saary 
causation to consc iour.; ness? Or do t he dif . icult i es i nvolved i n 
auoh concepts fin t eir s ol · tion only in the concrete · exper~­
ence of t he unitar y eonsciou:;mess? In short , co.n cQnseiousnesa 
be. better expl a ined i n terms of i dependently real c· tegories. 
o:r can t .. ese categories be better explained i n ter ·s of con-
sciousness? 'lhile both Ber lte ley a.nd. Ward employed t he empiri-
cal method . War d transcended Ber ke ley i n sho ing ho t he ob-
jective and subje ·· tive f a ctors of experience contribute to the 
organic unity of consciousness. To trea t either i ndependently 
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is to co.rnmit the "falla cy of r eifioation•" Whatever else obeots 
may be , they a.r e aspects of someon 1 experience. !1ut 11 e De.r a-
ley ' s interpret tion , ~ ar~'s argument i s 1ea'ened by identif ying 
the object ith s nse dat , .hioh-. on v ard 's vie. , onc:t selects 
from an Tubjeotive continuum . '' Kartt, i n this reopeot • transcend-
ed both ·· nl"d. and Ber el ey. 
'hat c n be conolud d. concernin the nntllli'e of experience 
and its bearing upon 1doal1sm? 
1 . Exper ienee i~ unified, active , purposeN.+. . hole in 
which sense d. t a .and f OX"mnl f a ctors a.r "' m~:tual'ly d.e enue;nt •. 
2 . Cate ories such as tiine hi "':Paco have meaning onl y in 
relat i on to consciousness . 
3 . The obJ active r eferbce of experience is not· to a mere 
. A 
a ense atum but to nn object transcending t he i mme i ately sensed. 
Therefore, an idea.lis hioh reduces the object to n collection 
of sense qualities is invalict. rlhile reference to objects in-
volves ca tegories , t his does not necessarily mean that obj cts 
are cross sections of universals or that the mind orea t s ob-
jects.. It does mean that knom obje 0ts , 1·hateTer e lse they may 
be , bear an es3entia l relationship to our inds. and that all 
object are the experience o£ some ind. 
4 . If one defines r tionalis .as n attempt to deduce- ex .. 
perience, then ati.ona11sm and e .p,tr1o1s · re in irreconcilable 
conflict. But if r a tionalis i nvolves simply a partie 1~ theory 
conQerning the i mport.,.nt role of t he concept 1n experience nd. ex-
istence •· then i t .s truth depends u on its ade quacy to the facts .• 
Kant's emphas is upon the unity o-£ the el:t as a oo:rr..d. i.tion of 
knO ledge, the concept as a ·condition tor .an intelligible se se 
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e~perience and a reference t o externAl objects, strengthens , 
not veaJ:ens • the empirical Pt-incdple ot seeking com Jrehe .1 ... ive 
wholes . liis ra.tior.tS.l i sm ¥vo.a a reaetiori ag · nst thoae r a tion ... 
aliots , particularly J.~eibniz end Wolt:r • '.'Tho a ttempted. to deduce 
the o;rld f'rom self- eviden t ;px-incipJ.es . 
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